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ABSTRACT 
This study proposes that modernity is constitutively based upon a 
synchronic temporality which perpetuates the present of the ego. Within this 
matrix, history is subject to the processes of subjectivization and the `otherness' 
of the past disappears. Postmodernism, it is argued, designates the attempt to 
disinter a properly historical thinking, or historicity, from the recursive 
temporality of the modern. This attempt is predicated upon the retroactive 
temporality of the future perfect which, whilst also a synchrony, arises from a 
productive tension between the past, the present and the future. The self-divisive 
time of the future perfect expedites the discomfiture of the ego and its 
concomitant subjectivization of the past and, by so doing, registers the historicity 
of that past. The relation between the modern and the postmodern forms of 
temporality is expressed by the Lacanian distinction between the imaginary and 
symbolic orders. It is argued, moreover, that this distinction is manifest in the 
narrative forms of the contemporary novel. Whilst the modern form of the 
contemporary novel replicates the structures of an egocentric repletion of 
synchrony, the postmodern novel displaces this imaginary problematic to the 
symbolic. By employing a variety of techniques founded upon retroactivity, 
postmodern novels are thereby shown to foster a disclosure of the structure of 
historicity. Within this rubric five novels are given extended consideration: 
William Gibson's Neuromancer, Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho, Thomas 
Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49, Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five and John 
Banville's Doctor Copernicus. 
iii 
Introduction - Time Out of Mind: 
Modernity, Postmodernity 
and the Future Perfect' 
1: At One Time 
Why is it that only the modem could have produced the postmodern? 
More specifically, what were the conditions of possibility which fostered the 
production of such a concept and how are these conditions inscribed within it? In 
order to answer this question, we must start backwards, as it were, by defining 
exactly what it is that the modem produced, that is, by defining the postmodem. 
This, of course, is a task of unusually daunting proportions, not only because of 
the sheer volume of material devoted to the subject, but also because it is the 
inconstancy of the `postmodern' (in whatever form, `-ity', `-ist', or `-ism') which 
is generally held up as its primary characteristic. Hans Bertens, for example, 
finds that it `is several things at once' and that, furthermore, `the term [has been] 
deeply problematical almost right from the start'. Equally, David Harvey 
damns the term as `a mine-field of conflicting notions'3, while Terry Eagleton 
declares that it `is such a portmanteau phenomenon that anything you assert of 
IA condensed version of this chapter was initially presented as a paper to `Lacan and 
Postmodernity: A "Che VuoiT' One Day Conference', University of Stirling, 28 November 1998. 
I am grateful for the comments made by all the participants, particularly Vance Adair, Malcolm 
Bowie, John Drakakis and Maggie Nolan. 
2 Hans Bertens, The Idea of the Postmodern: A History (London and New York: Routledge, 
1995), p. 3. 
one piece of it is almost bound to be untrue of another' 4 Openly declaring his 
agitation with the problem, Alex Callinicos opines the slipperiness of leading 
definitions of the postmodern, definitions which he condemns as `mutually 
inconsistent, internally contradictory and/or hopelessly vague'. 5 Adding to this 
list of unhappy epithets, Walter Truett Anderson bemoans the fact that it is `a 
puzzling, uppity term'. 6 Perhaps with such assertions in mind, Linda Hutcheon 
notes that `[flew words are more used and abused', but then adds as a caveat that 
`this is an appropriate condition for... a phenomenon whose mode is resolutely 
contradictory'. 7 Suitably wary of the pitfalls of this mode, Fredric Jameson 
tentatively ventures the claim that `[i]t is safest to grasp the concept of the 
postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has 
forgotten how to think historically in the first place'. ' With a surety of nerve that 
Jameson must envy, Thomas Docherty admits only of a secret knowledge when 
he observes that `it is a term which has often been used with a great deal of 
imprecision'. 9 For Edmund Smyth, however, `[i]t is evident that no consensus 
exists regarding either the parameters of postmodernism or the precise meaning 
of the term'. 1° In the light of such bewilderment, it falls to Brian McHale, finally, 
to propose that while `[n]o doubt there is no such "thing" as postmodernism', it 
3 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. viii. 
4 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. viii. 
s Alex Callinicos, Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge and Oxford: Polity 
Press and Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 2. 
6 Walter Truett Anderson, ed., The Fontana Postmodernism Reader (London: Fontana, 1996), p. 3. 
7 Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 1. 
8 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 
1991), p. ix (my italics). 
9 Thomas Docherty, ed., Postmodernism: A Reader (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1993), p. xiii. 
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does, at least, `exist discursively in the discourses we produce about it and using 
it'. " 
What, then, is the source of all this confusion? We might begin to trace it 
back to a series of subtle and interrelated conflations between subject and object. 
At the level of definition itself, Patricia Waugh advances a useful gambit when 
she argues that `Postmodernism tends to be used in three broad senses: as a term 
to designate the cultural epoch through which we are living and largely viewed in 
apocalyptic terms; as an aesthetic practice which is seen variously as co-extensive 
with the commodified surfaces of this culture or as a disruption of its assumptions 
from within through a "micropolitics" or "politics of desire"; and as a 
development in thought which represents a thorough-going critique of the 
assumptions of Enlightenment or the discourses of modernity and their 
foundation in notions of universal reason'. 12 Whilst most commentators accept 
one or all of these definitions, there remains a certain difficulty in disentangling 
each from the other. For example, how is it possible to distinguish 
postmodernism as an `aesthetic practice' from postmodernism as a `cultural 
epoch', or postmodernism as a `politics of desire' from postmodernism as a 
critique of `universal reason'? Faced with the impossible task of decoagulation, 
Waugh's solution to this problematic is to comprehend postmodernism as a 
structure of feeling which privileges the aesthetic. 
lo Edmund Smyth, ed., Postmodernism and Contemporary Fiction (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 
1991), p. 9. 
" Brian McHale, Constructing Postmodernism (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 1. 
12 Patricia Waugh, ed., Postmodernism: A Reader (London: Edward Arnold, 1992), p. 3. 
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It is the incontinence of this aesthetic and its concomitant theorization that 
leads Steven Connor to remark that `[i]ncreasingly disciplinary areas have sought 
to define their own postmodernist regimes in relation to those prevailing 
elsewhere, rather than by reference to their own histories'. 13 These transgeneric 
definitions inevitably take the form of distilling a common theoretical essence 
from the different disciplines, with the result that we now suffer from what 
Connor terms a `bulging overcoherence of the concept of the postmodern'. 14 In 
turn, the labours of theory come to exert their own conflationary pressures. 
Specifically, we may note, again with Connor, that an increasing theoretical self- 
consciousness has led to the disclosure of theory's situatedness within that which 
it seeks to explicate, such that `we are forced to use modes of understanding that 
derive from the periods and concepts that we might wish to stand clear of . 15 
Experience and our knowledge of it thus come to forge an indissoluble intimacy 
which, for Waugh, condemns much of postmodernism to "`bootstrapping" self- 
contradictions where it discovers itself forever implicated in that which it seeks to 
proclaim as inauthentic and exhausted'. 16 
13 Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary, 2°d 
edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997,1989), p. viii. 
Ia Ibid., p. ix. 
15 Ibid., p. 5. 
16 Postmodernism: A Reader, p. 4. At the level of fiction, this tendency is indexed by the growing 
number of narratives to feature not only their own theorizations, but also their own theorists. 
Thus, for example, Toby Litt's excellent short story `When I Met Michel Foucault' lists the 
eponymous theorist amongst its characters and quotes from his works. Toby Litt, `When I Met 
Michel Foucault in Adventures in Capitalism (London: Minerva, 1997,1996), pp. 189-228. In an 
even more self-conscious theorization, Alain De Botton finds room to mention everyone from 
Roland Barthes to Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Essays in Love: A Novel to the point where it is 
surprising that the book does not contain an index of proper names. Alain De Bolton, Essays in 
Love: A Novel (London: Picador, 1994,1993). Finally, Patricia Duncker's Hallucinating 
Foucault not only depicts Foucault as one of its characters, but also points to its own 
4 
In this respect, perhaps the most disturbing of all the circularities produced by the 
conflationary whirl of the postmodern is that of history itself. The 
autoreferentiality involved here is at least twofold. Firstly, as Jameson insists, 
there is a sense in which whatever position we adopt towards an historical object, 
especially the postmodern, it will `not [be] an empirically justifiable or 
philosophically arguable one, since it is itself the inaugural narrative act that 
grounds the perception and interpretation of the events to be narrated'. 17 
Secondly, and following on from this, these `narrative acts', or processes of 
emplotment, are necessarily of their time and will find that contemporaneity 
inscribed within their structures and effects. The problem with this, of course, is 
that if we are so thoroughly nailed to the "now", and thereby compelled to deploy 
contemporary conceptualizations, how can we tear ourselves free of the present 
and render, even approximately, the stories and experiences of the past? It is a 
problem coeval, we might say, with the very fact of representation itself. This is 
a point noted by Bill Readings when he argues that, 
Writing and reading cannot be understood as merely contingent or 
secondary in their effects upon the History to which they happen. On 
the contrary, they structure History in ways that upset the 
understanding of it as a procession of moments independent of acts of 
inscription. 18 
contemporary theoretical matrix when noting, for example, that `[m]y memories of those first 
days in Paris are like a sequence of postmodern photographs'. Patricia Duncker, Hallucinating 
Foucault (London: Picador, 1997,1996), p. 53. 
'7 Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. xiii. 
18 Bill Readings, IntroducingLyotard: Art and Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 
1991), p. 58. 
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At one extreme, then history is nothing but the record of its own inscription, a 
record that, of course, then succumbs to its own inscription, and so on in a 
vertiginous thrall to the present. Summing up (and in many ways advancing) this 
subjectivist logic, Barry Hindness and Paul Hirst argue that `[h]istory's object, 
the hitherto existing, does not exist except in the modality of its current existence, 
as representations'. 19 This is an argument that has achieved widespread currency 
over the past two decades and it is one that is symptomatic of the problematic at 
issue here. 20 For without the other of the past we have nothing against which to 
define the now. We are thus besieged by a "nowness" for which we can prescribe 
no limits. Indeed, for Jameson, it is `as though our utter forgetfulness of the past 
exhausted itself in the vacant but mesmerised contemplation of a schizophrenic 
present that is incomparable virtually by definition'. 21 In the light of this we may 
initially venture that the definitional confusions of postmodernism index an 
inability to render the other. 
There is, of course, something of this confusion in the word `history' 
itself, as it denotes both what has happened and the record of that happening. 
Tracing the history of the term itself, we may note that in German, for example, 
19 Barry Hindness and Paul Hirst, Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 309. 
20 Perhaps the most notorious examples of this are Jean Baudrillard's three articles written about 
the Gulf War: `The Gulf War Will Not Happen', `The Gulf War: Is It Really Taking Place', and 
`The Gulf War Did Not Take Place' collected in The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. By Paul 
Patton (Bloomingdale and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995,1991). If Baudrillard's 
titles are somewhat more hyperbolical than the texts they head, they have still occasioned a 
vitriolic response. Christopher Norris is typical when he intones, `How far wrong can a thinker go 
and still lay claim to serious attention? ' Christopher Norris, Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, 
Intellectuals and the Gulf War (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1992), p. 11. 
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Geschicte was used to designate an incident, while Historie designated is report, 
but, from the late 18th century onwards, the former term came to displace the 
latter qua the designation for both, as Reinhart Koselleck notes: 
The peculiar meaning of history, such that it is at the same 
time knowledge of itself, can be understood as a general formulation 
of an anthropologically given arc linking an d relating historical 
experience with knowledge of such experience. [... ] the concept 
"history pure and simple" laid the foundation for a historical 
philosophy within which the transcendental meaning of history as 
space of consciousness became contaminated with history as space of 
action. 22 
Such `contamination' is concomitant with what Raymond Williams argues is `the 
sense of history as human self-development which is evident from [the early 18th 
century] in Vico and in the new kinds of Universal histories'. 23 Indeed, within 
this `anthropologically given arc', history becomes less a putatively disinterested 
account of the past, than a project of concatenation which yokes together the past, 
present and future in a seamless flow leading to some form of enlightenment 24 
Whether from the point of view of the `moment' of enlightenment or that of the 
present itself, then, history so conceived becomes a variety of hysteron proteron, 
21 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. xii. 
22 Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. by Keith Tribe 
(Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1985,1979), p. 92. Also on this conflation, see Michel 
De Certeau's point that `[h]istoriography (that is "history" and "writing") bears within its name 
the paradox - almost an oxymoron - of a relationship established between two antinomic terms, 
between the real and discourse. ' Michel De Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. by Tom 
Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988,1975), p. xxvii. 
23 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 2"d edn. (London: 
Fontana, 1983,1976), p. 146. 
24 Referring to our earlier example, Williams notes that `[i]n German there is a verbal distinction 
which makes this clearer: Historie refers mainly to the past, while Geschicte (and the associated 
Geschictsphilosphie) can refer to a process including past, present and future'. Ibid., p. 147. 
ceaselessly maladapting the other to itself and finding only that which it is able to 
impute in the first place. 
What is disclosed by all these ever broadening categories of conflation is 
the privileging of synchrony over diachrony, even where, as with history, the 
object of analysis is seemingly diachrony itself. There is, in other words, a 
specific temporality underwriting the assimilation of experience to its 
theorization, and ultimately, object to subject. This temporality may be 
designated as a relation of tautology, for what it denotes is the coincidence of 
time with itself. Such a tautological temporality, however, is a historical 
phenomenon, as Koselleck proposes: 
From the second half of the eighteenth century on... [t]ime 
is no longer simply the medium in which all histories take place; it 
gains a historical quality. Consequently, history no longer occurs in, 
but through, time. Time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its 
own right. 25 
Paradoxically, then, at the point of time's historicization time ceases to be 
historical. For, in becoming less the medium of history and more a historical 
medium, time is subject to the split of self-reflexivity. Thus, in rounding upon 
itself, as it were, time privileges synchrony over diachrony, the loop of history 
over its linear counterpart. This substantial mutation in one of the paradigmatic 
Hence, for example, the phrase etwas geschichtlich betrachten, meaning `to consider something 
from the historical point of view'. 
25 Futures Past, p. 246. 
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co-ordinates of existence finds its registration in the very term `modernity', for 
what is articulated in that term is precisely a temporal self-reflexivity. 
This self-reflexivity manifests itself first of all in the fact that modernity 
announces its own moment of epochal succession as just that, a moment of 
succession. In attributing to itself this difference from previous epochs, it also 
foregrounds the very notion of epochal self-consciousness by becoming the age 
which renders such distinctions for the first time. Which is to say that, following 
Peter Osborne's excellent study The Politics of Time, we may attribute to 
modernity the distinctive characteristic of being the only epoch whose major 
experiential quality is a temporal self-reflexivity: 
For there is something decidedly new about modernity as a 
category of historical periodization: namely, that unlike other forms 
of epochal periodization (mythic, Christian or dynastic, for example), 
it is defined solely in terms of temporal determinants, and temporal 
determinants of a very specific kind. As Adorno put it: `Modernity is 
a qualitative, not a chronological, category. '26 
There are two points to be noted about the `temporal determinants' here. The 
first is that modernity does not designate itself as a mere succession in a linear 
chronology to the epoch that preceded it, but rather as a qualitative transcendence 
of all epochs. It is a break from the past, rather than a mutation in its lineage. As 
Leo Bersani comments, `[w]e are modern because our modernity makes absolute 
the notion of discontinuity implicit in all discourses on modernity, reformulates 
9 
discontinuity as a loss of aptitude for continuities'. 27 This qualitative self- 
consciousness is, secondly, registered in terms of a temporal abstraction, i. e., 
`modernity', der Moderne, les temps modernes, and Neuzeit. These designations 
all refer, as the last example literally suggests, to 'new time', a temporality that 
differentiates itself in a consciousness of temporality that differentiates itself. In 
contrast, as Koselleck proposes, `[t]he vast majority of epochal doctrines do 
not... draw on temporal determinants, but rather assume their specificity as given 
epochs on the basis of substantial, material, or personal determinants'. 
28 
The temporal paradoxes of such self-classification are clear enough. They 
are summed up, to recall Jacques Lacan, by `the double aporia of a true survival 
that is abolished by knowledge of itself, and by a discourse in which it is death 
that sustains existence'. 29 For if the defining characteristic of modernity is its 
temporal novelty, then, in order to perpetuate itself as an epoch, it must renew 
and keep renewing its `newness'. By so doing, however, novelty is subject to a 
repetition that renders it old and therefore no longer new. Furthermore, within 
the ambit of the repetition of newness, the old merely persists as yesterday's 
26 Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity andAvant-Garde (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 8- 
9. 
27 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p. 47. 
28 Futures Past, p. 234. Koselleck also notes of Neuzeit that `[t]he expression itself refers only to 
time, characterising it as new, without, however, providing any indication of the historical content 
of this time or even its nature as a period'. Ibid., p. 233. 
29 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London and New York: Routledge, 
1997,1977), p. 300. If Lacan is primarily talking about `how I as subject comes on the scene' 
here, its relevance still persists because, as Margreta De Grazia notes in her analysis of Michel 
Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge, `consciousness... and continuous periods are bound 
together'. Margreta De Grazia, `Soliloquies and Wages in the Age of Emergent Consciousness', 
in Textual Practice, 9: 1, (1995), 67-92, (p. 72). Obversely, then, it is not surprising that Lacan's 
critique of the cogito should be bound up with the temporal problematics of modernity. 
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newness, and therefore the `oldness' of previous epochs, against which modernity 
measures its newness, disappears. In such a situation modernity can no longer 
index its qualitative transcendence of all other epochs. It is little wonder, then, 
that in the midst of such a paradox, Theodor Adorno is boldly able to pronounce 
that '[t]he modern has really become unmodern' 30 Again, returning to historical 
semantics, we may note that something of this temporal sleight-of-hand, in which 
modernity attempts to efface its own conditions of (im)possibility, is expressed 
by Raymond Williams when he observes that, sometime `between, say, 1890 and 
1940... "modem" shifts its reference from "now" to "just now" or even "then", 
and for some time has been a designation always going into the past with which 
"contemporary" may be contrasted for its presentness'. 31 Modernity, on this 
reading, is perpetually ill at ease with itself, signifying a self-consciousness of a 
synchronicity that is non-synchronous, which is, in other words, diachronic. It is 
analogous, we might say, to that crepuscular reflexiveness that dimly glimmers in 
the gap between the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation, 
which, once recognized, announces a rupture so grievous that it can never be 
breached. Indeed, Henri Meschonnic argues that this analogy `may well be what 
best accounts for what the term modern or modernity does'. 32 Which is to say 
that, like the subject of the enunciation, `[t]he term has no referent. No fixed, 
30 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott 
(London: Verso, 1996,1951), p. 218. 
31 Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists, ed. by Tony 
Pinkney (London: Verso, 1996,1989), p. 32. Compare this with the distinction offered by The 
Collins English Dictionary: `Contemporary is most acceptable when used to mean of the same 
period.... The word is, however, often used to mean modern or up-to-date.... The second use 
should be avoided where ambiguity is likely to arise.... ' Patrick Hanks, ed., The Collins English 
Dictionary, 2"d edn. (Glasgow: Collins, 1986,1979). 
11 
objective referent. It has only a subject, of which it is full. It is the signifiant 
[signifying] of a subject. '33 In other words, by tearing itself free from the 
tradition of history and ascribing to the temporality of the new, modernity is 
doomed to itself: it can never be anything but the temporal transcendence which it 
already is. In this, it is of a piece with the history it underwrites, forever 
repeating itself, as we have already noted, in the mirror of inscription at the 
expense of the obliteration of its object. 34 
Turning now to Lacanian psychoanalysis, we can, perhaps, find a name 
and an exposition for this problematic in the mode of the imaginary. The 
imaginary is one order (with the symbolic and the real) of the tripartite schema 
which forms the centrepiece of Lacan's psychoanalytic theories. It refers, at one 
level, to the gestatory process of the ego, but also, more ambitiously, it denotes a 
type of relationship between the subject and its world, as Malcolm Bowie 
comments: 
The Imaginary is the order of mirror-images, identifications 
and reciprocities. It is the dimension of experience in which the 
individual seeks not simply to placate the Other but to dissolve his 
otherness by becoming his counterpart. By way of the Imaginary, the 
original identificatory procedures which brought the ego into being 
are repeated and reinforced by the individual in his relationship with 
the external world of people and things. 35 
"Henri Meschonnic, `Modernity, Modernity', in New Literary History, 23: 2, (1992), 401-430, 
(p. 419). 
3 Ibid., p. 419. 
34 Indeed, Koselleck proposes that `the experience of modernity is opened up only with the 
discovery of a history in itself, which is at once its own subject and object'. Futures Past, pp. 92- 
93. 
35 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991), p. 92. 
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The `original identificatory procedures' which give birth to the ego are based on 
the infant's lack of physical volition which Lacan identifies as being the result of 
the `specific prematurity of birth in man'. 36 This prematuration manifests itself in 
the infant's inability to co-ordinate its movements, an inability that is only 
overcome by identifying with the rather more felicitous Gestalt of its own image 
in a mirror (of whatever kind). Faced with this apparently more capable 
collocation of its limbs, the infant finds that `in relation to the still very profound 
lack of co-ordination of his own motility, it represents an ideal unity, a salutary 
imago'. 37 This sober picture of itself therefore anticipates the child's future 
development and affords it a pleasing sense of coherency, or, in other words, an 
ego. Whilst seeming a stabilizing fiction, this process of identification actually 
inheres within the seat of the subject as a desperately capricious force, constantly 
undermining the rectitude it seeks to impart with a kind of invertebral fitfulness. 
This is because, formed from an identification that precedes itself, the ego is thus 
constitutionally sundered, forever trying to reconcile the other to its same. 
In its wider application, then, the imaginary designates a restless seeking 
after self, a process of amalgamating more and more instances of replication and 
resemblance in order to bolster up the fable of its unity. As such, the imaginary 
denotes a condition in which, as Terry Eagleton notes, `what "self' we have 
36 Ecrits, p. 4. 
37 Ibid., p. 19. 
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seems to pass into objects, and objects into it, in a ceaseless closed exchange'. 38 
The boundaries between the inner and outer world are thus devoid of saliency, 
each object seamlessly accruing within the aggregation of the subject in a kind of 
projective empire of the self. Under such conditions, time becomes the servant of 
space, for, as Bowie laments, `the "I" is tirelessly intent upon freezing a 
subjective process that cannot be frozen, introducing stagnation into the mobile 
field of human desire'. 39 Just as with the abstractive cynosure of the "new", the 
operations of the ego repress duration by recasting everything within the formal 
rubric of what Lacan terms `the statue in which man projects himself40 The 
mirror stage qua genealogy thus becomes the mirror stage qua cosmology, a 
place of self rather than a passage of rites. 41 In this sense, then, the imaginary 
specifies a narcissistic relation with the world, an intrasubjective, as opposed to 
an intersubjective, condition, and it is thus of a piece with modernity, which, to 
recall Meschonnic, `has only a subject, of which it is full 
Indeed, the imaginary is, in one sense, a thoroughly historicized concept. 
We owe this insight particularly to the work of Teresa Brennan who argues that 
with it `Lacan is describing a specific era in history - that of the ego But the era 
he is describing is one that curtails historical thinking'. 43 This, of course, finds 
38 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 164. 
39 scan, p. 25. 
40 Ecrits, p. 2. 
41 This is what John Muller and William Richardson describe as the 'square of identification' in 
which `things are treated narcissistically as reflections of the ego'. John P. Muller and William J. 
Richardson, Lacan and Language: A Reader's Guide to Ecrits' (New York; International 
Universities Press, 1982), p. 34. 
42 'Modernity Modernity', p. 419. 43 Teresa Brennan, History A fier Lacan (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 28. 
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echoes in what we have already identified as the problematic of modernity, the 
splendid isolation of which abnegates the possibility of a historical referent and 
forces it into a kind of subjective irredentism. What is interesting is that various 
aspects of this imaginary problematic form the point of departure for many 
analyses not just of the modern, but of the postmodern too. Ihab Hassan, for 
example, identifies `immanence' as one of the two major tendencies of 
postmodernism, by which he means `to designate the capacity of the mind to 
generalize itself in symbols, intervene more and more into nature, act upon itself 
through its own abstractions and so become, increasingly, im-mediately, its own 
environment' 44 `Consciousness, ' he maintains, `becomes all. '45 With a rather 
less sanguine view of this state of affairs, Christopher Lasch argues that we are 
currently doomed to a `culture of narcissism' in which an older, entrepreneurial 
individualism has given way in its dotage to one in which the individual is 
`[a]cquisitive in the sense that his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate 
goods and provisions against the future, in the manner of the acquisitive 
individualist of nineteenth-century political economy, but demands immediate 
gratification and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire' 46 This 
empty bolstering of the self is, in turn, expedited by what he terms the `mirror 
effect' which, in a familiar formulation, `makes the subject an object; at the same 
44 Ihab Hassan, `Desire and Dissent in the Postmodern Age', in Kenyon Review, 5, (1983), 1-18, 
(p. 10). The other major tendency is `indeterminacy' which, although he does not say so, persists 
as a necessary corollary of immanence. 
45 Ihab Hassan, `The New Gnosticism: Speculations on an Aspect of the Postmodern Mind', in 
boundary 2,1: 3, (1973), 547-569, (p. 548). 
46 Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing 
Expectations (London: Abacus, 1979), p. xvi. 
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time, it makes the world of objects an extension or projection of the self . 47 What 
these examples seem to suggest, in their delineation of an imaginary rubric in the 
postmodem that is fully of a piece with the imaginary rubric of the modem, is 
that the latter persists, in some manner, within the former. There remains, in 
other words, and, indeed, as the term suggests, an element of modernity at work 
within postmodernity. This element, it may be proposed, is manifest in various 
formations of the mode of the imaginary. 
In order to pursue this notion further, we may turn to another equally 
influential diagnosis of the postmodem - Guy Debord's The Society of the 
Spectacle. In Debord's analysis, the term `spectacle', although never credited as 
such, operates as a synonym of the imaginary. Thus, for example, we find that 
the constitutive bifurcation of the ego is mirrored in the form of the spectacle: 
Like modem society itself, the spectacle is at once united 
and divided. In both, unity is grounded in a split. As it emerges in 
the spectacle, however, this contradiction is itself contradicted by 
virtue of a reversal of its meaning: division is presented as unity, and 
unity as division. 48 
Furthermore, we find that in the ever more desperate attempts to stabilize and 
elide this contradictory structure, `[t]he self-movement of the spectacle consists in 
this: it arrogates to itself everything that in human activity exists in a fluid state so 
47 Christopher Lasch, The Minimal Self (London: Picador, 1984), p. 30. 
48 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone 
Books, 194,1967), p. 36. 
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as to possess it in a congealed form' 49 The imaginary museum of form, in other 
words, stores diachrony and displays it as synchrony, that is, as the coagulated 
temporality of the ego. The value of Debord's analysis, however, proceeds not 
just from the delineation of an imaginary polis but also in the elaboration of its 
conditions of possibility. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the opening 
sentence of The Society of the Spectacle and its reprise of Marx's gambit in 
Capital: `The whole life of those societies in which modem conditions of 
production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles'. -"O 
Marx's introductory statement, it will be recalled, claims that `[t]he wealth of 
societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an 
"immense collection of commodities"'. 51 Indeed, it is the logic of the commodity 
form and its penetration throughout all spheres of the Lebenswelt that perhaps 
accounts for the increasing prevalence of an imaginary rubric, for, like the latter, 
the commodity restlessly seeks to replicate itself at the level of form, divesting its 
contraries of all particular content until they too are matched in the dynamics of 
exchange. It is an analogy that Marx himself makes when noting that `the 
physical body of commodity B becomes a mirror for the value of commodity A': 
In a certain sense, a man is in the same situation as a 
commodity. As he neither enters into the world in possession of a 
mirror, nor as a Fichtean philosopher who can say "I am r', a man 
first sees and recognizes himself as a man through his relation to 
another man, Paul, in whom he recognizes his likeness. With this, 
49 Ibid., p. 26. 
50 Ibid., p. 12. 
51 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes 
(London: Penguin/New Left review, 1990,1976), p. 125. 
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however, Paul also becomes from head to toe, in his physical form as 
Paul, the form of appearance of the species man for Peter. 52 
In the light of this, we may venture that, in the weakest formulation, there exists a 
striking correspondence between the currently prevailing formations and effects 
of the commodity and the imaginary which betokens more than a chance 
resemblance between the two. In the strongest formulation of this 
correspondence, it can be argued that the dominance of the logic of the imaginary 
is the psychic realization of the ego's colonization by the formalizing rubric of 
the commodity. At the very least we may say, then, that their respective histories 
are bound to each other at every stage. 53 
Following on from this, it may be proposed that, at one level, the 
modernity we commonly identify as persisting in postmodernity is the experience 
of capitalism itself, an experience that, in the tradition of Raymond Williams, we 
may term an imaginary `structure of feeling'. 54 If, therefore, as Osborne 
maintains, `modernity may be understood as a general term for the experience of 
capitalism', and if, as Jameson proposes, postmodernism represents `a purer and 
more homogenous expression of classical capitalism, from which many of the 
52 Ibid, p. 144. Compare this to Lacan's comments on `the statement, "I'm a man", which at most 
can mean no more than, "I'm like he whom I recognize to be a man, and so recognize myself as 
being such"". tcrits, p. 23. 
53 Indeed, Lacan claims that we are beset by the antidialectical mentality of a culture which, in 
order to be dominated by objectifying ends, tends to reduce all subjective activity to the being of 
the ego'. Ecrits, p. 23. 
54'[S]tructures of feeling can be defined as social experiences in solution, as distinct from other 
social semantic formations which have been precipitated and are more evidently and more 
immediately available. ' Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), pp. 133-134. 
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hitherto surviving enclaves of socio-economic difference have been effaced (by 
way of their colonization and absorption by the commodity form)', then it is not 
surprising that the order of the imaginary (as well as its theoretical elaboration) 
should have assumed the provenance it has over so many registers of 
experience 55 Indeed, neatly summarizing this point for us, Harvey argues that 
`[w]herever capitalism goes, its illusory apparatus, its fetishisms, and its system 
56 of mirrors come not far behind' 
In the light of this we can return to the problematic of modernity and the 
temporality of the new. For, with the effacement of all residual forms of 
difference, the new can no longer be countenanced as new, that is as a qualitative 
contrast. Rather, it is transformed into quantity because, as Jameson laments, 
ss The Politics of Time, p. 194 and Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
405 respectively. ý6 
The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 344. In a now classic exposition, Harvey contends that 
postmodernity is characterized by a new round of time-space compression that is fuelled by a 
crisis in capitalist accumulation. Its resemblance to modernity is thus one of matrix, for the latter 
was also a reaction to such a crisis; its difference, however, proceeds from its intensity. What is 
particularly interesting about Harvey's analysis is how he delineates the effects of capital's flows 
in terms of the imaginary dialectic of homogeneity and heterogeneity. Thus, for example, he notes 
`that the more unified the space, the more important the qualities of the fragmentations become 
for social identity and action. ' Ibid., p. 271. It is a point elaborated by Eric Hobsbawm, when he 
proposes that `[a]s the transnational economy established its grip over the world, it undermined a 
major, and since 1945, virtually universal, institution: the territorial nation-state'. Eric 
Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century - 1914-1991 (London: Michael 
Joseph, 1994), p. 424. Hobsbawm identifies three major reactions to this spatial homogenization. 
The first is the resistance of existing nations to the attenuation of their identity in the erection of 
both cultural and economic barriers. The second reaction is manifest as a kind of regionalism in 
what Hobsbawm suggestively terms `the collective egoism of wealth' whereby rich areas, either 
supra- or intra-national, like the European Union and Lombard League, attempt to fence 
themselves off from poor areas. Ibid., p. 427. Thirdly, Hobsbawm points to the rise in identity 
politics wherein individuals declare allegiance to imaginary communities predicated on a single 
characteristic. All three of these reactions are emblematized in, and named by, the concept of 
`Balkanization'. What is important to recognize here is the interrelatedness of the drives towards 
universalism and particularism, for, as Harvey argues, `[t]hey should be regarded... as two 
currents of sensibility that flow [... ] along side by side, often within the same person, even when 
one or the other sensibility be[comes] dominant in a particular place and time'. The Condition of 
Postmodernity, p. 275. 
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`[n]ow everything is new... the very category of the new... loses its meaning and 
becomes itself something of a modernist survival'. 57 The corollary of this, of 
course, is that the old too loses its meaning, and with it the past as well, as we 
have seen. Postmodernity, on this reading, then, represents the logical terminus 
of modernity; it is, as Jameson contends, `more modern than modernism itself 58 
Indeed, it is precisely this interminable cycle to which the postmodern pays its 
grim and tautologous testament. For, at its simplest, to succeed modernity, as the 
`post' of `postmodernity' would suggest, is merely to repeat modernity as a 
qualitative transcendence. This is because to be modern is to be new, original or 
different, and, therefore, for modernity to continue, as the `modernity' of 
`postmodernity' suggests, even at the level of sublation, means that it must repeat 
itself and preserve its self-reflexivity self-reflexively. Postmodernity, in such an 
account, would then be, as Osborne avers, a return of modernity: 
[I]f the primary, root sense of `modernity', prior to its 
theoretical elaboration or the attribution to it of any particular 
historical content, is `the quality or character of being modem'; and if 
the modern, in its primary sense, is simply that `pertaining to the 
present and recent times', or originating in the current age or period', 
then, paradoxically, `postmodernity' must be the name for a new 
modernity. 59 
`Postmodernity', therefore, signals an identity with, and a difference from, 
`modernity': it is new but also the same, or, as Meschonnic memorably writes, it 
37 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 311. 
5" Ibid., p. 310. 
59 The Politics of Time, p. 4. 
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is `[a] word on a leash'. 60 Its identity lies in its acknowledged debt to 
modernity's self-reflexive break with tradition, its self-proclamation as distinctive 
from what preceded it historically. Its difference is, ironically, precisely its 
disavowal of modernity as a new epoch, its disclosure of an antiquity in the new, 
which postmodernity then, self-reflexively, re-assigns to itself. 
In this sense, postmodernity signals, at one time, both the birth pangs and 
the funeral rites of the novel and the new. It is, as Connor acknowledges in a 
discussion of Charles Jencks, `a very tricky paradox' to negotiate: 
In order to be genuinely "new" (and not "old" like Late 
Modernism), postmodernism must eschew modernism's commitment 
to the new, restoring or sustaining connections with the past. In order 
to be truly new, then, postmodernism must be old. And yet, as Jencks 
insists, it cannot be confused with a straight revivalism, either. 
Postmodernism is defined, therefore, in that difficult space between 
the old new and the new old. 61 
Postmodernity, in other words, designates a point of tension in the modem, that 
friction occasioned by the project of novelty and its perpetuation as the same. 
For, in submitting to the imperative to make it new, that is qualitatively different, 
modernity transmogrifies the new into an invariant, that is, a quantity - the 
always-already new, `[e]ndlessly beginning again', as Meschonnic comments. 2 
Postmodernity earns its dialectical spurs precisely at the point where it 
acknowledges quality as quantity, the always-already new as old, and diachrony 
60 'Modernity Modernity', p. 421. 61 Postmodernist Culture, p. 85. 
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as synchrony. In tandem with Osborne, then, we may accept that `if current uses 
of "postmodern" and its cognates paradoxically remain within the framework of 
"modernity", they do more than just repeat its existing forms' 63 What they do 
instead is foreground the tautological rubric of modernity and elaborate it 
precisely as a problematic. This necessitates shifting from the order of the 
imaginary to the order of the symbolic, and it is with this transition in mind that 
we must turn now to the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard. 
2: What Does Postmodernism Want? 
Postmodernism begins in intemperance. Wilfully scorning the solace of 
good forms, it is seemingly calculated to exceed, conjuring up an immoderation 
that knows no trim. With it, as we have seen in attempts to define it, all sober 
measurements are cast aside in favour of excess - the superfluity of concept over 
case and the surplus of idea over imagination. This represents, of course, the 
action of the sublime and, glorying in its superabundance whilst less mindful of 
its power to impoverish, Jean-Francois Lyotard has been foremost amongst those 
keen to advance it as a defining characteristic of postmodernism. He is, however, 
careful to distinguish between the authentic sublimity of postmodernism and its 
ersatz modernist counterpart: 
62 `Modernity Modernity', p. 401. 
63 The Politics of Time, p. 4. 
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[M]odern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a 
nostalgic one. It allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as 
the missing contents; but the form, because of its recognizable 
consistency, continues to offer the reader or viewer matter for solace 
and pleasure. Yet these sentiments do not constitute the real sublime 
sentiment, which is in an intrinsic combination of pleasure and pain: 
the pleasure that reason should exceed all presentation, the gain that 
imagination or sensibility should not be equal to the concept. 
Postmodernism, then, is characterized by the `proper' sublimity in whose stead 
modernism can only offer a tawdry nostalgia for the `real' thing. If nostalgia can 
please you with its beauty, it is a pastel pleasure that appears all the poorer for it 
in comparison with the exquisite pains of the authentic sublime, where the 
success of reason is indexed by the baleful failure of the imagination. 
Lyotard's point of reference for this conception of the sublime is, of 
course, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement. 65 He cites approvingly Kant's 
own example of the commandment 'Thou shalt not make graven images' as a 
kind of archetypal postmodern injunction. 66 This is instructive, in the double 
64 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoffrey 
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984,1979), p. 81. 
65 It is worth pointing out that Lyotard's use of the Kantian sublime has not gone unchallenged. 
Chief among his critics is Christopher Norris, who argues that `this version of the Kantian sublime 
is one that thoroughly mystifies issues of social and ethico-political judgement by treating them, 
in effect, as modalities of aesthetic understanding'. Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, 
Intellectuals and the Gulf War, p. 94. Whilst admitting that Lyotard's is `a particular reading of 
the Kantian sublime', Patricia Waugh, however, is perhaps more sensitive to the Lyotardian idiom 
when she notes that `he prefers to revert to a notion of the value of the aesthetic as a form of non- 
utilitarian autonomy, a mode which is resistant to any form of conceptualisation and is therefore 
unpresentable'. Patricia Waugh, Practising Postmodernism/ReadingModernism (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1993,1992), p. 30. Lyotard is, on this reading, attempting to negotiate what Terry 
Eagleton argues is `the contradictory nature of an aesthetic which on the one hand offers a fruitful 
ideological model of the human subject for bourgeois society, and on the other hand holds out a 
vision of human capacities by which that society can be measured and found gravely wanting'. 
Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 118. 
66 Ibid., p. 78. 
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sense, insofar as it admits of the conception of the Absolute at the same time that 
it denies its presentation, apart from in the form of a negation. However, such a 
negative theology is of interest not for what it enjoins us to do or not do, but 
precisely in what it does not instruct us to do at all. This void of, and prohibition 
on, instruction opens up the space of the desire of the Other, the terrible anxiety 
of the question `What does the Other want? ', or, as Lacanian psychoanalysis 
phrases it, The vuoi? '. If the most compelling response to such inscrutability is 
the construction of a fantasy scenario which might serve as an answer to fill out 
the void of the question, even that is forbidden here, as Slavoj Zizek points out: 
[I]s not the Jewish god the purest embodiment of this `Che 
vuoi? ', of the desire of the Other in its terrifying abyss, with the 
formal prohibition to `make an image of God' - to fill out the gap of 
the Other's desire with a positive fantasy-scenario? Even when, as in 
the case of Abraham, this God pronounces a concrete demand 
(ordering Abraham to slaughter his own son), it remains quite open 
what he really wants with it: to say that with this horrible act 
Abraham must attest to his infinite trust and devotion to God is 
already an inadmissible simplification. The basic position of a Jewish 
believer is, then, that of Job: not so much lamentation as 
incomprehension, perplexity, even horror at what the Other (god 
wants with the series of calamities that are being inflicted upon him. 6 
For Zizek, the enigma or sublimity of God only acquires meaning in its 
differential relation with what we may profitably term the beautiful death of 
Christ. `[T]his fantasy scenario, ' he argues, is `the final proof that God-Father 
loves us with an all-embracing infinite love, thereby delivering us from the 
anxiety of `Che vuoi? '. '68 In Lyotardian terms, Christ is the `good form' that 
67 Slavoj tiiek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), p. 115. 
62 Ibid., p. 116. 
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domesticates the `formlessness' of God. 69 What we may take from this 
juxtaposition of texts is a reformulation of Lyotard's point of departure for his 
discussion of the sublime, i. e., `Answering the Question: What is 
Postmodernism? '. For, on his own terms, Lyotard can only answer with another 
question: `What Does Postmodernism Want? '. 
What is of interest in this reformulation is how it enables us to understand 
the postmodern condition as one that is analogous to a relation of transference. 
For what is at stake in our hailing or interpellation by the sublime is a supposition 
of knowledge; that is, an imputation of knowledge to the sublimity of the Other. 
In order to illustrate this we may stay with the archetypal example of the 
sublimity of God and concur with Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen when he observes that 
[t]o believe that there is a subject of knowledge is to believe 
in god, but it is also a "mistake" that psychoanalysis permits, if not to 
be thwarted (it is, Lacan says, "essential"), at least to be recognized. 
The psychoanalyst, precisely because his patients ordinarily invest 
him with such omniscience, knows very well for his part that no 
subject contains this knowledge... unless it is the improbable 
"subject" of the unconscious, who (dis)appears in the "mistake of the 
subject supposed to know" - in the patient's transference, in other 
words, and, more generally, in all the symptoms, slips of the tongue, 
lapses, and bungled actions that inscribe themselves in such 
transference to the analyst (or the teacher). 70 
As with the detective who is able to conjure order from chaos, the solution from 
the mystery, just by hi/her very presence, so `[a]s soon as the subject who is 
69 Indeed, for Waugh this differential relation informs much of Lyotard's critique in `Answering 
the Question: What is Postmodernism? ', as `not only is there an overt identification of authentic 
Postmodernism with an aesthetic of the sublime, there is... a similar but covert identification of 
political conformism, realism in literature, the conventional in art, the aesthetic in Habermas, with 
Kant's concept of the beautiful'. Practising Postmodernism/ReadingModernism, p. 31. 
70 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Master, trans. by Douglas Brick (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 5. 
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supposed to know exists somewhere... there is transference'. 7' Notwithstanding 
the fact that, as Lacan states, the psychoanalyst `does not present himself as a 
god, he is not God for his patient, his structural position within the relation of 
transference operates to that effect insofar as he is the guarantor of meaning. 72 In 
other words, the imputation of knowledge to the Other functions as the sine qua 
non of meaning production. As Zizek comments, `[t]his knowledge is of course 
an illusion, but it is a necessary one: in the end only through this supposition of 
knowledge, can some real knowledge be produced'. 73 
For Lacan, the `pivotal point' of this fiduciary bond is what he terms `the 
desire of the psycho-analyst'. 74 This desire is, again, an attribution of desire to 
the analyst on the part of the analysand; it is the analysand's answer to the 
enigmatic Che vuoi? of the analyst in his/her capacity as the placeholder of the 
Other, as Zizek argues: 
The enigma that pertains to the very status of the subject of 
desire is the famous "Che vuoi? " - what does the Other want of me, 
what does he see in me that causes his desire, which is that X, the 
object-treasure which makes me an object of the Other's desire? The 
only way to get out of this impasse is to offer myself to the Other as 
the object of his desire: as Lacan puts it, in love, the subject "gives 
what he does not possess, " objet petit a, the hidden treasure which is 
what is "in him more than himself. " In this way, I simultaneously 
"return my love" to the Other, i. e., I determine my desire as the desire 
for the Other: I make him into the object of my desire in order to be 
able to avoid the abyss of his desire. This, of course, is precisely 
71 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. By Jacques-Alain 
Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1994,1977,1973), p. 232. 
72 Ibid., p. 230. 
" The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 185. 74 The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 231. 
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what the psychoanalyst by definition must not do: his is to maintain 
open the abyss of "Che vuoi? " at any price, he must never return the 
(transferential) love to the analysand. 75 
In other words, transference depends upon the analyst maintaining the enigma of 
Che vuoi?: the analysand will keep `answering' with fantasy-scenarios until, 
hopefully, as Dylan Evans suggests, `the subject's fundamental fantasy 
emerges'. 76 Having patiently reconstructed the analysand's fundamental fantasy, 
however, there is yet a further, crucial stage to complete before the end of the 
psychoanalytic process, and that is what Lacan terms "traversing the fantasy". 77 
This entails a recognition of the function of fantasy as concealing the abyssal 
contingency of the symbolic order. The symbolic order, simply defined, is as 
Bowie points out, `the realm of language, the unconscious and an otherness that 
remains other'. 78 The agency of the symbolic is, then, the signifier and it is in 
this regard that we may note that whilst an imaginary relation designates binarism 
and fixity, a symbolic relation is differential and fluid. Unlike the former 
relation, then, all relations in the symbolic are mediated by a third, that is, by the 
impersonal Other. `[T]he Other is, ' as Lacan tirelessly restates, `the locus of that 
memory that [Freud] discovered and called the unconscious'; it is, therefore, why 
75 Slavoj Liiek, Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992), p. 191. 
76 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 39. 
" Lacan talks, for example, of `a subject who has traversed the radical phantasy'. The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 273. 
78 Lacan, P. 92. This `otherness that remains other' Lacan designates as the `Other' in order to 
distinguish it from the 'other' of the imaginary which is, as we have seen, constantly subsumed in 
the self. 
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`all history is by definition symbolic'. 79 Hence, as Lacan argues, what analysts 
`teach the subject to recognize as his unconscious is his history - that is to say, 
we help him to perfect the present historicization of the facts that have already 
determined a certain number of the historical "turning points" in his existence'. 80 
Such a process involves, as we are seeing, an unmasking of the veil of fantasy. It 
is a point supported by Zizek when he comments that, 
[f]antasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space 
of a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void. [... ] As 
such, fantasy is not to be interpreted, only `traversed'; all we have to 
do is experience how there is nothing `behind' it, and how fantasy 
masks precisely this nothing. 81 
`This nothing' is the constitutive lack in the symbolic, the excess of the real that 
persists as a structural effect of the signifying chain. It is a necessary 
insufficiency because without it representation would be completely coextensive 
with what is represented, thereby abnegating the function of mediation as such 
and the subject in particular. If, then, the Che vuoi? of the analysand indexes the 
abyss of the analyst's desire qua the absence in the symbolic, the analysand's 
production of fantasies can be understood as attempts to paper over this hole. As 
such, fantasy may be designated an imaginary construct insofar as, for Malcolm 
Bowie, `[w]ithin the conditions of "absolute non-reciprocity" that govern 
subjectivity, ... phantasy creates 
for us a dream of identity, symmetry and 
79 Ecrits, p. 215, and, Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan - Book VII 
1959-1960, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 13 
respectively. 
Ecrits, p. 52. 
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reversibility'. 92 We might say, in this context, therefore, that fantasy represents 
the operation of the beautiful, whereas traversing the fantasy is, rather, a modality 
of the sublime; for what the latter designates is the renunciation of any attempt to 
fill the lack in the Other, or cover up the constitutive void in the symbolic. The 
unswerving perpetuation of the Che vuoi? by the analyst thus not only works to 
compel the creation of ever more desperate fantasy-scenarios as a response to it, 
but ultimately serves to dispel their imaginary hold over the analysand at all. 
What is striking here, is that by attending to the mechanism of 
transference as it has been delineated so far, we can begin to understand it as an 
expository analogy of the mechanism at work in Lyotard's sublime postmodernist 
work of art. Specifically, we are able to comprehend the latter as implicitly 
acknowledging the contingency of the symbolic order by virtue of its 
displacement of the rules of conventional form: 
A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a 
philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in 
principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged 
according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar 
categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are 
what the work of art is looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are 
working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will 
have been done. 83 
81 The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 126. 
82 Lacan, p. 178. 
83 The Postmodern Condition, p. 81. 
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Within this context we may say, therefore, that postmodern artists are working in 
the abyss of the Che vuoi?, although without resorting to the imaginary 
machinations of filling in that void, but, instead, accepting it as a condition of 
possibility for, as Lyotard asserts, `new presentations, not in order to enjoy them 
but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable'. 84 What is intriguing 
about the postmodern project as Lyotard describes it, however, is its temporal 
character, which is that of the future perfect - the `what will have been done'. 
We can, perhaps, begin to see the relevance of this retroaction by referring 
again to the process of transference, for which the future perfect provides the 
underlying dynamic. Nowhere is this more readily discernible than in Lacan's 
first graph of desire. 85 
Graph r 
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Here the vector of the signifying chain (S-S') is twice intersected by the vector of 
subjective intention in such a way that the second intersection is at a point 
preceding the first one. This retroactive traversal of the signifying chain is 
essentially the action of capitonnage or quilting. It is, as Lacan notes, `a 
retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was 
before and announces himself - he will have been - only in the future perfect 
tense'. 86 Which is to say that the slippage of signification is provisionally halted, 
or, `buttoned down', only when it is intersected by a master signifier, or intention, 
that confers meaning upon what preceded it. For example, `freedom' signifies 
different things according to the master signifier, or point de capiton, which 
retroactively coheres its field of meaning. If the point de capiton is `Marxism', 
then the `freedom' of the free market is an illusory one which masks constitutive 
inequalities; whereas if the master signifier is `bourgeois liberalism', then 
`freedom' consists precisely in the equivalency of opportunity afforded by the 
free market. 87 
What is crucial here is the relation of this retroversion to transference. For 
what is at stake in transference is the occlusion of the appearance of the 
retroactive production of meaning, thereby facilitating a misrecognition of the 
861bid., p. 306. 
87 It is in the light of this that we may understand Lyotard's famous contention that `[t]he grand 
narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses'. The Postmodern 
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merely contingent as a transcendental schema. Thus, `[w]e are, ' declares Zizek, 
"`in transference" when it appears to us that real freedom is "in its very nature" 
opposed to bourgeois freedom, that the state is "in its very nature" only a tool of 
class domination, and so on'. 88 It is from this misrecognition, this 'being 
mistaken' as Lacan terms it, that the psychoanalyst comes to be designated the 
subject supposed to know: `[e]ven the psychoanalyst put in question is credited at 
some point with a certain infallibility, which means that certain intentions, 
betrayed perhaps, by some chance gesture, will sometimes be attributed even to 
the analyst put in question, You did that to test me! i89 To return to our earlier 
example, there is, for Zizek, a similar dynamic at work in the traditional detective 
story: 
[T]he detective's "omniscience" is strictly homologous to 
that of the psychoanalyst, who is taken by the patient as the "subject 
supposed to know'- supposed to know what? The true meaning of 
our act, the meaning visible in the very falseness of the appearance. 
... the 
detective, solely by means of his presence, guarantees that all 
these details will retroactively acquire meaning. In other words, his 
"omniscience" is an effect of transference.... 90 
Whilst this is the detective story in its `pure' form, Roland Barthes has delineated 
its chronotope in similar terms (in the guise of the `hermeneutic code'), when he 
notes that most of the dilatory devices employed in novels work `to arrest the 
enigma, to keep it open', just as the analyst works to maintain the sublimity of the 
Condition, p. 37. Indeed, the only `mode of unification' that is finally possible is the unattainable 
unity of the real itself. 
88 The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 102. 89 The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 234. 
32 
Che vuoi?. 91 Again, as with the desire of the psychoanalyst, Barthes maintains 
that `[e]xpectation becomes the basic condition for truth'. 92 
This exposition of transference should, then, contribute to our 
understanding of Lyotard's apparently most scandalous claim that 
`[p]ostmodernism... is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this 
state is constant'. 93 To understand postmodernism as modernism `in the nascent 
state' necessitates subverting the logic of linear chronology in favour of a 
retroactive temporality. If psychoanalysis signifies its concern with the latter in 
the very etymology of the term `analysis' (from ana, meaning `going back' or 
`again', and luien, meaning `loosening' or `dissolving'), then Lyotard himself 
also makes the connection in a typically cryptic letter to Jessaymn Blau on the 
meaning of the prefix `Post-': 
I mean that for a proper understanding of the work of 
modem painters... we would have to compare their work with 
anamnesis, in the sense of psychoanalytic therapy. Just as patients try 
to elaborate their current problems by freely associating apparently 
inconsequential details with past situations - allowing them to 
uncover hidden meanings in their lives and their behaviour - so we 
can think of the work of Cezanne, Picasso, Delauney, Kandinsky, 
Klee, Mondrian, Malevich, and finally Duchamp as a working 
through [durchabeiten] performed by modernity on its own meaning. 
You can see that when it is understood in this way, the 
'post-' of `postmodern' does not signify a movement of comeback, 
flashback, or feedback - that is, not a movement of repetition but a 
90 Slavoj Ziiek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 57-58. 
91 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974,1970), p. 76. 
92 Ibid., p. 76. The temporality of the detective story chronotope is elaborated upon at greater 
length in Chapter Two of this thesis. 93 The Postmodern Condition, p. 79. 
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procedure in `ana': a procedure of analysis, anamnesis, anagogy, and 
anamorphosis that elaborates an `initial forgetting'. 94 
Lyotard's assertions about the complex temporality of postmodernism, then, 
proceed by analogy with Freud's concept of durchabeiten or `working through'. 
As J. Laplanche and J. -B. Pontalis declare, this is not the clearest of Freudian 
categories, but they take it to mean `a sort of psychical work which allows the 
subject to accept repressed elements and to free himself from the grip of 
mechanisms of repetition'. 95 This `acceptance' of what has been repressed is thus 
a kind of remembering of what was initially forgotten, but it is to be distinguished 
from the simple recall of a memory which `remembering' implies if only because, 
as Freud notes, `something is "remembered" which could never have been 
"forgotten" because it was never at any time noticed - was never conscious'. 
% 
Indeed, Lyotard claims that `[r]emembering, one still wants too much', whereas 
`working through would be defined as a work without end and therefore without 
will'. 97 Thus it is that, as Laplanche and Pontalis explain, `working through is 
expedited by interpretations from the analyst which consist chiefly in showing 
how the meanings in question may be recognised in different contexts'. The 98 
94 Jean-Francois Lyotard, `Note on the Meaning of 'Post-", in Postmodernism: A Reader, ed. by 
Thomas Docherty (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993), pp. 47-50 (pp. 49-50). 
93 J. Laplanche and J. -B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson- 
Smith (London: H. Karnac Books, 1988,1973,1967), p. 488. Laplanche and Pontalis comment 
that we are left `in considerable doubt as to what Freud meant exactly by working-through'. Ibid., 
488. 
Sigmund Freud, `Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through (Further Recommendations 
on the Technique of Psycho-analysis 11)', (1914), in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. by James Strachey, Volume 12 (London: 
Hogarth, 1953-74), pp. 145-156 (p. 149). 
97 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington and 
Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991,1988), p. 29 and p. 30 respectively. 98 The Language of Psychoanalysis, p. 488. 
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event subject to the `initial forgetting' is, therefore, not so much remembered as it 
was, but, rather, restructured through its inscription within another field of 
meaning, and remembered as it is. By working-through a memory, then, an event 
becomes a repetition that happens for the first time: simply, it will have been. 99 
Lyotard's name for such an immemorialization is, in fact, the event. This 
is a happening that refuses integration within the symbolic network until the 
symbolic network has itself been refashioned. For Lyotard, simply put, 
`something happens which is not tautological with what has happened'. 1°° 
However, as Bill Readings explains, an event is not a novelty of history but, 
rather, a novel history: 
The event is the radically singular happening which cannot 
be represented within a general history without the loss of its 
singularity, its reduction to a moment. The time of the event is 
postmodern in that the event cannot be understood at the time, as it 
happens, because its singularity is alien to the language or structure of 
understanding to which it occurs. '°' 
There is, of course, a sense here in which writing the event is always doomed to 
fail. Firstly, we must accept that singularity only persists as an effect of 
negativity: something is by virtue of what it is not. In this sense singularity can 
99 This is to distinguish it from that other kind of repetition which is a compulsion and about 
which Freud declares 'the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and 
repressed, but acts it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, 
without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it. ' `Remembering, Repeating and Working- 
Through (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-analysis II)', p. 150. 
'°° Jean-Francois Lyotard, The D erend. " Phrases in Dispute, trans. by G. Van Den Abbeele 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988,1983), p. 79. 
101 Introducing Lyotard. " Art and Politics, p. 57. 
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only be conceived within a context and therefore must lose its designation as 
singular. From this perspective the event may therefore be considered sublime, 
for its designation as a singular happening exceeds the capacity to present it in its 
singularity. Secondly, and following on from this, singularity even as an effect of 
negativity is only possible within the order of representation - that is, within the 
order of the symbolic. This is because, as John Forrester declares, `[t]here are no 
holes in reality - there is no "real" absence. '102 Singularity, in other words, is 
impossible in the real, it can only exist in the symbolic which, paradoxically, is 
therefore the register of the real. By which is meant that we can attest to the 
singularity of an event only at the point of our failure to present that singularity. 
This point is precisely the boundary between the symbolic and the real and it is 
only with the failure of symbolization, that is with the sublimity of the event, that 
the real is disclosed. 
The significance of the disclosure of the relationship between the real and 
the symbolic, what Geoffrey Bennington terms the "tensivity" between the 
orders, lies in its eschewal of a subjective historiography. 103 Which is to say that 
the event qua history is produced in the friction between the symbolic and the 
real and it is therefore neither fully subjective nor fully objective but, rather, the 
result of their differential relation. As Bennington expounds, `we can no longer 
simply accept the traditional view that the event "comes first" in an 
102 John Forrester, The Seductions of Psychoanalysis: Freud , 
Lacan andDerrida (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 176. 
103 Geoffrey Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1988), p. 108. 
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unquestionable "real" world, nor, in the simple reversal-model, that it is purely 
"produced" by the narrating agency'. 104 History, on this model, is neither a set of 
pristine facts awaiting reclamation, nor is it, for Readings, `nothing other than 
"what is said about it now"'; instead it is the sum of their difference and this 
difference is always contingent. 105 
The postmodern represents, in other words, the attempt to disinter a 
properly historical thinking from the imaginary present of the modem. Like the 
latter, the former is predicated upon synchrony; unlike the modem, however, the 
postmodern inscribes the real of this synchrony in the symbolic rather than the 
imaginary. 106 Thus, when Bennington proposes that `the postmodern is the 
working out of a psychoanalytic temporality' we may understand this to express, 
more specifically, a relation between the time of fantasy and the time of 
traversing the fantasy in which the latter is privileged over the former. 107 In 
order to distinguish this relationship from the dominant conception of history as a 
diachronic narrative, we may refer to this symbolization of the synchronic by the 
term `historicity'. As Jameson reminds us, `[h]istoricity... can first and foremost 
be defined as a perception of the present as history; that is, as a relationship to the 
present which somehow defamiliarizes it and allows us that distance from 
'°4 Ibid., p. 107. It is worth pointing out here that Bennington is not using "real" in the precise 
Lacanian sense even if, in this context, it corresponds to that designation. 
105 Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics, p. 58. 
106 As Lizek points out, `[w]hat characterizes the symbolic order is the specific mode of causality, 
namely retroactive causality'. Slavoj Ziiek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As A 
Political Factor (London; Verso, 1991), p. 201. 
107 Introducing Lyotard, p. 59. 
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immediacy which is at length characterized as a historical perspective'. 108 Which 
is to say that historicity is a history not exclusively moulded by the present of the 
ego, but, rather one in which the latter is suitably relativized by the real of the 
`past' and the `future'. `[A] postmodern historicity, ' then, as Peter Nicholls 
argues, `conceives the subject as shaken out of its secure metaphysical time and 
exposed to the shock of a temporality which is always self-divided. "09 The 
postmodern, in other words, besieges the imaginary fortifications of the modem 
problematic and attempts to surmount them at the same time. In contradistinction 
to the history of the imaginary, it recognizes and attests to its constitutive split as 
the very condition of both the object that is knowledge and the subject that knows 
it. The postmodern, therefore, represents the return of history rather than its end. 
Indeed, we may add in response to the question set up earlier, that what 
postmodernism wants, as it were, is precisely the return of the object qua history, 
or more properly, historicity. For what Lyotard is implicitly propounding with 
the sublimity of postmodernism is a non-subjectivizable object, or, what Lacan 
describes as `the object that cannot be swallowed..., which remains stuck in the 
108 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 284. 
109 Peter Nicholls, `The Belated Postmodern: History, Phantoms and Toni Morrison', in 
Psychoanalytic Criticism; A Reader, ed. by Sue Vice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1966), pp. 50-67 
(p. 56). In the context of this study it is worth pointing out that Nicholls has, here and elsewhere, 
criticized `Jameson's developmental view, which is founded on a rigorous, unpassable opposition 
between modem and postmodern'. Peter Nicholls, `Divergences: Modernism, Postmodernism, 
Jameson and Lyotard', Critical Quarterly, 33: 3, (1991), 1-18, (p. 4). Apart from the fact that we 
have already seen how Jameson identifies the postmodern as the intensification of the modern, he 
has remained concerned throughout his oeuvre to sensitize us to the complexities of periodical 
schema. As Jameson argues, `such categories are produced within an initial diachronic or 
narrative framework, but become usable only when that initial framework has been annulled, 
allowing us now to coordinate or articulate categories of diachronic origin (the various distinct 
modes of production) in what is now a synchronic or metasynchronic way'. Fredric Jameson, The 
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gullet of the signifier'. "" This unassimilable object is the condition of possibility 
for the subject as such; it is, as Zizek argues, `the subject himself in his 
oppositional determination, the negative of the subject, a piece of flesh that the 
subject has to lose if he is to emerge as the void of distance towards every 
objectivity'. " In this sense, the object inheres within the subject as the subject's 
cause, it is `the subject itself in the mode of objectivity'. 112 The imaginary 
conflation of subject and object which we earlier noted as characteristic of the 
problematic of modernity can only be overcome, then, by recognizing the 
symbolic conflation of subject and object. In other words, it is only with the 
disappearance of the subject, in the object, that the subject can emerge at all, just 
as it is only with the disappearance of history, in the present, that history too can 
finally emerge. 
3: Time and Time Alain 
If Lacan is foremost amongst those who have been responsible for re- 
articulating the Freudian concept of a retroactive temporality, then he has clearly 
Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: Routledge, 1989,1981), 
98. Pio 
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 270. 
111 Slavoj Ziiek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London; 
Verso, 1994), p. 33. 
112 Slavoj Ziiek, `Hegel with Lacan, or the Subject and its Cause', in Reading Seminars I and II: 
Lacan's Return to Freud, ed. by Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink and Maire Jaanus (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 397-413 (p. 400). 
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been joined in this enterprise by many others. 113 Lyotard obviously serves as our 
most pertinent example here, but equally striking over recent years has been the 
work of Jacques Derrida. Indeed, it would perhaps not be overstating the case to 
say that Derrida's entire oeuvre is a working-through of the problematics of time, 
a working-through that finds the self-dividing temporality of d ferance forever 
disturbing the traditional temporality of presence/absence and all that it 
underwrites. The former thus manifests itself, in a relevant example, as an 
`historicity which cannot be historical, an "ancientness" without history, without 
anteriority, but which produces history', in contradistinction to the latter which is 
articulated as a `history [that] has no doubt always been associated with a linear 
scheme of the unfolding of presence, where the line relates the final presence to 
the originary presence according to the straight line or the circle'. "4 History, for 
Derrida, is therefore only produced by a temporality that exceeds its teleology. 
113 In their discussion of the modality of retroversion identified by Freud as Nachträglichkeit, 
Laplanche and Pontalis note that '[t]he credit for drawing attention to the importance of this term 
must go to Jacques Lacan'. The Language of Psychoanalysis, p. 111. Typically, Lacan is not slow 
to acknowledge this credit. For example, whilst distinguishing between `the retroactive effect of 
meaning in sentences, meaning requiring the last word of a sentence to be sealed' and 
Nachtrliglichkeit [which] reveals a temporal structure of a higher order', he remarks of the latter 
`remember I was the first to extract it from Freud's texts'. Jacques Lacan, 'Position of the 
Unconscious', in Reading Seminar M., Lacan's 'Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis', 
ed. by Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink and Maire Jaanus (Albany: State University of New York, 
1995), pp. 259-82 (pp. 267-268). If the latter concept is Freud's, we may perhaps find something 
of Friedrich Nietzsche in the former concept and his argument that `[n]ot every end is a goal. The 
end of a melody is not its goal; but nonetheless, if the melody had not reached its end it would not 
have reached its goal either. ' Friedrich Nietzsche, A Nietzsche Reader, ed. and trans. by R. J. 
Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1977), p. 278. 
"a Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul De Man, 2"d edn., trans. by Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan 
Culler and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989,1986), p. 95, and 
Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and 
London: john Hopkins University Press, 19776), p. 85 respectively. It is probably worth pointing 
out that Derrida maintains the impossibility of ever actually escaping from the kind of 
metaphysical time identified in the latter quotation. David Wood, however, takes issue with this 
contention, noting that, for Derrida, 'the denial of the possibility of an alternative concept of time 
is compromised by his own endorsement of a pluri-dimensional temporality'. David Wood, The 
Deconstruction of Time (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1991,1989), p. xi. 
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As Vincent Descombes contends, `[t]here is history because, from the origin 
onwards, the present is, so to speak, always delayed with regard to itself. 115 As 
we have seen, such logic finds a particular application in the contemporary and 
Mark C. Taylor, writing in the tradition of Derrida and Maurice Blanchot, argues 
that we can only understand the modernist/postmodernist split in terms of a 
differential temporality. He therefore proposes that `[t]o think difference - the 
difference that marks the margin between modernism and postmodernism, it is 
necessary to refigure space by imagining time without presence'. 116 
If these examples disclose the rise in the privileging of retroversion in 
theory, they are allied, at the level of form, to the increasing attention paid to its 
role as a stylistic and exegetical device. Steven Connor, for example, 
commenting on Jameson's problematical deployment of tenses, argues that `[t]he 
proliferation of conditionals and varieties of the future perfect leave us 
permanently unclear whether what we are reading is past, or passing, or to 
come'. 117 Connor is certain, however, that this is no mere stylistic quirk, but 
rather `attests... to the puzzling virtuality of time in our time'. 118 As such, this 
1 13 Vincent Descombes, Modem French Philosophy, trans. by L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980,1979), p. 145. 
1 16 Mark C. Taylor, `Back to the future', in Postmodernism: Philosophy and the Arts, ed. by Hugh 
J. Silverman (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 13-32 (p. 13). 
117 Postmodernist Culture, P. 50. While I disagree with this criticism, its point of attack 
nevertheless remains symptomatic of the wider temporal self-consciousness being elaborated 
here. 
'is Ibid., p. 50. It is perhaps worth noting in this context that the title of one of Jameson's more 
recent works, The Seeds of Time, finds its incipience in the Shakespearean play, Macbeth, which 
is most explicitly committed to an exploration of complex temporalities: 
BANQUO: If you can look into the seeds of time 
And say which grain will grow and which will not.... 
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writing perhaps demands a new kind of reading too. In this respect, Zizek's 
analyses of Lacan are exemplary for they comprehend his work `as a work in 
progress, as a succession of attempts to seize the same persistent traumatic 
kernel': 
The shifts in Lacan's work become manifest the moment one 
concentrates on his great negative theses: "There is no Other of the 
Other", "The desire of the analyst is not a pure desire".... upon 
encountering such a thesis, one must always ask the simple question: 
who is this idiot who is claiming that there is an Other of the Other, 
that the desire of the analyst is a pure desire, and so on? There is, of 
course, only one answer: Lacan himself a couple of years ago. The 
only way to approach Lacan, therefore, is to read "Lacan contre 
Lacan". ' 9 
Which is to say that when we read Lacan's oeuvre we need to work through his 
earlier theses in terms of his later ones, in much the same way that he continued 
to re-elaborate even his central concepts throughout his career. There is, of 
course, a certain kinship in this approach with the more mundane fact of 
signification which, as we have already noted, requires some provisional 
`buttoning down' of meaning for it to make sense. Commenting upon Terence 
Hawkes' article `Telmah' (itself, of course, `Hamlet' backwards), Peter Barry 
finds that, characteristically, cultural materialists exploit this feature of 
narrativization to produce what he terms `novelistic' effects. Thus, he finds, for 
example, that `suspense is maintained by holding back key details about identity 
or situation till the moment of maximum impact', whilst the typical `structure is a 
William Shakespeare, Macbeth, ed. by G. K. Hunter (London: Penguin 1995), 1: 3: 57-58. 
119 The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality, p. 173. 
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series of seemingly unrelated incidents or situations which turn out to be 
intimately intertwined'. 120 
Such esoteric concerns find their popularization in the realm of demotic 
culture. In the genre of cinema, for example, a cursory glance at the biggest box- 
office earners over the last twenty years would include such retroactive-plotted 
films as Terminator (Parts I and II), Back to the Future (Parts I, II and III), Bill 
and Ted's Excellent Adventure, Bill and Ted's Bogus Journey, Groundhog Day, 
Time Cop, Twelve Monkeys, Total Recall and Big. 121 Even a film as apparently 
`linear' as Men In Black is explicitly, as well as implicitly, concerned with the 
effects of retroversion. The film's enabling premise is the existence of a secret 
government agency supposed to administer alien activity which was, it is 
maintained, formed in the 1950s. If there is such an organization, this is, of 
course, precisely the time when it will always have been set up. 122 However, its 
existence is kept secret by the use of memory erasers (or `neurolysers') on all 
those who come into contact with it. The agents of this erasure, in every sense of 
the phrase, are pure letters `J' (Will Smith), `K' (Tommy Lee Jones) and `Z' (Rip 
'20 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Studies (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 189. 
121 Whilst there is clearly a certain irony in making sequels to films predicated on recursive 
temporalities, it does at least attest to the popularity of the genre. For a more detailed account of 
these films it is worthwhile consulting Constance Penley, The Future of an Illusion: Film, 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
122 Indeed, the periodization of this film, as well as others like Independence Day and Mars 
Attacks!, is symptomatic of the transferential process by means of which the past always comes 
from the future. For, while these films are essentially 1950s `B'-movies updated to 1990s 
blockbusters, their forms also connote a certain futurity in terms of their generic matrices in 
science fiction, a genre which depends on a temporality which is specifically anticipatory. The 
paradox of transference, in which the future determines the past, is equally emblematized at the 
level of content in the technology which, whilst being far more sophisticated than our present 
equipment, is styled in that smooth bland plastic fashion so redolent of the 1950s. 
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Torn). Without identity themselves (their fingerprints are burnt off, for example), 
they work to rewrite the past by inducing the forgetting inherent to the 
transferential illusion of capitonnage, which, as we have seen, must always efface 
its traces as a condition of its success. Thus is it that they are, as `Z' remarks to 
`J', "recognizable only as dejä vu", as repetitions without origin. 123 Indeed, one 
of the film's finest moments in this respect is its closing theme. This is a rap 
cover version of a song called `Forget-Me-Nots' which replaces the old 
eponymous lyric in the chorus with the phrase `Men in black'. 
The main concern of this study, however, is the form of the contemporary 
narrative. Utilizations of an ego-shattering, retroactive temporality are 
everywhere to be found here, but one example that irresistibly proposes itself is 
Walter Abish's collection of short stones In The Future Perfect. The most 
extreme, and also the most typical narrative strategy employed by Abish in this 
collection is that used in `In So Many Words'. Here Abish narrates the banal 
routine of an American woman, interspersing it with a series of randomly 
numbered fragments which anticipate the words of the story in alphabetical, 
rather than syntactical order: 
17 
American an and another diary great in introduction is my 
Saturday simply Sunday the this to weekend 
20 
123 Men In Black, directed by Barry Sonnerfeld, written by Ed Solomon (Columbia Pictures, 
1997). On this point, 'Z' also says to T, "You were never born". 
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This is an introduction to my diary. In the diary the Great 
American Weekend is simply another Saturday and Sunday. 124 
These fragments render the story unreadable; they resist interpretation but by that 
resistance foreground the compunction of the reading mind to coagulate all the 
elements of a narrative into an imaginary whole. In other words, as these 
fragments are unassimilable to such a whole they disclose the presupposition of a 
time when they will have meant; that is, when the alphabetical ordering of the 
words of the fragments will have been like their syntactic concatenation in the 
narrative of the story. It is a point that finds more concrete expression in John 
Berger's G., where the narrator discerns an analogy of this narrative problematic 
in psychical and historical processes: 
She could not explain her feelings to herself. There is a 
historical equivalent to the psychological process of repression into 
the unconscious. Certain experiences cannot be formulated because 
they occurred too soon. This happens when an inherited world-view 
is unable to contain or resolve certain emotions or intuitions which 
have been provoked by a new situation or an extremity of experience 
unforeseen by that world-view. [... ] In certain respects we are likely 
to be better understood by those who follow us than by ourselves. 
Nevertheless their understanding will be expressed in terms which 
would now be alien to US. 125 
The two parts of Abish's story (the meaningless fragments and the meaningful 
narrative) dramatize the temporal theory of Berger's narrator. In each initial 
meaningless fragment we may discern that which `cannot be formulated', and in 
124 Walter Abish, In the Future Perfect (London: Faber and Faber, 1984,1975), p. 95. 
125 John Berger, G., (London: Bloomsbury, 1996,1972), p. 104. 
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the meaningful fragment which follows it we may discern an `understanding' 
which returns to the fragment in the future perfect, expressing the truth of that 
fragment in terms which are now `alien' to it. Invoking another example, the 
story is thus like the jackal in Michael Ondaatje's The English Patient in whose 
`jaws are pieces of the past he delivers to you, and when all of that time is fully 
discovered it will prove to have been already known'. 126 
The differences in form, content and effect of these three examples attests 
to the diversity in articulating retroversion in contemporary narratives. This 
diversity, it may be ventured, is not best served by attempting to codify a poetics 
of postmodern fiction. Such a project would seem to fetishize the figures and 
techniques of the novels in question which, in any case, produce their effects 
through various combinations and in a complex relation to the historical content 
of these texts. Indeed, this is merely to emphasize a point made throughout this 
study that form is best understood as the logic of content. Rather what is at stake 
in characterizing the contemporary novel is an elaboration of the processes by 
which its `raw' materials (ultimately, the postmodern condition itself) are 
fashioned, and in turn, fashion their narrativization. The broad proposal of this 
thesis is that the postmodern novel designates those contemporary texts which 
subject their imaginary `raw' materials to the temporality of the symbolic; texts 
which, in other words, disclose the historicity of history. 
126 Michael Ondaatje, The English Patient (London: Picador, 1993,1992), p. 259. 
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It is a proposal which may be mapped out in more detail using the co- 
ordinates already provided in the analysis of postmodernity. In particular we may 
invoke Zizek's definition of fantasy as `the primordial form of narrative, which 
serves to occult some original deadlock'. 127 The structure of narrative expedites 
such mystification by collapsing the synchronic onto the diachronic, a diachrony 
which then assumes as its telos what it will seek to explain. It is thus, perversely, 
a synchrony masquerading as diachrony: a straight line, as it were, which is 
secretly a circle, positing its own presuppositions in an endless temporal loop. 128 
As such, narrative, like fantasy, may be understood as an imaginary discourse, 
accruing to itself only that which is already presupposed as the same. However, 
this definition can be refined, for if this is narrative qua fantasy, then, it may be 
proposed there is also, as its counterpoint, narrative qua traversing the fantasy: in 
other words, a symbolic narrative. It is a distinction that Jameson also makes 
when he argues that an imaginary narrative is one which, qua fantasy, stages a 
series of objections to its own constitution which must then be overcome for it to 
be realized. The imaginary narrative thus conducts an inquiry into its own 
conditions of possibility and, by so doing, secures those conditions and therefore 
127 Slavoj Ziiek, the Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997), p. 10. 
128 As an example of such a narrative Ziiek proffers the following: `The sociopolitical fantasy par 
excellence, of course, is the myth of "primordial accumulation": the narrative of the two workers, 
one lazy and free-spending, the other diligent and enterprising, accumulating and investing, which 
provides the myth of the "origins of capitalism", obfuscating the violence of its actual genealogy'. 
However, this `effectively explains nothing, since it already presupposes a worker behaving like a 
full-blown capitalist'. Ibid., pp. 10-11. In regard to the novel, Elizabeth Deeds Ermath has 
produced a singular theorization of circular time in postmodern fiction in her Sequel to History. 
Unfortunately, her approach has little in common with the one advanced here, but her proposal 
that `[p]ostmodern narrative can be instructively thought of as a temporal instance of collage, or 
rather collage in motion' provides an interesting alternative to this one. Elizabeth Deeds Ermath, 
Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of Representational Time (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), p. 8. 
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itself. In contradistinction to this form, Jameson sets up a second order of 
narrative: 
Unlike the more degraded, and easily commodifiable, texts 
of the Imaginary level, these new, second-level narratives - we will 
call them... "Symbolic texts" - entertain a far more difficult and 
implacable conception of the fully realized fantasy: one which is not 
to be satisfied by the easy solutions of an "unrealistic" omnipotence 
or the immediacy of a gratification that then needs no narrative 
trajectory in the first place, but which on the contrary seeks to endow 
itself with the utmost representable density and to posit the most 
elaborate and systematic difficulties and obstacles... It then 
sometimes happens that the objectives are irrefutable, and that the 
wish-fulfilling imagination does its preparatory work so well that the 
wish, and desire itself, are confounded by the unanswerable resistance 
of the Real. 129 
An imaginary narrative, then, is one which resolves contradictions by mystifying 
them, obscuring the forces beyond its control and, as it were, wishing them away. 
A symbolic narrative, however, foregrounds these contradictions, rehearsing 
objections which may either be answered or refuted by the real. 
We may detect a local variation of this distinction in the work of the 
metafictional novel. Such texts as Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five or John 
Fowles' The French Lieutenant's Woman operate at two different narrative 
levels: the diegetic and the exegetic. The former level is subject throughout to the 
symbolic scrutiny of its exegesis which, traversing the fantasy of the narrative, 
stages and represents the contradictions inherent to the diegesis. These texts 
therefore remain in some way unresolved, but in that irresolution sensitize us to 
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the persistence of the real, `that bedrock against which the desiring subject knows 
the break up of hope and can finally measure everything that refuses its 
fulfilment'. 130 In other words, these novels resist the easy accommodations of the 
ego for a more uncomfortable, but ultimately more solid grounding in the 
differential relation between subject and object. Underpinning this relation is the 
retroactive temporality of the future perfect which yokes together the diegetic 
level of a narrative and its exegetic counterpoint in a synchronic structure that is, 
however, differentiated from its imaginary form by the provisionality of its 
temporal mode. 
It is within this conceptual framework, then, that the following 
expositions take their bearings. Chapter One analyses the representation of 
imaginary experience in the postmodern, relating it specifically to the sublimity 
of both the process of urbanization and the operations of the commodity form. It 
designates the cyberspace of William Gibson's Neuromancer as a fantasy-gaze 
which occasions the disappearance of the subject and argues that it is this subject 
that is being sought for in the butchery of American Psycho. Chapter Two 
delineates the symbolization of imaginary experience in Thomas Pynchon's The 
Crying of Lot 49. In particular, it proposes that the anamorphic temporality of 
the detective story affords an apposite rubric for Walter Benjamin's monadic 
historiography. Utilizing Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five as its point of 
departure, Chapter Three analyses the narrativization of the imaginary and 
129 The Political Unconscious, p. 183. 
130 Aid, p. 184. 
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symbolic temporalities of trauma. Finally, Chapter Four discusses the role of the 
vanishing mediator in John Banville's Doctor Copernicus. This point of opacity 
in the narrative of history, it is argued, finds its corollary in the pleonastic 
character of the subject. These readings, then, represent less the development of 
an argument than a constellation of analyses which attempt to illuminate the 
problematic outlined in this chapter from different, and hopefully instructive 
angles. In this regard, each exposition returns to its topic, as it were, for the first 
time. 
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Chapter One - Shangri-da: 
The Postmodern Imaginary in William 
Gibson's Neuromancer and Bret Easton 
Ellis's American Psycho. ' 
1: Garden of Earthly Delight 
Over the past two decades `science fiction has with some success 
struggled against its ghettoization as lowbrow genre fiction'. In doing so, it has 
become, as Annette Kuhn comments, `a privileged cultural site for enactments of 
the postmodern condition'. Apart from the fact that postmodernity is, for Scott 
Bukatman, `a moment that sees itself as science fiction', one of the principle 
reasons for this renewed interest in science fiction has been the genre's own 
invigoration in the form of cyberpunk. 4 This slick, sassy and seedy subgenre 
finds its finest hours in the works of William Gibson, Rudy Rucker, Lewis 
1A condensed version of this chapter was initially presented as a paper to the Departmental 
Seminar, Department of English Studies, University of Stirling, 29 April 1997. I am grateful for 
the comments made by all participants, particularly Vance Adair, David Punter, Nicholas Royle 
and Rory Watson. 
2 Claire Sponsler, `Cyberpunk and the Dilemmas of Postmodern Narrative: The Example of 
William Gibson', Contemporary Literature, 33: 4, (1992), 625-644, (p. 625). 
3 Annette Kuhn, ed., Alien Zone: Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema 
(London: Verso, 1990), p. 178. Echoing these comments, Steven Connor notes that `[o]ne of the 
most remarkable developments in postmodernist writing and writing about postmodern writing 
during the 1980s has been the increased prominence and standing of science fiction, especially 
that brand of science fiction known as "cyberpunk". Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An 
Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary, 2°d edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 134. 
4 Scott Bukatman, Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodernist Science Fiction 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 6. 
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Shiner, John Shirley and Bruce Sterling. Surveying this loose body of work 
Brian McHale concludes that the latest generation of science fiction is 'a 
paradigm of contemporary writing at large'; 5 indeed, it has impelled Fredric 
Jameson to remark, rather more pointedly, that cyberpunk is `henceforth, for 
many of us, the supreme literary expression if not of postmodernism, then of late 
capitalism itself'. 6 If this is so, then it owes this dubious position, in large part, to 
the groundbreaking novel Neuromancer by William Gibson.? For although, as 
Bukatman argues, `[c]yberpunk at its best is not quite reducible to the work of 
William Gibson [... ] he is certainly its most archetypal literary figure'. 8 
Neuromancer is set in the twenty-first century underworld of high-tech 
zaibatsu culture. Information is the privileged commodity of this culture and it is 
the vocation of the novel's protagonist, Case, in his role as a cowboy, to steal it. 
He does this by jacking into the universal fund of data known as cyberspace, an 
advanced form of the Internet, and hacking through corporate electronic defences. 
The narrative concerns itself with one particular `run' or mission in which Case is 
hired by an artificial intelligence to break into the information vaults of the 
Tessier-Ashpool zaibatsu in order that the artificial intelligence may free itself 
s Brian McHale, Constructing Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 12. 
6 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 
1991), p. 419. 
7 This is the first in a series of three novels set in the same near future. In the editions used here, 
they are Neuromancer (London: Harper Collins, 1993,1984), Count Zero (London: Harper 
Collins, 1993,1986) and Mona Lisa Overdrive (London: Harper Collins, 1994,1988). These 
novels are also augmented by a collection of short stories entitled Burning Chrome (London: 
Harper Collins, 1995,1986). Gibson's other novels The Difference Engine (with Bruce Sterling), 
Virtual Light and Idoru do not draw upon the paradigm first set out in Neuromancer. 
8 Terminal Identity, p. 146. 
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from its pre-programmed limits to join with another of its kind and form a super 
artificial intelligence. 
Much of the novel, then, is centred around cyberspace, or the matrix as it 
is alternatively called, the representational innovation for which the work of 
Gibson has become famous. It is first defined for the reader via the medium of a 
children's educational programme: 
"Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by 
billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being 
taught mathematical concepts.... A graphic representation of data 
abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. 
Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the 
mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights 
receding.... "9 
It is precisely in its ability to represent `unthinkable complexity', to gain a 
cognitive purchase upon the welter of data, that the concept of cyberspace persists 
as an innovative narrative strategy. For it is a response to what Jameson has 
articulated as `the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great 
global multinational and decentred communicational network in which we find 
ourselves caught as individual subjects'. 1° The spatial metaphor Jameson invokes 
here, his troubled call for cognitive mapping, is richly suggestive; for, in trying to 
think the totality, the postmodern novelist encounters a more immediate 
problematic, which, as Jameson notes, operates as an analogue of the former, and 
9 Neuromancer, p. 67. 
10 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 44. 
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that is the metamorphosis of space itself. This latter `has finally succeeded in 
transcending the capacities of the human body to locate itself, to organize its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a 
mappable external world'. " 
In this respect, we may see cyberspace as an attempt at a postmodern 
cartography; that is, as a representational strategy for domesticating what 
Jameson terms `postmodern hyperspace'. 12 Central to this enterprise is, as 
Gibson's reference to the `city lights' above suggests, a recognition of the change 
in, and thus a recodification of, contemporary urban experience. As Paul Patton 
notes, `[i]mages of the city play a crucial role in accounts of the postmodern 
"Ibid., p. 44. It is probably fair to point out that of all Jameson's analyses of postmodernity his 
comments on space have been subject to the most trenchant critiques. On Jameson's conception 
of cognitive mapping, Doreen Massey, for example, remarks that `while space is posed as 
unrepresentable, time is thereby, at least implicitly and at those moments, counterposed as the 
comforting security of a story it is possible to tell. This of course clearly reflects a notion of the 
difference between time and space in which time has a coherence and logic to its telling, while 
space does not. ' Doreen Massey, `Politics and Space/Time', New Left Review, 196, (1992), 65- 
84, (p. 83). Echoing this point, Steve Pile suspects `that the lack of dynamism in Jameson's model 
stems from his underlying sense of space as being a passive backdrop to social relationships'. 
Steve Pile The Body and The City: Psychoanalysis, Space and Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 
1996), p. 247. Similarly, Sean Homer finds that `[d]espite [Jameson's] ostensible intentions, space 
has once more become defined negatively in relation to time'. Sean Homer, Fredric Jameson: 
Marxism, Hermeneutics, Postmodernism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 145. While it is 
undoubtedly true that Jameson proposes a certain level of difficulty in co-ordinating oneself in 
postmodern space, it by no means follows that this is an implicit valorization of time. Indeed, as 
he states explicitly, there is no easy way to separate the two categories and what he therefore 
means by the `spatial turn' of postmodernism is the distinction `between two forms of 
interrelationship between time and space rather than between those two inseparable categories 
themselves'. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 154. Jameson's 
critique of postmodern space is thus bound to a critique of a postmodern temporality which `has 
forgotten how to think historically'. Ibid., p. ix. In the light of this, we may understand Jameson's 
call for cognitive mapping as an attempt to produce a form of representation which is able to 
articulate the relationship between the individual and the general, the particular and the universal, 
as they are mediated by the socio-economic and cultural productions of both space and time. It is 
an attempt, in other words, to think the totality, and therefore its `representational failure' does not 
stand for a wilful castigation of space; indeed, as Jameson points out, `once you knew what 
"cognitive mapping" was driving at, you were to dismiss all figures of maps and mapping from 
your mind and try to imagine something else'. Ibid., p. 409. 
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condition. As a matter of course, these accounts include as one of their essential 
moments a description of the experience of contemporary urban life. ' 13 Indeed, 
the individual's relationship with, and navigation of, metropolitan space has, as 
Raymond Williams argues, occupied a privileged position in the thematic 
hierarchy of literary materials since the Romantic era. On Williams' reading the 
city always presents itself as a space of sublimity - from the literal strangeness of 
crowds in Wordsworth to the impenetrable fogs of Dickens and the dark and 
dizzying streets of Conrad - the metropolis is never completely knowable, and 
therefore the individual's relationship to it is always monadic and alienated, even 
as it revels in a certain vital exoticism produced by this estrangement. Literary 
attempts to tame the concrete jungle vary, but one worth noting in this context is, 
as Williams observes, `the new figure of the urban detective': 
In Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories there is a 
recurrent image of the penetration by an isolated rational intelligence 
of a dark area of crime which is to be found in the otherwise (for 
specific physical reasons, as in the London fogs, but also for social 
reasons, in that teeming, mazelike, often alien area) impenetrable city. 
This figure has persisted in the urban `private eye' (as it happens, an 
exact idiom for the basic position in consciousness) in cities without 
the fogs. '4 
lz Ibid., p. 44. 
13 Paul Patton, `Imaginary Cities: Images of Postmodernity', in PostmodernCities and Spaces, 
Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 112-121 (p. 112). Patton has 
in mind here Fredric Jameson's Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism and 
David Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity. In terms of postmodern fiction, some of the 
more pertinent examples of writing urbanicity are Italo Calvino's Invisible Cities, Alasdair Gray's 
Lanark: A Life in 4 Books, Jonathan Raban's Soft City and lain Sinclair's Downriver. 
'4 Raymond Williams, The Politics of Modernism: Against the New Conformists (London: Verso, 
1996,1989), p. 42. 
55 
The very name of Neuromancer's protagonist -`Case' - signposts an 
inheritance from this tradition of urban rationalism which Bukatman, among 
others, has located as a specific relationship with `the alienated spatialities of 
Chandler'. 15 Echoing Friedrich Engels' comments about Manchester crowds, 
Jameson proposes that the work of Raymond Chandler is subtended by a sense of 
spatial disjunction: 
... the 
form of Chandler's books reflects an initial American 
separation of people from each other, their need to be linked by some 
external force (in this case the detective) if they are ever to be fitted 
together as parts of the same picture puzzle. And this separation is 
projected out onto space itself no matter how crowded the street in 
question, the various solitudes never really merge into a collective 
experience, there is always distance between them. Each dingy office 
is separated from the next; each room in the rooming house from the 
one next to it; each dwelling from the pavement beyond it. This is 
why the most characteristic leitmotif of Chandler's books is the figure 
standing, looking out of one world, peering vaguely or attentively 
across into another.... 16 
We may note a certain equivocation in the social status of detectives, from 
Sherlock Holmes to Philip Marlowe, which stems from an involvement with 
marginalized activities and characters (opium and femmes fatales, for example) 
15 Terminal Identity, p. 142. Gibson himself it is worth pointing out, refutes such connections: 
`"But with Chandler -I have never read much of his work, and I never enjoyed what I did read 
because I always got this creepy puritanical feeling from his books"'. Larry McCaffrey, `An 
Interview with William Gibson', in Storming the Reality Studio: A Casebook of Cyberpunk and 
Postmodern Science Fiction, Larry McCaffrey (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
1991), pp. 263-285 (p. 269). 
16 Fredric Jameson, `On Raymond Chandler', in The Poetics of Murder: Detective Fiction and 
Literary Theory, Glen W. Most and William W. Stone (San Diego, New York; London: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 122-148 (p. 131). 
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that is seemingly at odds with a more respectable pursuit of justice and the law. '7 
This can be seen as the expression of an affinity with, and therefore of an ability 
to negotiate, just those urban spaces that are occluded from the `normal' social 
gaze. If we plot this affinity as a trajectory, then its logical end-point might well 
be found in a character like Case who, being a thief, is, in every sense of the 
word, streetwise. 
In Neuromancer, as Claire Sponsler avers, `although the dominant culture 
always looms in the background - in the multinational corporations (the Maas- 
Biolabs and Hosakas) as well as in the form of a few powerful individuals (the 
Tessier-Ashpools and Josef Vireks of the world) - the surface attention is all on 
the counterculture, from orbiting Rastafarians to punk street gangs to mincome 
Project voodoo worshipers'. '8 For Case the `outlaw zonesi19 that provide the 
topography of Neuromancer are readily navigable, throwing up certain 
understandable patterns as long as you know what you are looking for, such as in 
this description of the apparently aleatory mobilities of the street mob: 
Groups of sailors up from the port, tense solitary tourists 
hunting pleasures no guidebook listed, Sprawl heavies showing off 
17 Recent criticism has discerned in these proclivities the mechanism of identification, for the 
detective has in some way to repeat the crime in order to catch the criminal. Jameson, for 
example, argues that in the works of Georges Simenon `Maigret's conclusions are based on the 
fact that he can or cannot visualise the character in question committing the crime which is to be 
solved. Maigret is thus called on to imagine, or indeed to reinvent the character before him as a 
potentiality for a certain number of acts.... ' Fredric Jameson, The Prison House of Language: A 
Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1972), p. 204. This process will be explored in more detail in the following chapter. 
18 `Cyberpunk and the Dilemmas of Postmodern Narrative: The Example of William Gibson', 
'9629. Neuromancer, p. 19. 
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grafts and implants, and a dozen distinct species of hustler, all 
swarming the street in an intricate dance of desire and commerce. 20 
The taxonomic specificity of the expert gaze here obviates the unknown terror 
of the urban crowd and replaces it with cognizance of an otherwise invisible 
concatenation of distinct purposes that unite in the collective experience of 
`desire and commerce'. We may note then that, as with Jameson's Chandler, the 
metropolitan populace's `need to be linked by some external force' is fulfilled by 
what, following Williams, we may term the `private eye' of Case. At one level, 
this example of Case's all-knowing gaze operates as a rehearsal of the larger 
problematic of point of view in the novel and in the postmodern generally-, for, as 
Bukatman observes of the latter, there has 'arisen a new and boundless urbanism, 
one which escapes the power of vision through its very dispersal'. 21 
We may take this `boundless urbanism' to register both a geographical 
and a metaphorical metropolitan incontinence. The former finds its instantiation 
in the topography of Neuromancer, where Case's home town, `the Boston- 
Atlanta Metropolitan Axis', is suitably indexed, for a city overflowing the 
measure, by the sobriquet `the Sprawl'. 22 The sheer material expansiveness of the 
metropolis, which in Neuromancer extends even into the extra-terrestrial orbit of 
Freeside, `brothel and banking nexus, pleasure dome and free port, border town 
20 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
21 Terminal Identity, pp. 122-123. 
22 Neuromancer, p. 57. 
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and spa', is matched in another sense by the ubiquity of urban experience. 23 It is 
this that Jameson has in mind when he remarks upon the complementary 
'disappearance of Nature': 
Where the world system today tends toward one enormous 
urban system - ... - the very conception of the city 
itself and the 
classically urban loses its significance and no longer seems to offer 
any precisely delimited objects of study, any specifically 
differentiated realities. Rather, the urban becomes the social in 
general, and both of them constitute and lose themselves in a global 
that is not really their opposite either (as it was in the older 
dispensation) but something like their outer reach, their prolongation 
into a new kind of infinity. 2 
We may perhaps discern in this global imperative of the urban the broad outline 
of an imaginary dynamic. For the city, like the ego, pursues its other in `Nature', 
or the countryside, only insofar as it then subsumes that difference within the 
identity of itself. This, then, is what Lacan means in referring to the imaginary 
`vertigo of the domination of space'. 25 As Teresa Brennan points out: 
The ego ... 
is opposed to the history of anything different 
from itself. It is interested in difference only in so far as everything 
different from it provides it with a mirror for itself. In this respect, it 
will reduce all difference to sameness; if everything different is 
deadened and dominated in the process of becoming totally 
preoccupied with the ego, it loses the lively heterogeneous difference 
rightly celebrated in the postmodern Zeitgeist. 26 
23 Ibid., p. 125. 
24 Fredric Jameson, The Seeds of Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 28-29. 
2 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. By Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1997,1977), 
28. ý6 
Teresa Brennan, History After Lacan (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 37. 
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If `difference' is continually being chewed up and swallowed in the 
territorializing maw of the ego then this, as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen reflects, 
makes of its world a space `strangely petrified and static, a sort of immense 
museum peopled with immobile "statues", and "images" of stone, and hieratic 
"foams"' 27 
We can find something of this unregeneracy in the character of the 
postmodern city, for, as Sharon Zukin contends, `[d]espite local variations, ... the 
major influence on urban form derives from the internationalization of 
investment, production and consumption. In socio-spatial terms 
... 
internationalization is associated with the concentration of investment, the 
decentralization of production, and the standardization of consumption. ' 28 Zukin 
cites McDonald's and Benetton as examples of this standardization and notes that 
`[t]heir shops are ubiquitous in cities around the world', and therefore help to 
make those cities over in the image of each other. 29 Such a process, however, 
occasions a problematic definition of otherness. For if urbanicity has achieved 
such a ubiquity that even the most bucolic of backwoodsmen can simultaneously 
assume the position of streetwise urbanite, how can urban experience be 
characterized with any sense of singularity? For Jameson the answer to this can 
be found in the global sweep of representation. Instead of drawing upon national 
27 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Master, trans. by Douglas Brick (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 59. 
28 Sharon Zukin, `The Postmodern Debate Over Urban Form', Theory, Culture and Society, 5: 2-3, 
(1988), 431-446, (p. 436). 
291bid., p. 436. 
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images of provincial and rural boredom to counterpoint and thus characterize the 
excitement of the city, he argues that this contrast is preserved, `but simply 
transferred to a different kind of social reality, namely the Second World city and 
the social realities of a nonmarket or planned economy. 30 As adductions for his 
argument Jameson calls upon the now classic images of `meager shelves of 
consumer goods in empty centrals from which the points of light of advertising 
are absent, streets from which small stores and shops are missing, [and the] 
standardization of clothing fashion (as most emblematically in Maoist China)'. 31 
This, of course, is a local truth of the wider proposition advanced by Robert 
Young that `[p]ostmodernism can best be defined as European culture's 
awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the 
32 world'. 
In Neuromancer Turkey occupies the position of other in capitalism's 
cultural imaginary; it is, the narrative assures us, `a sluggish country '. 33 Such 
sluggishness is due, in no small part, to the antiquated technologies still operating 
in Turkey: a Citroen sedan is only `a primitive hydrogen-cell conversion', "`the 
left hand of John the Baptist"' is merely kept "`inside this brass hand thing"' 
rather than "`in a support vat"', and even `the written word still enjoy[s] a certain 
30 The Seeds of Time, pp. 29-30. 
31 Ibid., p. 30. 
32 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London: Routledge, 1990), 
p. 19. In this context we may plausibly read `capitalist' for `European'. If such a notion seems to 
betray Jameson's assertion of the ubiquity of capital (for which Young takes him to task, Ibid., 
p. 115), it is only because we fail to designate this ubiquity as experiential, rather than as 
empirical. In other words, this is the experience of an imaginary relationship. 
33 Neuromancer, p. 108. 
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prestige here'. 34 More tellingly, however, it is the superannuated architecture, 
with its `crazy walls of patchwork wooden tenements' and `soot-stained sheets of 
plastic and green-painted ironwork out of the age of steam', that provides the 
most pressing sense of otherness. 35 It is, the narrator comments, `an old place, 
too old'. 36 Indeed, without the seclusion of a `dome', the Finn feels 
"`agoraphobic"', and it is only upon entering the bazaar that he is `comforted by 
the crowd density and the sense of enclosure'. 37 The irony of this is it constitutes 
a kind of return to origins, for as Jameson points out, postmodem buildings 
`which are open emporia in which one finds food markets, theaters, bookstores, 
and all kind of other specialized services, run together in a fashion that surely 
derives ultimately and historically from the great open-air markets or bazaars of 
the East and of precapitalist modes of production'. 38 
What is striking about this observation and its relation to the 
representation of Turkish space in Neuromancer is how it articulates the dynamic 
of capitalism's cultural imaginary. If the Finn feels 'comfortable' in a bazaar, it 
is because his indigenous topography has already subsumed that archaic spatial 
form within itself. The otherness of Turkey here is thus merely a property of its 
separation from the other spatial and technological forms which constitute the 
postmodern in its unity. 39 Indeed, for Jameson, the form of cyberpunk develops 
34 Ibid., p. 108, p. 116 and p. 108 respectively. 
35 Ibid, p. 107 and p. 112 respectively. 
36 Ibid., p. 113. 
37 Ibid., p. 108 and p. 112 respectively. 
38 The Seeds of Time, pp. 156-157. 
39 Neuromancer, however, does hint that Turkey will soon succumb to the capitalist imaginary 
and the homogenization of space. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the hotel the 
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from `the evaporation of a certain Otherness'. 40 Such a process of `evaporation' 
perhaps finds its most salient expression in an economy of enclosure or 
fortressing. 41 An example of this is, of course, the bazaar, which stands as such 
an emblematic postmodern form because of `the sense of enclosure' it affords. 
This sense of envelopment proceeds from what Jameson terms `a logic specific to 
Imaginary space, whose dominant category proves to be the opposition of 
container and contained' and `the fundamental relationship of inside to outside'. 42 
Without explicitly making the connection himself, Jameson has, in later 
publications, linked these relationships to both postmodern architecture and 
science fiction in general. Of the former he notes that it is subject to what he 
designates `the Blade Runner syndrome' in which `the interfusion of crowds of 
people among a high technological bazaar with its multitudinous nodal points, all 
of it sealed into an inside without an outside, ... thereby 
intensifies the formerly 
urban to the point of becoming the unmappable system of late capitalism itself'. 43 
Of the latter, Jameson proposes that `all SF of the more "classical" type is 
"about" containment, closure, the dialectic of inside and outside'. 44 Above and 
protagonists stay in while there: `[t]heir room might have been the one in Chiba where he'd first 
seen Armitage. He went to the window, in the morning, almost expecting to see Tokyo Bay'. 
Neuromancer, p. 108. 
40 The Seeds of Time, p. 151. 
4° Lacan notes that `the formation of the I is symbolized in dreams by a fortress, or a stadium - its 
inner area and enclosure, surrounded by marshes and rubbish tips, dividing it into two opposed 
fields of contest'. Ecrits: A Selection, p. 5. 
42 Fredric Jameson, `Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan', in The Ideologies of Theory Essays - 
1971-1986: Volume 1- Situations of Theory, Fredric Jameson (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 75- 
115 (p. 86). 
43 The Seeds of Time, p. 157. It is also worth pointing out here that Jameson argues `[w]e must 
think of the space of dirty realism [i. e., cyberpunk] as a collective built space, in which the 
opposition between inside and outside is annulled'. Ibid., p. 155. 
Fredric Jameson, `Science Fiction as a Spatial Genre: Generic Discontinuities and the Problem 
of Figuration in Vonda McIntyre's The Exile Waiting', Science-Fiction Studies, 14, (1987), 44-59, 
(p. 58). 
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beyond the spaces we have already been looking at, then, it is perhaps not 
fortuitous that the raise en scene of much of Neuromancer is cyberspace or, more 
pertinently, the matrix, a word which finds its etymology in `womb' - the 
paradigmatic topos of container and contained. 45 In this respect, of course, the 
name of Case himself is a not insignificant reference to such a spatial formation. 
There is, then, a contradiction at work in the postmodern metropolis. It is, 
in its boundlessness, what Jameson terms a `total space'46; it is also, in its 
replication at the micro-level, a totalising space, one whose very boundedness 
aspires to `some new category of closure'. 47 This `imploded urbanism'48, as 
Bukatman describes it, may be more readily understood by reference to 
Jameson's celebrated analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel. Jameson detects a 
certain modality of hermeticism at work in the overtly discreet construction of the 
entrances to the Bonaventure, which serve to seal its occupants into the total 
space of the hotel: 
... 
ideally the minicity of Portman's Bonaventure ought not 
to have entrances at all, since the entryway is always the seam that 
links the building to the rest of the city that surrounds it: for it does 
not wish to be part of the city, but rather its equivalent and its 
replacement or substitute. That is obviously not possible, whence the 
downplaying of the entrance to its bare minimum. 49 
45 Jameson notes that imaginary space 'clearly enough originates in the infant's fantasies about the 
maternal body as the receptacle of part-objects (confusion between childbirth and evacuation, and 
so forth)'. `Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan', p. 86. 
46 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 40. 
47 Ibid., p. 39. 
48 Terminal Identity, p. 126. 
49 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pp. 40-41. 
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We can find a similar thematic at work in the architecture of Neuromancer, for 
example in Cheap Hotel, where `the courtyard that served the place as some 
combination of lobby and lawni50 is located on some unspecified level above the 
fifth floor; or in Straylight where `the entrance to the elevator had been concealed 
beside the stairs to the corridor'. 51 
In a second moment the difficulty of locating an entrance to postmodern 
buildings is joined by an active repulsion in the form of the building's very 
materiality, which in the case of the Bonaventure is its `great glass reflective 
skin': 
... the glass skin repels the city outside, a repulsion for which 
we have analogies in those reflector sunglasses which make it 
impossible for your interlocutor to see your own eyes and thereby 
achieve a certain aggressivity toward and power over the Other. In a 
similar way, the glass skin achieves a peculiar and placeless 
dissociation of the Bonaventure from its neighbourhood: it is not even 
an exterior, inasmuch as when you seek to look at the hotel's outer 
walls you cannot see the hotel itself but only the distorted images of 
everything that surrounds it. 52 
As Bukatman argues, `[t]he new monument is no longer the substantiality of the 
building, but the depthless surface of the screen. This is a transformation 
literalized in Blade Runner by the proliferation of walls which are screens, sites 
50 Neuromancer, p. 30. 
51 Ibid., p. 299. 
52 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 42. 
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of projection now rather than inhabitation. ' 53 The city, in other words, maintains 
an extimate relation with itself, it is, to recall Borch-Jacobsen's memorable 
phrase `ex-posing itself, exactly as the eye can see itself only by exorbiting itself 
in a mirror'. 54 
The move from the opacity of walls, with all their connotations of density, 
solidity and substantiality, to the reflectiveness of screens is realized as 
something of a leitmotif in Neuromancer. Indeed, according to Gibson, 
mirror/silver is clearly the colour of the future. For example, `[t]he Jarre [is] 
walled with mirrors', the Sense/Net building is `mirror-sheathed, the Chinese 
virus programme has `black mirrors' on is flanks `reflecting faint distant lights 
that [bear] no relationship to the matrix around it', boots are `sheathed in bright 
Mexican silver', `the beach [is] silver-gray' and even the aftershave has a 
`metallic edge'. 55 It is little wonder, then, that with so many reflective surfaces, 
one of the paradigmatic topoi of Neuromancer is the mise-en-abyme. For 
example, when Molly, who has `twin mirrors' of `empty quicksilver' ('surgically 
inset, sealing her sockets'), meets Terzibashjain, similarly attired with `silver 
glasses', the reflections cause them to make, as he points out, "`the tunel infinity, 
53 Terminal Identity, p. 32. Peter Marcuse argues that such walls reflect `an increasing social 
division, along increasingly sharp but double-edged and hence ambiguous lines, often buried in 
apparently chaotic or "natural" spaces, divisions hierarchical in nature and of growing severity in 
impact'. Peter Marcuse, `Not Chaos, but Walls: Postmodernism and the Partitioned City', in 
Postmodern Cities and Spaces, Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 
cr. 243-253 (p. 244). 
Lacan: The Absolute Master, p. 52. 
ss Neuromancer, p. 14, p. 80, p. 216, p. 4, p. 281 and p. 111 respectively. 
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mirror into mirror"'. 56 This is equally a problem at the level of built space, for 
example, in Freeside: 
The glass wall of the balcony clicked in with its view of 
Desiderata, but the street scene blurred, twisted, became the interior 
of the Jane de The, Chiba, empty, red neon replicated to scratched 
infinity in the mirrored walls. 57 
Traditional architectural notions of exteriority and interiority are thus suspended 
in this new reflective space. People and buildings are absented from their actual 
place by projection, only to return in the phenomenologically vertiginous non- 
space of the mise-en-abyme in which location is never fixed. It is a problem 
compounded by the autotelic spatiality of postmodern interiors, that total space 
which, like the Villa Straylight, `is a body grown in upon itself 58 and which 
replicates its traditional exterior within itself in the connotative form of street 
lights and road signs and, most obviously, plants which for Case on Freeside are 
`too cute, too entirely and definitively treelike' S9 Indeed, in this respect, 
Bukatman argues that `the city is now composed of a "synthetic space-time" that 
simulates the lost geophysical urban spaces of human habitation and 
circulation'. 0 
56 Ibid., p. 42, p. 41, p. 36 and p. 109 respectively. 
57Ibid., p. 172. 
58 Ibid., p. 206. 
59 Ibid., p. 154. 60 Terminal Identity, p. 126. 
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Whilst, on one level, there is something uncanny about this environment, 
something too unfamiliarly familiar, where even the random forms of nature itself 
betray a degree of calibration in the `too cleverly irregular slopes of sweet green 
grass', we may also take this as an instance, at another level, of the larger 
problematic of co-ordination that is so pointedly emblematized in the mise-en- 
abyme. 61 For Bukatman, `[t]he new urban space is directionless - co-ordinates 
are literally valueless when all directions lead to more of the same'. 62 Such a 
sublime topography is precisely what is adumbrated in Neuromancer. On 
Freeside, for example, `[i]f you turned right, off Desiderata, and followed Jules 
Verne far enough, you'd find yourself approaching Desiderata from the left'. 63 
Molly sums up the problem with admirable terseness when she points out to 
Case that "'[t]he perspective's a bitch"': 
They were standing in a broad street that seemed to be the 
floor of a deep slot or canyon, its either end concealed by subtle 
angles in the shops and buildings that formed its walls. The light, 
here, was filtered through fresh green masses of vegetation tumbling 
from overhanging tiers and balconies that rose above them. The 
sun... 
There was a brilliant slash of white somewhere above 
them, too bright, and the recorded blue of a Cannes sky. He knew 
that sunlight was pumped in with a Lado-Acheson system whose two- 
millimeter armature ran the length of the spindle, that they generated 
a rotating library of sky effects around it, that if the sky were turned 
off, he'd stare up past the armature of light to the curves of lakes, 
rooftops of casinos, other streets - But it made no sense to his body. M 
61 Neuromancer, p. 154. 
62 Terminal Identity, p, 126. 
63 Neuromancer, p. 180. 
64 Ibid., p. 148. 
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If this metropolitan simulacrum, in which even the sky can be `turned off', 
makes no sense to Case's body it is because, as Jameson declares, `[w]e do not 
yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace [... ] in part 
because our perceptual habits were formed in that older kind of space I have 
called the space of high modernism'. 5 Absented from itself, this imaginary 
space finds its most succinct and troubling definition in Mona Lisa Overdrive 
when one of the characters recalls the fundamental lesson of the new geography: 
`There's no there, there'. 66 
What strikes the reader about this concatenation of spatial motifs is how 
the logic of the topographical content in Neuromancer finds its expression in the 
form of the novel itself. We may note, for example, how the postmodern 
building's impediments to entry and its rebarbative exterior are realized formally 
by the novel's entrance, as it were, in medias res. Furthermore, the reader's 
difficulty in co-ordinating her/himself in the reading space of Neuromancer is 
exacerbated by the genuinely forbidding nomenclature and technical innovations 
it portrays. The novel is, in effect, a total space which repels the cyberspace 
65 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pp. 38-39. `It is, ' for Patton, 
'tempting to ridicule this analysis. ' Indeed, Patton duly gives in to such a temptation, arguing 
that, as Jameson `is someone who gets lost in large supermarkets', we can only understand his 
analysis of the Bonaventure in terms of'a somewhat overblown response to a novel architectural 
design'. ('Imaginary Cities', p. 114). If there is a certain inflationary rhetoric to Jameson's 
comments, we may perhaps detect in this the critical work of estrangement. We may also adduce 
Edward W. Soja's observations on the same building - he accompanied Jameson and Henri 
Lefebvre on a field trip to the Bonaventure - when he proposes that 'its pastiche of superficial 
reflections bewilder co-ordination and encourage submission instead.... Once inside ... 
it 
becomes daunting to get out again without bureaucratic assistance. ' Edward W. Soja, Postmodern 
Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical social Theory (London: Verso, 1989), p. 243- 
244. 
66 Afona Lisa Overdrive, p. 55. 
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ingenue. As Bukatman observes, its difficulty rehearses a certain elitism, for 
`[n]ot everyone can read Neuromancer; its neologisms alienate the uninitiated 
reader' 67 Such assertions, of course, beg the question of how one joins the 
privileged ranks of the initiates. In this respect we may profitably attend to the 
construction of metaphors in the text, which replicate at the level of the sentence 
the topeme we have already identified as the mise-en-abyme. Nowhere is this 
metaphorical incest more clearly expressed than in cyberspace itself, operating as 
both vehicle and tenor of a series of tropological substitutions that ultimately 
dissolve the very saliency of such distinctions. For example, early on in the 
novel, the narrative recounts Case's experience of being followed in the street: 
... in some weird and very approximate way, 
it was like a run 
in the matrix. Get just wasted enough, find yourself in some 
desperate but strangely arbitrary kind of trouble, and it was possible 
to see Ninsei as field of data, the way the matrix had once reminded 
him of proteins linking to cell specialities. Then you could throw 
yourself into a high speed drift and skid, totally engaged but set apart 
from it all, all around you the dance of biz, information interacting, 
data made flesh in the mazes of the black market.... 68 
The macro- and microscopic are conflated here in a process of equivalence 
which finds being chased through the city comparable to programming a 
computer, the content of which is subsequently compared to the metropolis itself 
and that, in turn, to bio-chemical systems in the body, which is then an image of 
bodies themselves, and, finally, an analogy of cyberspace data. Similarly, in the 
penultimate run of the novel, Case's sensory experience is described as `receding, 
67 Terminal Identity, p. 152. 
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as the cityscape recedes: city as Chiba, as the ranked data of Tessier-Ashpool SA, 
as the roads and crossroads scribed on the face of a microchip, the sweat-stained 
pattern on a folded, knotted scarf 69 What is disclosed by this collocation of 
images is how, throughout Neuromancer, the metropolis is troped by cyberspace, 
and vice versa, in a series of substitutions which finds each element operating as 
the deep structure and regulatory frame of the other. 
In other words, we can understand cyberspace by reference to the city and 
we can understand the city by reference to cyberspace. This is a point also noted 
by Bukatman: 
The notion of a dark and crowded space broken by neon 
forms and corporate structures is surely not unfamiliar. Perhaps we 
can begin to learn about Gibson's cyberspace by learning from Las 
Vegas or Times Square or Tokyo for, on one level, cyberspace only 
represents an extension of the urban sector located at the intersection 
of postmodernism and science fiction. 70 
From the very first sentence of the novel, `[t]he sky above the port was the color 
of television, tuned to a dead channel'71, Gibson deploys a mode of representation 
in which technology and space are strictly indivisible. For Bukatman this 
`establishes the impossibility of a "real" space existing apart from its electric 
analogue'. 72 This indivisibility has several implications, but, for our immediate 
68 Neuromancer, p. 26. 
69 Ibid., p. 310. 
70 Terminal Identity, p. 121. 
" Neuromancer, p. 9. 
72 Terminal Identity, p. 148. For our purposes, such a notion finds particularly apt expression in 
Count Zero, where one of the characters notes that `[t]he sinister thing about a simstim construct, 
71 
purposes, we may note that, as readers, we are being asked to refer one 
description in the novel to another in a circular trail of signifiers that only 
obliquely signposts an extra-textual referent. In turn, this may be ascribed to the 
formal constraints of science fiction itself, by definition, science fiction 
presupposes a level of innovation or novelty in content that finds its sanction as 
novelty precisely in a calculated non-referentiality. Which is to say that if an 
intra-diegetic detail can be thoroughly transcribed extra-diegetically it invalidates 
the novelty which is its generic signature. This formal necessity for intra-diegetic 
cross-referencing, at least to a degree, begets a narcissistic thematic that we have 
noted in the predominance of the mise-en-abyme but which, more properly, is a 
condition of possibility of spatiality as such. 
Indeed, Jameson has proposed that `the distinctiveness of SF as a genre 
has less to do with time (history, past, future) than with space'. 73 We may 
perhaps qualify this by understanding the dominance of space in science fiction as 
an expression of a form of time, that is as a spatialization of temporality. 74 In 
really, was that it carried the suggestion that any environment might be unreal, that the windows 
of the shopfronts she passed now with Andrea might be fragments. Mirrors, someone had once 
said, were in some way essentially unwholesome; constructs were more so, she decided. ' Count 
Zero, p. 197. 
" Fredric Jameson, `Science Fiction as a Spatial Genre: Generic Discontinuities and the Problem 
of Figuration in Vonda McIntyre's The Exile Waiting', p. 58. 
74 We may find a warrant for this in the fact that Jameson executes a similar manoeuvre in regard 
to postmodern temporality when he argues that `[w]hat one means by evoking its spatialization is 
rather the will to use and to subject time to the service of space, if that is now the right words for 
it'. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 154. Jameson's caution here is 
part of a more widely expressed concern not to disable the concept of space with a priori 
characteristics, for, as Kristin Ross attests, `[o]ur tendency is to think of space as an abstract, 
metaphysical content, as the container for our lives rather than the structures we help create. The 
difficulty is also one of vocabulary, for while words like "historical" and "political" convey a 
dynamic of intentionality, vitality and human motivation, "spatial", on the other hand, connotes a 
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cyberspace, Wintermute avouches for this process when he remarks to Case that 
"`An hour here'll only take you a couple of seconds"'. 75 Time is petrified, as it 
were, in the imaginary museum as a kind of stasis. For Malcolm Bowie, it is a 
concept disclosed in the very name of the mirror stage itself, because `the double 
meaning of stade turns time into space' 76 Perhaps the most salient manifestation 
of such inertia can be found in the form of the computer. For Jameson, `this new 
machine' does not, unlike `the older machinery of the locomotive or the airplane, 
represent motion', rather it `can only be represented in motion'. 77 This is exactly 
how Neuromancer portrays the new technology, often by recourse to the kinetic 
idiom of an older machinery, such as, for example, when Case has `the strange 
impression of being in the pilot's seat in a small plane'. 78 Speed, under such 
conditions, is merely experienced as `the sensation of speed', thereby giving rise 
to the paradoxically `worrying impression of solid fluidity' that troubles Case on 
one of his runs. 79 He can, as it were, travel anywhere without ever actually 
moving. Equally, Bukatman has observed of the postmodern metropolis that 
`time is displaced within a field of inaction and, ultimately, inertia as the city, the 
universe, circles back upon itself in a closed feedback loop'. 80 This temporal 
inertia, in its guise as an obsession with space, is the condition of possibility for 
science fiction and therefore we may say that, at one level, Gibson's 
Neuromancer is narrativizing just this condition of possibility. The irony of this 
stasis, neutrality, and passivity. ' Kristin Ross, The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the 
Paris communes (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 8. 
"Neuromancer, p. 202. 
76 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991), p. 35. 
77 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 45. 
78 Neuromancer, p. 302. 
79 Ibid., p. 302. 
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is precisely that it reproduces another `closed feedback loop'. Somewhat less 
ironically, we may allow that this constitutes science fiction's moment of self- 
consciousness, or, rather, an awareness built in the form of Neuromancer that is 
startlingly self-reflexive. It is clear, therefore, why the chronotope of science 
fiction has assumed the generic supremacy it has within the similarly narcissistic 
and topophiliac culture of postmodernity, which is itself forever in search of a 
referent. 
2: Finding Your Feet 
Given what we have seen so far of the imaginary topography adumbrated 
in Neuromancer, it is little wonder that the story the novel is concerned to 
articulate is itself one of co-ordination. Like the mirror stage child, Case starts 
the narrative with a certain level of motor incapacity, `his nervous system 
[damaged] with a wartime Russian mycotoxin' that leaves him in `the prison of 
his own flesh'. 81 His inability to jack into the matrix at this stage in the drama is 
thus analogous to what Lacan terms the `primordial Discord betrayed by the signs 
of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal months'. 82 Indeed, the 
`mirror' in which Case comes to assume his specular image is the matrix, where 
the body is not so much mastered as a whole but rather dispensed with 
completely: 
80 Terminal Identity, p. 128. 
81 Neuromancer, p. 12. 
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For Case, who'd lived for the bodiless exultation of 
cyberspace, [the damage done to his nervous system] was the Fall. In 
the bars he'd frequented as a cowboy hot shot, the elite stance 
involved a certain relaxed contempt for the flesh. The body was 
meat. 83 
If the `bodiless exultation' described here bears comparison with the imaginary 
infant's `triumphant jubilation'TM at his/her spatial captation, it also indexes the 
division proper to the latter in which body and self are happily sundered in order 
that the `self' may be at all. The serial deprecation of the physical body in 
Neuromancer, which is always figured as `eat'- ('Travel was a meat thing' `Meat, 
some part of him said. It's the meat talking, ignore it. ')85 - attests to its status as 
an embarrassing surplus that always threatens to topple the project of unification 
back into an undignified heap. Intimations of corporeality are thus ugly 
reminders of the awkward truth of the body, a truth that must be forgotten if the 
fictions of the imago are not to melt in the air. As Lacan argues, it is 
`meconnaissance that characterizes the ego in all its structures', it must 
92 Ecriis, p. 4. 
83 Neuromancer, p. 12. As well as being part of a larger religious framework in the novel, the 
Biblical reference here finds a resonance in what Bowie argues is Lacan's attempt with the mirror 
stage `to find an early moment in the human life cycle when the individual's humanity is already 
fully at stake, and to find a new beginning for the moral drama of psychoanalysis. Lacan's 
account of the "specular" moment provides the ego with its creation myth and its Fall. ' Lacan, 
p. 21. We may find a more implicit Biblical resonance in those hosts in the machine, 
Neuromancer and Wintermute. The latter's name, for example, can be understood to designate a 
state `after the Fall' ('winter') and, equally, one `without the Word' (`mute'). These entities are 
imprisoned in a state of imperfection, as it were, and it is Case's task to fashion them into a 
Gestalt. They therefore parallel his own trajectory from fragment to whole, from state of sin to 
one of redemption, and become, in suitably imaginary terms, "`the sum total of the works, the 
whole show"'. Neuromancer, p. 316. 
sa Ecrits, p. 18. 
ss Neuromancer, p. 97 and p. 181 respectively. 
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misrecognize itself in what it is not in order to be what it is. 86 The self, in other 
words, can only exist outside of itself, keeping at arm's length the cackhanded 
reality which would otherwise rudely intrude upon what Lacan suggestively 
terms `the virtual complex' of the co-ordinated Gestalt. 87 Such virtuality is, of 
course, also afforded by cyberspace: 
He'd operated on an almost permanent adrenaline high, a by- 
product of youth and proficiency, jacked into a custom cyberspace 
deck that projected his disembodied consciousness into the 
consensual hallucination that was the matrix. 88 
There is a clear link articulated here between `proficiency' and the `projection' 
of Case's `disembodied consciousness'; as Borch-Jacobsen comments, `[i]f there 
is a "stage" here, it is one that is both unstable and instantaneous, that of an ek- 
89 stasis that projects the ego before itself'. 
Mastery of the self is, then, only realized at the price of both a specular 
schism and a schismatic speculation and it is therefore not surprising that the 
illusory self is constantly haunted by cracks in the mirror. As Bowie points out, 
the infant's `projections towards the ego are constantly threatened by a 
retrospective pull towards fragmentation'. 90 Such fragmentation manifests itself 
86 Ecrits, p. 6. 
87 Ibid., p. 1. 
88 Neuromancer, p. 12. 
89 Lacan: The Absolute Master, p. 48. 
90 Lacan, p. 26. 
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in fantasies about the corps morcele which, for Lacan, attains an emblematic form 
in the paintings of Hieronymous Bosch: 
This fragmented body ... usually manifests 
itself in dreams 
when the movement of the analysis encounters a certain level of 
aggressive disintegration in the individual. It then appears in the form 
of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy, 
growing wings and taking up arms for intestinal persecutions - the 
very same that the visionary Hieronymous Bosch has fixed, for all 
time, in painting, in their ascent from the fifteenth century to the 
imaginary zenith of modem man. 91 
If the `imaginary zenith of modern man' is, by necessity, always-already in the 
future, then Gibson's anticipation of it in Neuromancer is surely one of its most 
profound exempla in its depiction of what we might term a world of `techno- 
Bosch', a world where the most exquisite violence is constantly being executed 
upon the most ethereal flesh. One of the clearest instances of this is the "`horror- 
show"' that figures as Riviera's inaugural appearance in the nove192: 
The back of the fallen man's jacket heaved and burst, blood 
splashing the wall and doorway. A pair of impossibly long, rope- 
tendoned arms flexed grayish-pink in the glare. The thing seemed to 
pull itself up out of the pavement, through the inert, bloody ruin that 
had been Riviera. It was two meters tall, stood on two legs, and 
seemed to be headless. Then it swung slowly to face them, and Case 
saw that it had a head, but no neck. It was eyeless, the skin gleaming 
a wet intestinal pink. The mouth, if it was a mouth, was circular, 
91 Ecriis, pp. 4-5. Given our earlier discussion of postmodern architecture, it is interesting to note 
that, in turning `to the works of Hieronymous Bosch for an atlas of all the aggressive images that 
torment mankind', Lacan finds particularly striking `the narcissistic structure of those glass 
spheres in which the exhausted partners of the garden of delights are held captive'. Ibid., pp. Il- 
12. 
92 Neuromancer, p. 115. 
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conical, shallow, and lined with a seething growth of hairs or bristles, 
glittering like black chrome. 93 
Riviera's projections are only the most (literally) spectacular examples of 
techno-Bosch in Neuromancer, for in this, and the rest of the cyberspace trilogy, 
`an armoured mechanical creature is being produced', as Bowie phrases it, 
`[fjrom spare parts'. 94 Such `spare parts' take the form of a variety of artificial 
supplements, from aluminium talons through replica simstim corneas to mirrored 
glass implants. These prostheses are, of course, only the most conspicuous 
examples of the fluidity of relations that obtain between subject and object within 
the novel's imaginary rubric. At the level of form such fluidity is realized by a 
strategy of oxymoronic substitution; what is organic is described mechanically 
and what is mechanical is described organically: 
His teeth sang in their individual sockets like tuning forks, 
each one pitch-perfect and clear as ethanol. His bones, beneath the 
hazy envelope of flesh, were chromed and polished, the joints 
lubricated with a film of silicone. 95 
The junk looked like something that had grown there, a 
fungus of twisted metal and plastic. He could pick out individual 
objects, but then they seemed to blur back into the mass: the guts of a 
television so old it was studded with the glass stump of vacuum 
tubes.... 96 
93 Ibid., p. 114. 
94 Lacan, p. 26. 
95 Neuromancer, p. 184. 
96 Ibid., p. 63. 
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At one level this synthesis of the mechanical and the organic announces a 
starker re-articulation of its elements, as the corruption of each constituent (by the 
other) offers the contrast against which the purity of the element may more 
readily be perceived. The vacuity of the inscription of sensory experience within 
language is thus offset by a kind of plenitude which is the soiling of its 
abstractive purity with its opposite register. Whilst this is somewhat of a Utopian 
gesture, it is also, in its attempts to forestall the abstractive properties of 
language, a further envelopment within the `here-and-now'. Such envelopment is 
characteristic of the imaginary mode which, without language, is unable to 
differentiate between the function and the person who embodies it, and therefore 
suffers from what Jameson terms `the "bad immediacy" of the pre-Symbolic. 
There is, as we have already noted, something of this in the first-time reader of 
Gibson who is confronted by a plethora of proper names (Ninsei, Cloud Dancers, 
Mitsubishi-Genetech, Sanpaku, Jaffe) and nouns that act like proper names whose 
designation is not always clear and which therefore fail to specify their objects 
clearly. As such, these stand as isolated signifiers, impeding diachrony and 
meaning, like many of what initially appear to be the redundant details of the 
narrative. This bewilderment on the part of the reader is analogous to the 
inability to conceptualize that hampers the imaginary mode, with the Gestalt, as it 
were, not yet visible in the sum of its parts. 
The paradigmatic form of the prosthesis, in Neuromancer as elsewhere, is 
the mirror itself, which, as we have seen, serves as a means of completing the 
97. Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan', p. 90. 
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incipient ego `in the same way, ' for Borch-Jacobsen, `that the deformed foot ends 
up adopting the form of the so-called orthopedic shoe. '98 Such an `orthopedic' 
relationship can be witnessed throughout the novel in Case's progress in 
assuming a `proficiency' of movement, his attempt to master the `meat', which is 
anticipated metonymically by the dexterity of the Flatline. The Flatline is the 
ROM personality construct of McCoy Pauley, who, we are informed, is one of 
the `legends in the biz'. 99 In his adroit negotiation of cyberspace and his status as 
a literally disembodied consciousness, the Flatline functions as a form of ideal- 
ego for Case, an `orthopedic shoe' in which the latter's foot, as it were, will take 
proper shape: 
The matrix blurred and phased as the Flatline executed an 
intricate series of jumps with a speed and accuracy that made Case 
wince with envy. 
"Shit Dixie... " 
"Hey, Boy, I was that good when I was alive. You ain't seen 
nothin'. No hands! "10° 
The "`No hands! "' joke here is a pointed reminder of the corps morcele which 
still incapacitates Case at this stage in the novel, whilst the reference to his `envy' 
attests to the fact that if he is to overcome his fragmented body he must submit to 
what Lacan designates `the dialectic of jealousy': 
98 Lacan: The Absolute Master, p. 65. Borch-Jacobsen takes his cue for this analogy from Lacan's 
comment that `[t]he mirror stage is a drama ... which manufactures 
for the subject, caught up in 
the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented 
body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopedic. ' Ecrits, p. 4. 
99 Neuromancer, p. 11. 
100 Ibid., p. 199. 
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All human knowledge stems from [this] dialectic of 
jealousy.... It's a matter of an observable generic notion, 
behaviouristically observable. What takes place between two young 
children involves this fundamental transitivism expressed by the fact 
that one child who has beaten another can say - The other beat me. 
It's not that he is lying - he is the other literally - there you have the 
true sense of the expression fragmented body - and the initial 
synthesis of the ego is essentially an alter ego, it is alienated. '0' 
Such looking-glass confusions between the self and the other provide a template 
for the technologies of transitivism which predominate in Neuromancer. The 
Flatline ROM construct is but one example, and others include the `[m]imetic 
polycarbon' suits of the Panther Moderns, the Chinese virus whose "`logics kinda 
sleaze [... ] up to the target and mutate [... ], so it gets to be exactly like the ice 
fabric"', and the various simstim units which enable Case to `flip [... ] into 
[Molly's] sensorium'. 102 One particularly striking instance of the use of the latter 
technology occurs when Case sees himself as Molly sees him, that is from the 
point of view of the mirrors on her lenses: 
He flipped. 
And found himself staring down, through Molly's one good 
eye, at a white-faced, wasting figure, afloat in a loose fetal crouch, a 
cyberspace deck between its thighs, a band of silver trodes above 
closed, shadowed eyes. The man's cheeks were hollowed with a 
day's growth of dark beard, his face slick with sweat. 
He was looking at himself. 103 
101 Jacques Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III - 1955-1956, ed. By 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Russell Grigg (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 39. 
102 Neuromancer, p. 74, p. 202 and p. 78 respectively. 
103 Ibid., p. 301. 
81 
If Case's alienation from himself, and the `wasting figure' he pejoratively 
apprehends himself to be, is clearly evinced here, then so also is the 
problematization of notions of interiority and exteriority this entails and which we 
have already seen realized in the architecture of the postmodern. For Zizek, what 
characterizes the kind of technologies employed in Neuromancer - technologies 
which are effectively hyperbolized versions of really existing virtual reality 
machines and technobiology - is their predication upon `the loss of the surface 
which separates inside from outside': 
This loss jeopardizes our most elementary perception of `our 
own body' as it is related to its environs.... On the one hand, inside is 
always outside: with the progressive implantation and replacement of 
our internal organs, techno-computerized prostheses (bypasses, 
pacemakers... ) function as an internal part of our `living' 
organism.... On the other hand, outside is always inside: when we 
are directly immersed in VR, we lose contact with reality - electro- 
waves bypass the interaction of external bodies and directly attach our 
senses: `it is the eyeball that now englobes man's entire body'.. '°4 
With such technologies, then, our most basic phenomenological relationships 
with the world are submitted to a kind of conceptual vertigo in which 
`[p]otentially, total subjectivization (the reduction of reality to an electro- 
mechanically generated cyberspace "window") coincides with total 
objectivization (the subordination of our "inner" bodily rhythm to a set of 
stimulations regulated by external apparatuses)'. 1°5 We might, in the context of 
our analysis, designate this coincidence of ontologies as an imaginary relation, for 
104 Slavoj Lizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997), p. 134. 
105 Ibid., p. 135. 
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in the imbrication of ego with alter ego there is the continual threat that 
everything will either be reduced to self or to other. Such a threat is indexed by 
the verb employed to indicate the alternation between these states in 
Neuromancer - `to flip': each is the obverse side and necessary condition of the 
other. Indeed, we may even allow that Case and Molly respectively correspond, 
at one level, to the processes of total subjectivization and objectivization, for the 
enfeebled body of the former is offset by the augmented athleticism of the latter, 
while the latter's automatized psyche is compensated for by the colonizing ego of 
the former. Following Zizek, we can see here an example of `the way the 
progressive immobilization of the body overlaps with bodily hyperactivity' in 
postmodernity: 
[O]n the one hand I rely less and less on my proper body; 
my bodily activity is more and more reduced to giving signals to 
machines which do the work for me (clicking on a computer mouse, 
etc. ); on the other hand, my body is strengthened, "hyperactivated", 
through body-building and jogging, pharmaceutical means, and direct 
implants, so that, paradoxically, the hyperactive superman coincides 
with the cripple who can move around only by means of prostheses 
regulated by a computer chip (like the Robocop). I°6 
This paradox reaches a zenith in Neuromancer where, for example, in the above 
passage, the infantile (`fetal crouch'), `wasting figure' of Case moves around only 
by virtue of his prosthetic, hyperactive, superwoman Molly. 
106 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
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It is, of course, the prosthesis of cyberspace that finally delivers the 
mastery of his motor capacity Case has been questing for throughout the novel: 
In the instant before he drove Kuang's sting through the base 
of the first tower, he attained a level of proficiency exceeding 
anything he'd known or imagined. Beyond ego, beyond personality, 
beyond awareness, he moved Kuang moving with him, evading his 
attackers with an ancient dance, Hideo's dance, grace of mind-body 
interface granted him, in that second by the clarity and singleness of 
his wish to die. 107 
There seems to be an acknowledgement here that Case's proficiency can only 
be realized at the expense of an alienation from himself, that is, in a spatial 
relation `[b]eyond ego', which is then disavowed as the identity he establishers 
with the ice breaker - `he moved Kuang moving with him'. The ego, in other 
words, is conceived in a kind of nescience, a self-deception which is 
simultaneously the necessary condition of self-deliverance. 108 As Vance Adair 
points out, `[i]t is not so much alienation that constitutes the ego as it is the denial 
of that very of process of alienation'. 109 The laceration of the dash in `mind-body 
interface' is perhaps a sufficient indication of this in itself, for the point of union 
discloses the faultline it seeks to conceal. What is also of interest in this respect 
is that just prior to Case achieving the `grace of the mind-body interface' here, the 
logy Neuromancer, p. 309. 
los We may note with Phillippe Julien that the misrecognition upon which the mirror stage is 
contingent `is not ignorance: what is denied is in some way known'. Phillippe Julien, Jacques 
Lacan's Return to Freud: The Real, The Symbolic and The Imaginary, trans. By Devra Beck 
Simiu (New York: New York University Press, 1994), p. 38. The very fact of virtual technology, 
for example, betrays a cognizance of an alienation from the very reality it seeks to reproduce: its 
presence merely marks the absence to which it is the solution. In this way cyberspace may be said 
to offer itself up as a paradigm of alienation that is constitutive in so far as it is denied. 
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Flatline construct disappears from the narrative in a manner "`[t]hat's kinda hard 
to explain"'. llo Indeed, it is not explained, and for this very reason it suggests 
that Case's identification with the Flatline has fully realized itself, that the latter 
has been swallowed up by the imaginary maw of the former, in so far as Case has 
attained the proficiency of which the Flatline was the supreme exponent and thus, 
as it were, become himself by becoming the construct. That Case has 
successfully addressed the infelicities between the body and the self can be 
witnessed in the triumphant last image of the novel: 
And one October night, punching himself past the scarlet 
tiers of the Eastern Seabord Fission Authority, he saw three figures, 
tiny, impossible, who stood at the very edge of one of the vast steps 
of data. Small as they were, he could make out the boy's grin, his 
pink arms, the glitter of the long gray eyes that had been Riviera's. 
Linda still wore his jacket; she waved, as he passed. But the third 
figure, close behind her, arm across her shoulders, was himself. " 
Here, for the first time, is Case's own figure projected as a totality onto 
cyberspace. Previous to this he has only been able to see `a representation of his 
deck, fingers flying automatically across the board'. ' 12 Such bleak intimations of 
the corps morcele are, however, finally banished by this image of unity and he is, 
we might say, `(w)hole' again. 113 
109 Vance Adair, `Rewriting the (S)crypt: Gazing on Hamlet's Interiors', Q/W/FJR/T/Y, 6, (1996), 
5-15, (p. 8). 
110 Neuromancer, p. 308. 
111 Ibid., p. 317. 
112 Ibid., p. 303. 
111 say 'again' here because the trajectory of the narrative is merely a repetition of what we must 
assume preceded it: Case has already been a `cowboy hotshot', has already been `whole' and the 
novel recounts his attempt to regain that status. From a symbolic perspective this is merely the 
retroactive effect of the imaginary process of totalization, as Jane Gallop explains: `[t]he mirror 
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This wholeness, understood as a privileging of the absolute over the 
differential, is, of course, not purely structural, for, at a more ideological level, 
the novel is concerned to elaborate the recuperation of Case to a socially 
acceptable status. Whilst he starts Neuromancer as `just another hustler, trying to 
make it through', he ends it by having his criminal record erased, undergoing a 
`complete flush out' of his blood and being in possession of a valid passport, as 
well as a large sum of legal money"4: 
He spent the bulk of his Swiss account on a new 
pancreas and liver, the rest on a new Ono-Sendai and a ticket 
back to the Sprawl. 
He found work. 
He found a girl who called herself Michael. 115 
This fairy-tale ending is nothing more than the inscription of Case within the 
social imaginary of late capitalism. Even the ersatz exoticism of the girl's name 
here betrays the kind of bourgeois fantasy life that he has been heading towards 
all along. We can, perhaps, see this more clearly if we attend to Jameson's 
suggestive analysis of `science fiction' films of the 1950s. Such a genre, he 
stage would seem to come after "the body in bits and pieces" and organize them into a unified 
image. But actually, that violently unorganized image only comes after the mirror stage so as to 
represent what came before. What appears to precede the mirror stage is simply a projection or a 
reflection. There is nothing on the other side of the mirror. ' Jane Gallop, Reading Lacan (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 86. In this respect we may say that Case's tortuous 
journey from a state of fragmentation to one of unity represents the effect of narrativizing a spatial 
relation, or, articulating the synchronic diachronically. 
114 Neuromancer, p. 11 and p. 314 respectively. 
115 Ibid, p. 317. 
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argues, `is a wish fulfilment that takes as its object a vision of ideal work'. ' 16 
This fantasy of non-alienating labour refers... 
... to a 
kind of collective folk dream about the condition of 
the scientist himself - he does not do real work, yet he has power and 
crucial significance; his remuneration is not monetary, or at the very 
least money seems no object; there is something fascinating about his 
laboratory (the home workshop magnified into institutional status, a 
combination of factory and clinic), about the way he works nights (he 
is not bound by routine or by the eight-hour day); his very intellectual 
operations are caricatures of the way the non-intellectual imagines 
brainwork and book knowledge to be. There is, moreover, the 
suggestion of a return to older modes of work organization, to the 
more personal and psychologically satisfying world of the guilds, in 
which the older scientist is the master and the younger one the 
apprentice.... 117 
We can find a similar model of `libidinally gratifying' work in Neuromancer. 
From his `work place' (itself an exciting environment - hotels and spaceships - 
augmented by the portable comforts of his keyboard), Case is able to effect 
transformations of global significance; money is limitless where it is not actually 
meaningless (a sharp difference from his previous non-cowboy work); he is 
apprenticed to Dixie Flatline and, perhaps most pertinently, he is not alienated by 
the technology he utilizes: it is, rather, a passport to ecstasy, wholeness and social 
valorization. Much of this fantasy is indicated by his designation as a `cowboy', 
suggestive, as it is, of a nostalgic vision of work which encompasses notions of a 
pioneering spirit, camaraderie, a semi-renegade status and an empathetic contact 
with nature. If there is an irony in this latter point (which perhaps finds its 
116 Fredric Jameson, 'Metacommentary', in The Ideologies of Theory Essays -1971-1986: Volume One -Situations of Theory, Fredric Jameson, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 3-16 (p. 15). 
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expression in the description of cyberspace as a `consensual hallucination), it may 
be observed that Case's disgust with the `meat thing' (that is, any activity outside 
of cyberspace) contrasts markedly with the kind of intuitive appreciation of the 
matrix he experiences that in older fictions would ordinarily be reserved for 
Nature. 
Read in this manner, Case's assumption of legality at the end of 
Neuromancer corresponds to the latent content of the rest of the novel: his 
character is always-already a fantasy of the socialized subject he will become. It 
is a connection that Andrew Ross contextualizes in appropriately Gibsonesque 
terms when he argues that, `Yuppie gentrification was the new pioneer frontier of 
the 1980s, and cyberpunk was one of its privileged genres, splicing the 
glamorous, adventurist culture of the high-tech console cowboy with the 
atmospheric ethic of the alienated street dick whose natural habitat was 
exclusively concrete and neon'. "" In this respect, as Jameson notes, `urban 
punks are merely the opposite numbers to the business yuppies', for, unlike the 
fictions of an earlier phase of capitalism, `[t]here is now a circulation and 
recirculation possible between the underworld and the overworld of high-rent 
condos and lofts'. 119 What this process of `recirculation' indexes is the 
117 Ibid., p. 15. 
11a Andrew Ross, Strange Weather: Culture, Science, and Technology in the Age of Limits 
(London: Verso, 1991), p. 147. Indeed, as Ross points out, the `hacker mythology' begotten by 
Neuromancer is almost exclusively white, masculine and middle class'. Ibid., p. 84. 
119 The Seeds of Time, p. 152. The connection between the underworld and the overworld is also 
implicit in Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. 's scathing critique of cyberpunk: 'for the one thing that 
cyberpunk is fascinated with above all else, its ruling deity, is sleaze - the scummy addiction to 
thrill that can focus all of a person's imaginative power on a sensation that wipes out all 
discipline, and which at the same time sells books, attracts movie options, and generates sequels. ' 
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dissolution of otherness that we have already witnessed operating in the 
imaginary architecture of the postmodern. It will be unsurprising, then, to learn 
that the work of de-differentiation can finally be detected in the form of the novel 
itself. 120 Apart from the chronotope of science fiction, to which, as Gibson 
admits, Neuromancer stands in something of an antagonistic relationshi p12 1, the 
whole novel finds its matrix in various pulp fictions, including those of the 
cowboy/frontier, spy, private detective and gangster genres, as well as in a more 
specific relationship to Thomas Pynchon. 122 Such mongrelization extends right 
through Neuromancer down to the primacy of the neologism itself, which is, 
perhaps, most clearly represented in the compound `cyberspace'. 123 We are, then, 
in a sense returned to the problematic of co-ordination, for, in its aggregation of 
forms, Neuromancer fails to afford a single generic point, other than itself, from 
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., `Cyberpunk and Neuromanticism', in Storming the Reality Studio: A 
Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodern Science Fiction, Larry McCaffrey (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 182-193 (p. 193). 
120 Scott Lash proposes that postmodernism may be understood as a culture of de-differentiation 
in contradistinction to the differentiation of modernism. Drawing upon Jean-Francois Lyotard's 
early work, his approach has, unfortunately, little in common with the one advanced here. 
However, it is interesting to note, given the imaginary rubric of de-differentiation in this chapter, 
that he draws on a metaphorics of spacing for much of his analysis: 'De-differentiation is also 
present in the postmodernist refusal to separate the author from his or her oeuvre or the audience 
from the performance; in the postmodernist transgression of the boundary (with no doubt greater 
or lesser success) between literature and theory, between high and popular culture, between what 
is properly cultural and what is properly social. ' Scott Lash, `Discourse or Figure? 
Postmodernism as a "Regime of Signification"', Theory, Culture & Society, 5: 2-3, (1988), 311- 
336, (p. 312). 
121 "`When I was starting out I simply tried to go in the opposite direction from most of the stuff I 
was reading"'. Brian McHale, Constructing Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 245. 
122 Ibid., c. f pp. 231-233. Unusually, Gibson concurs with his critics in telling Larry McCaffrey 
here that `"Pynchon has been a favourite writer and a major influence all along"'. `An Interview 
with William Gibson', p. 272. 
123 Gibson's explanation of the matrix of `cyberspace' is suitably inflected within the 
indeterminate rubric of irony: `"Assembled word cyberspace from small and readily available 
components of language. Neologic spasm: the primal act of pop poetics. Preceded any concept 
whatever. Slick and hollow - awaiting received meaning. "' Julian Stallabrass, `Empowering 
Technology: The Exploration of Cyberspace', New Left Review, 211, (1995), 3-32, (p. 5). What, 
of course, is not ironic about this description is how it attests to the value of the signifier in the 
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which to establish its meaning. For Jameson this is symptomatic of a wider 
problematic: 
From the generic standpoint, what interests us here is the 
way in which the former genres (thrillers, spy films, social exposes, 
science fiction, and so on) now conflate in a movement that re-enacts 
the dedifferentiation of the social levels, and by way of their own 
allegorization: so that the new post-generic genre films are allegories 
of each other, and of the impossible representation of the social 
totality itself. '24 
The irony of reading the form of Neuromancer as a symptom of the 
impossibility of negotiating the overdetermined social spaces of late capitalism is 
that cyberspace represents an attempt to overcome just such an impossibility in 
the first place. In fact, it is, as we shall see, the supreme example of a machinery 
of de-differentiation. 
3: With an Eve to the Future 
That Neuromancer's primary register is a visual one finds a particular 
resonance in the fact that it is also a `visionary' text. As the suffix `-mancer' 
suggests (from the Greek manteia, meaning `soothsaying'), the novel proclaims 
its divinatory project from the title onwards, one which finds Gibson sketching an 
market place. It is perhaps only the plasticity of `postmodernism' that can compare in this respect 
for sheer marketing success. 
124 Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and World Space in the World System 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 5. 
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intuitively suasive portrait of the near future. Part of the suasiveness of this 
account lies in the content-level detail he has picked up from postmodernity and 
re-cast, like geomantic earth, within another configuration that is, nevertheless, 
recognizably cognate with our own period. 123 Features, such as the company 
names and the hegemony of Japanese-American culture, right up to the obsession 
with the technologization of nature itself, are granted a sanction of plausibility 
from the reader precisely because they are extensions of existing practices. 
Indeed, anticipation in its own right is just such a practice, if not the dominant 
one of late capitalism, as the necessity of accelerating turnover time has 
occasioned a wholesale discounting of the future into the present. This, in turn, 
has spawned a mass expectancy industry concerned to forecast and forge market 
trends, using, more often than not, the very computer technology that forms the 
subject matter of Neuromancer. 
Speculation is also a defining characteristic of the imaginary mode. As 
Lacan comments, `[t]he mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is 
precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation', for the anaclitic child prefigures 
in an image the full development of its motor-nervous system and thus achieves a 
kind of self-mastery. 126 Such a child, in other words, is something of neuro 
(nerves) - mancer (of the future). In terms strikingly akin to these, Marshall 
123 In conversation with Larry McCaffrey, Gibson himself has commented on this facet of his 
work, noting that, `"When I write about technology, I write about how it has already affected our 
lives; I don't extrapolate in the way I was taught an SF writer should"'. `An Interview with 
William Gibson', p. 274. 126 tcrits, 
p. 4. 
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McLuhan has famously written of humanity's progress towards self-mastery by 
way of the annihilation of space-time: 
After three thousand years of explosion, by means of 
fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the Western World is 
imploding. During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies 
in space. Today, after more than a century of electronic technology, 
we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global 
embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is 
concerned. 127 
In this image of the extension of our central nervous system we can witness the 
problems of the imaginary amplified to global proportions. Once again the task 
of self-mastery is imperilled by its own success, ex-posing itself to the Kantian 
jeopardy of a boundless subjectivity that is pure self and that thereby fails to 
secure its own objective conditions of existence. In this respect, the `consensual 
hallucination' of cyberspace can be understood as a kind of collective solipsism 
in which the aspirations of bourgeois individualism are given free reign and end 
up being strangled on the leash. For Terry Eagleton these temporal and spatial 
projections are of a piece with each other: 
The fantasy of total technological omnipotence conceals a 
nightmare; in appropriating Nature you risk eradicating it, 
127 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 3-4. 
McLuhan's triumphalism is poignantly undercut some twenty years later by Jameson's 
befuddlement: `The newer architecture therefore - like many of the other cultural products I have 
evoked... - stands as something like an imperative to grow new organs, to expand our sensorium 
and our body to some new, yet unimaginable, perhaps ultimately impossible, dimensions'. 
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 39. Of course, just as Jameson was 
making this plea, Gibson was refining his own response to this crisis in the form of the reticulated 
networks of cyberspace, which, in one of its definitions, is `actually a drastic simplification of the 
human sensorium'. Neuromancer, p. 71. 
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appropriating nothing but your own acts of consciousness. There is a 
similar problem with predictability, which is surrendering phenomena 
into the hands of the sociological priests threatens to abolish history. 
Predictive science founds the great progressive narratives of middle- 
class history, but by the same stroke offers to undermine them, 
converting all diachrony to a secret synchrony. 128 
The tension that Eagleton alights upon here between the diachronic and the 
synchronic is endemic to all anticipatory projects and, as such, it enables us to 
read them in two seemingly contradictory ways. 
Firstly, while conceding that the imaginary mode fosters a secret 
synchronization, equally it expedites a form of diachronization by affording the 
nascent subject the possibility of narrativization. The anticipation of the mirrored 
infant enables it to impute to its current position a teleology it would otherwise 
lack, `decisively project[ing], ' as Lacan remarks, `the formation of the individual 
into history'. 129 We may understand this to mean re-situating our own present as 
cause rather than effect, which is to say as `history'. For Jameson, this is the 
generic function of science fiction, which, in presenting us with its possible 
futures, thereby `transform[s] our own present into the determinate past of 
something yet to come. It is this present moment.... that upon our return from the 
imaginary constructs of SF is offered to us in the form of some future world's 
remote past, as if posthumous and as though collectively remembered. 030 In 
128 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 74. '29) 
rits, p. 4. 
130 Fredric Jameson, `Progress Versus Utopia; or, Can we Imagine the Future? ', Science Fiction 
Studies, 9: 2, (1982), 147-158, (p. 152). It is also interesting to note that in this same article, 
Jameson proffers the neat, but ultimately unpersuasive, thesis that the emergence of SF as a 
discourse on the future corresponds to the disappearance of the historical novel. The former, he 
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Neuromancer it may be argued that this historicizing process offers itself up more 
clearly in the guise of redemption, or at least (given the dystopian qualities of 
Gibson's near future) the cool comforts of survival after the mutually assured 
destruction of the Cold War, which was threatening to thaw at the time of the 
novel's production. 
In the light of this, as Steven Connor notes, anticipation has come to 
acquire a regenerative potency as a narrative strategy: 
If one form of the novel of history is concerned with 
investigating the new relations to the past required by the dramatic 
changes of the late twentieth century, another from is concerned with 
the possibility of narrating a future, and with the assailed potential of 
narrative as such in a world in which absolute finality and closure, 
which had hitherto been available to human life through narratives, 
now threatened to bring to an end the narrative of human history. "' 
There is a sense in which the speculative novel does run the risk of effecting 
closure upon the narrative of history, and, as Eagleton points out above, of 
smuggling in synchrony under the assumption of diachrony. For like the 
narcissistic infant captivated by its own image, there is a danger of imagining the 
future in terms of the present and thereby of forming a closed circuit of 
representation. Neuromancer's all too persuasive future would seem to attest to 
this predicament, but in doing so it also bears testament to a collective 
argues, `now registers some nascent sense of the future, and does so in the space on which a sense 
of the past has once been inscribed'. Ibid., p. 150. 
131 Steven Connor, The English Novel in History: 1950-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 199- 
200. 
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enfeeblement of the utopian imagination. We are so thoroughly immersed in the 
here-and-now, that we are, as it were, inured to the future as much as we are 
inoculated against the past. For Jameson, science fiction's function is to disclose 
this limited horizon, because in `setting forth for the unknown, [it] finds itself 
irrevocably mired in the all-too-familiar, and thereby becomes unexpectedly 
transformed into a contemplation of our own absolute limits. 132 The limits of the 
postmodern are, as we have already noted, always those of the `self. One of the 
more notable expressions of this predicament is, for Eagleton, the triumphal 
pronouncements of the end of history - pronouncements which he takes to task in 
a suitably speculative register: 
It is not out of the question that, in the apparent absence of 
any "other" to the prevailing system, any utopic space beyond it, 
some of the more desperate theoreticians of the day might come to 
find the other of the system in itself. They might, in other words, 
come to project utopia onto what we actually have, finding in, say, the 
mobilities and transgressions of the capitalist order, the hedonism and 
pluralities of the marketplace, the circulation of intensities in media 
and disco, a freedom and fulfilment which the more puritanical 
politicos among us still grimly defer to some ever-receding future. 
They might fold the future into the present and thus bring history 
slithering abruptly to a halt. 133 
One of the more curious manifestations of the temporal folds that have been 
produced by Neuromancer is its effects on the development of technology. The 
132 `Progress Versus Utopia; or, Can We Imagine the Future? ', p. 153. 133 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 18-19. The 
point of `pretending to forecast what is already staring us in the face' is, according to Eagleton, `to 
estrange it to the point where we might be able to grasp something of its historical logic'. Ibid., 
p. 20. This, of course, echoes the insight we have already attributed to a `benign' reading of 
futurity in fiction. 
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novel's central innovation is, for example, discussed as if it were actually in 
existence, as Julian Stallabrass points out: 
[C]yberspace as a technological development has a strange 
status, not only because it has not been realized, but also because it is 
a concept which has its origins in fiction, particularly in the 
cyberpunk novels of William Gibson. 134 
So persuasive is Gibson's vision that the first virtual reality machine was named 
after cyberspace, British Telecom are developing a `neuro-camera' under the 
label `Soul Catcher' (from the title of Chapter 37 in Mona Lisa Overdrive) and 
Timothy Leary (now self-proclaimed virtual technology guru) has described 
Gibson as the author of the `underlying myth, the core legend, of the next stage of 
human evolution'. 135 The new machines of virtuality are, in other words, in an 
analogous position relative to Neuromancer, as the imaginary infant is to the 
image in the mirror. 
3 
15 
'Empowering Technology: The Exploration of Cyberspace', p. 5. 
13s Benjamin Woolley, Virtual Worlds: A Journey in Hype and Hyperreality (London: Penguin, 
1993), pp. 36-37. Gibson has registered his unease at this proclivity for epochal astrology, stating 
that, `"I sometimes get the feeling that technical people who like my work miss several layers of 
irony"'. Ibid., p. 37. Critics of cyberspace technology tend, like Mark Slouka, to be alarmed by it 
because it helps to accentuate `our growing separation from reality'. Mark Slouka, War of the 
Worlds: Cyberspace and the High-Tech Assault on Reality (London: Abacus, 1996), p. 1. For 
2izek, however, this alarm merely indexes an over-proximity to the 'secret' of reality, which is its 
very virtuality: '[T]he experience of virtual reality should... make us sensitive to how the 
"reality" with which we were dealing always-already was virtualized. The most elementary 
procedure of symbolic identification, identification with an Ego Ideal, involves... an identification 
with a virtual image: the place in the Big Other from which I see myself in the form in which I 
find myself likeable (the definition of Ego Ideal) is by definition virtual. Is not virtuality, 
therefore, the trademark of every, even the most elementary, ideological identification? When I 
see myself as a "democrat", a "communist", an "American", a "Christian", and so on, what I see 
is not directly "me": I identify with a virtual place in the discourse. And in so far as such an 
identification is constitutive of a community, every community is also stricto sensu always- 
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The enfeeblement of the utopic faculty may itself be read as a symptom of 
the encroachment of immediacy upon the postmodern subject. The geographies 
of enclosure, which we have already observed at work in the contemporary 
metropolis, are emblematic of this condition, and it is one that, as Jameson 
remarks, threatens the very practice of symptomology in the first place: 
The new space that emerges involves the suppression of 
distance (in the sense of Benjamin's aura) and the relentless 
saturation of any remaining voids and empty places, to the point 
where the postmodern body... is now exposed to a perceptual barrage 
of immediacy from which all sheltering layers and intervening 
mediations have been removed. 136 
Such a `suppression of distance', of course, is precisely the organizing principle 
of cyberspace, whose topeme is, as we have already noted, the container. Indeed, 
according to Gibson, cyberspace as a concept was intended to suggest... 
... the point at which media 
[flow] together and surround us. 
It's the ultimate extension of the exclusion of daily life. With 
cyberspace as I describe it you can literally wrap yourself in media 
and not have to see what's really going on around YOU. 137 
We may read this statement as an acknowledgement of the function of 
cyberspace as an imaginary resolution of the real problems of co-ordination that 
have been identified as so perplexing to the postmodern subject. For Bukatman 
already virtual. ' SlavojLi2ek, The Indivisible Remainder: Essays on Schelling and Related 
Matters (London: Verso, 1996), p. 194 
136 Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, pp. 412-413. 
137 Benjamin Woolley, Virtual Worlds: A Journey in Hype and Hyperreality, p. 122. 
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this is a reason for celebration, because, in its 'open acknowledgement of the 
supersession of individual bodily experience', cyberspace offsets the 
impoverishment of the self with a kind of cognitive compensation 138: 
[C]yberspace certainly hyperbolizes the space of the city, 
projecting the metroscape into an exaggerated representation that 
accentuates its bodiless vertigo, but it permits the existence of a 
powerful and controlling gaze. 39 
The power of this gaze lies in its ability to unify and thereby domesticate the 
city's heterogeneous spatial practices. In this respect, we might concede that it is 
cyberspace, and not Case, that assumes the mantle of `private eye' which for 
Raymond Williams is the emblem of urban rationalism. 
Nowhere is the status of the cyberspace subject more clearly realized as 
what Bukatman terms a `pure gaze' than in the climactic run of the novel'40: 
The Kuang program spurted from a tarnished cloud. Case's 
consciousness divided like beads of mercury, arcing above an endless 
beach the color of the dark silver clouds. His vision was spherical, as 
though a single retina lined the inner surface of a globe that contained 
all things, if all things could be counted. 141 
Perhaps the most significant part of this astounding image is the subjunctive 
mood of the last clause and its qualification of the totalizing claim made in the 
138 Terminal Identity, p. 149. 
139 Ibid., p. 150. 
140 Ibid., p. 151. 
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previous statement. The one `thing' that cannot be counted in this scenario is, of 
course, Case himself, reduced as he is to the status of a pure gaze. For Zilek this 
situation is exemplary of both the fantasy-gaze and, in a final irony for a 
postmodern text, the Cartesian cogito: 
Cogito designates [the] very point at which the "I" loses its 
support in the symbolic network of tradition and thus, in a sense 
which is far from metaphorical, ceases to exist. And the crucial point 
is that this pure cogito corresponds perfectly to the fantasy-gaze: in it, 
I found myself reduced to a non-existent gaze, i. e., after losing all my 
effective predicates, I am nothing but a gaze paradoxically entitled to 
observe the world in which I do not exist (like, say, the fantasy of 
parental coitus where I am reduced to a gaze which observes my own 
conception, prior to my actual existence, or the fantasy of witnessing 
my own funeral). 142 
In this respect, cyberspace, we might say, is a computerized cogito; a fantasy 
construct in which the `I' is absorbed by the `eye' and the subject is reduced to 
observing reality from behind his/her retina. Looking at everything from all 
sides, the cyberspace gaze embodies what Miran Bozovic describes as `the 
unbearable experience of the absolute point of view'. 143 This experience remains, 
however, an ideological one, because, as Stallabrass argues, 
141 Neuromancer, p. 304. 
142 Slavoj Liiek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993), p. 64. 
143 Miran BozoviZ, `The Man Behind His Own Retina', in Everything You Always Wanted to 
Know About Lacan (But Were Afraid To Ask Hitchcock), Slavoj Liiek (London: Verso, 1992), 
pp. 161-177 (p. 166). It is unbearable because, as Liiek notes elsewhere, `self-consciousness is the 
very opposite of self-transparency: I am aware of myself only insofar as outside of me a place 
exists where the truth about me is articulated'. Tarrying with the Negative, p. 67. The `absolute 
point of view', in other words, occasions the disappearance of the subject. In this respect, Liiek 
argues that `what brings about the "loss of reality" in cyberspace is not its emptiness (the fact that 
it is lacking with respect to the fullness of the real presence) but, on the contrary, its very 
excessive fullness (the potential abolition of the dimension of symbolic virtuality). Is not one of 
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[a] number of old bourgeois dreams are encompassed in the promise 
of this technology: to survey the world from one's living room, to 
grasp the totality of all data within a single frame, and to recapture a 
unified knowledge and experience. 144 
Stallabrass here reminds us that if cyberspace serves as a kind of cognitive map of 
the city (that is as a way of representing and reordering the relationship between 
the subject and the metropolis), then this is merely a level of mediation; what 
Jameson terms a `representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and 
control even more difficult for our minds and imaginations to grasp: the whole 
new decentred global network of the third stage of capital itself'. las 
We may understand this assertion more clearly by reference to one of the 
most graphic descriptions of cyberspace in Neuromancer: 
Program a map to display frequency of data exchange, every 
thousand megabytes a single pixel on a very large screen. Manhattan 
and Atlanta burn solid white. Then they start to pulse, the rate of 
traffic threatening to overload your simulation. Your map is about to 
go nova. Cool it down. Up your scale. Each pixel a million 
the possible reactions to the excessive filling-in of the voids of cyberspace therefore informational 
anorexia, the desperate refusal to accept information, in so far as it occludes the presence of the 
Real? ' The Plague of Fantasies, p. 155. Interestingly, Liiek links this filling-in of the hole that 
sustains the symbolic to the re-writing of canonical texts from the viewpoints of hitherto 
marginalized characters. These texts, such as Jean Rhys's Wide Sargasso Sea, Christa Wolf s 
Cassandra or Salman Rushdie `Yorick' (in East, West), thereby bear witness to an over-proximity 
to the real. If this remains an unconvincing thesis, it is perhaps because such isolated works fail to 
saturate their respective `ur-texts' in the way that other media, such as cyberspace, apparently 
saturate their respective provenances. Indeed, Wolf s own explanation of the `genre' seems far 
more persuasive when she writes, `How quickly does lack of speech turn into lack of identity? ' 
Christa Wolf, Cassandra: A Novel and Four Essays, trans. By Jan Van Heurck (London: Virago, 
1984), p. 161. 
144 'Empowering Technology', p. 4. 
145 postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. 38. 
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megabytes. At a hundred million megabytes per second, you begin to 
make out certain blocks in midtown Manhattan, outlines of hundred- 
year-old industrial parks ringing the old core of Atlanta.... 146 
Like capital itself, all qualities are transmuted into quantities here, recalibrated as 
a universal form of data and thus domesticated within `a single frame'. The 
recodification of data as absolutes, what Stallabrass affirms as `its transformation 
into readily understood visual forms', is what finally betrays the imaginary 
provenance of cyberspace. 147 At the time of Neuromancer's production, that is 
before 1984, computers were still essentially a literary technology, documenting 
data in terms of figures and words. 148 On Gibson's screens, however, data is 
represented pictorially and, as such, it represents a retreat from the differential 
values of the symbolic into the absolutism of the imaginary. 149 For Stallabrass 
this amounts to a Utopian gesture: 
Such quantitative modes of thought presuppose an identity between 
concept and object, word and thing, and privilege mathematical logic 
as alone capable of grasping the essence of things. The invention of 
cyberspace is, then, the attempt to create a world where to perceive is 
the same as to understand, where "objects" are entirely adequate to 
146 Neuromancer, p. 57. 
147 'Empowering Technology', p. 8. 
148 Indeed, Ian Parker pointedly notes that 'William Gibson used a manual typewriter to write his 
earliest cyberpunk novels, with his knowledge of word-processing, let alone email and the 
internet, gained second-hand from friends'. Ian Parker, Psychoanalytic Culture: Psychoanalytic 
Discourse in Western Society (London: Sage, 1997), p. 212. 
149 It is a feature of the new technology that Vivian Sobchack has commented upon in similar 
terms: `digital electronic technology atomizes and abstractly schematizes the analogic quality of 
the photographic and cinematic into discrete pixels and bits of information that are transmitted 
serially, each bit discontinuous, discontiguous, and absolute - each bit "being-in-itself' even as it 
is part of a system. ' Vivian Sobchack, `The Scene of the Screen: Towards a Phenomenology of 
Cinematic and Electronic Presence', Post-Script, 10, (1990), 50-59, (p. 56). 
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their concepts, and are even, through their dematerialization, identical 
with them. so 
What such a space ultimately represents, however, is a world without lack, a 
`Shangri-da' we might say, in which the constitutive insufficiency of the 
symbolic is fatally replenished by the transparency of the image. Lacking any 
point of mediation, representation thus collapses back into reality and the subject 
disappears from the signifying chain, finally failing to enjoy the ostensive 
paradise that it has dreamt about for so long. 
The irony of this disposition, in which the realization of the fantasy of the 
subject occasions the subject's death, is articulated, paradoxically, by the refusal 
of death in Neuromancer. As Sponsler notes, `[r]ather than marking the end of 
one person's life, death can be nearly infinitely evaded, with humans such as Herr 
Virek or the Dixie Flatline being kept alive in machinelike eternity in vats or as 
computer constructs'. 151 Case, for example, begins the narrative renting `a coffin' 
in Cheap Hotel where he is described as `grinn[ing] like a skull'. 152 However, 
despite this close association with death, he ends the novel starting, what we have 
already observed, as a new life. In this respect, the matrix can be said to function 
150 Ibid., p. 31. The abstractive register of cyberspace finds its conditions of possibility in what we 
might term the urban experience of generalizable immigration, as Eagleton explains: `The 
deracinated fate of the modernist exiles and emigres is a material condition for the emergence of a 
newly formalizing, universalizing thought, one which having spurned the ambiguous comforts of 
a motherland can now cast a bleak analytic eye, from its "transcendental" vantage-point in some 
polyglot metropolis, on all such specific historical legacies, discerning the hidden global logics by 
which they are governed. ' The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 321. 
151 `Cyberpunk and the Dilemmas of Postmodem Narrative', p. 633. In this respect, Neuromancer 
is, according to Thomas Pynchon, typical of science fiction: `I suspect one of the reasons that 
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as something of a life-support machine. This insistence upon living nevertheless 
signifies an imaginary death because, as Lacan remarks, `the symbol manifests 
itself first of all as the murder of the thing'. '53 Which is to say that death is 
constitutive of the symbolic order because the symbol, as placeholder of the 
thing, substitutes the thing and effectively kills it. If the symbol stands as the 
gravestone of the thing, then, it is appropriate that Case begins the novel in a 
coffin for, as Lacan comments, `[t]he first symbol in which we recognize 
humanity in its vestigial traces is the sepulture'. 1TM Case's refusal to lie down and 
die in the coffin therefore designates his refusal of symbolization and a 
concomitant retreat into the delusions of the imaginary. The essentially 
solipsistic character of this manoeuvre (that is, its abnegation of intersubjective 
relations) is evinced by Lacan's point that... 
... 
[i]t is in effect as a desire for death that [the subject] 
affirms himself for others; if he identifies himself with the other, it is 
by fixing him solidly in the metamorphosis of his essential image, and 
no being is ever evoked by him except among the shadows of 
death. '55 
fantasy and science fiction appeal so much to younger readers is that... mortality is so seldom an 
issue. ' Thomas Pynchon, Slow Learner: Early Stories (London: Vintage, 1995,1984), p. 5. 
152 Neuromancer, p. 30 and p. 32 respectively. 
153 merits, p. 104. 
154 Ibid., p. 104. Commenting on this passage, Bowie argues that `[i]f analytic practice places its 
main stress on the Imaginary, and on the bolstering of the ego, it will find itself purging death- 
fears and death-desires from its activities. At worst, it will collude with the analysand in creating 
an empty and demeaning sense of immortality. A stress on the Symbolic, on the other hand, 
allows the individual's mortality to speak and be spoken; it allows him to be unillusioned in his 
desire, and for a time, to fly in the face of the Real. ' Lacan, p. 100. 
iss Ecrits, p. 105. 
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The technology that perpetuates life in Neuromancer thus finally denies the death 
that would give that life any meaning. As with the transcendental vista that 
cyberspace seems to offer at the expense of the loss of the subject for whom it is 
meant to benefit, the imaginary placations of Neuromancer are a set of self- 
undoing conceits fit only for the habituation of capital and psychosis. Indeed, it 
is to this grim pairing that we must now turn. 
4: Postmortemism 
The veracity of Jameson's contention that, in postmodernity, `urban punks 
are merely the opposite numbers to the business yuppies' is perhaps given its 
most brutally convincing testament in American Psycho by Bret Easton Ellis. '56 
In this truly rebarbative narrative, Ellis adumbrates the singular monotony of the 
life of a powerful New York financier, Patrick Bateman, and his ineluctable 
descent into a psychopathic hell where `no-one is safe, [and] nothing is 
156 The Seeds of Time, p. 152. There is depressingly little literature on this, one of the most 
technically accomplished novels of recent years. As Nancy and Joe Applegate report, the initial 
reviews of the novel were concerned to elaborate a sensationalized indignance at its detailed 
anatomies of the act of murder, thereby giving the `impression that critics seem[ed] to be quoting 
the same one or two offensive passages, without attempting to read the entire book before 
condemning it'. Nancy and Joe Applegate, `Prophet or Pornographer: An Evaluation of Black 
Humor in American Psycho', Notes on Contemporary Literature, 25, (1995), 10-12, (p. 10). 
Elizabeth Young advances a compelling analysis of these shocked reviews: `The publication of 
Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho in 1991 was replete with ironies. It seemed as if the world 
had decided to add to the book all the old-fashioned fictional qualities that it so conspicuously 
lacked: melodrama, plot, characterization, irony, hubris. The story of the book - its publication 
history, its author, is controversial aspects, its fashionability - has to stand in for the lack of story 
in the book which no one seemed to bother to read in any detail. ' Elizabeth Young, `The Beast in 
the Jungle, The Figure in the Carpet: Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho', in Shopping in Space: 
Essays on American "Blank Generation " Fiction, Elizabeth Young and Graham Caveney 
(London and New York: Serpent's Tail, 1992), pp. 85-122 (p. 85). 
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redeemed'. 157 Here, the truth of Lacan's dictum that `no being is ever evoked by 
him except among the shadows of death' is morbidly literalized in the bloody 
recrudescence of Bateman's indifferent and indiscriminate butchery of the 
denizens of New York. The reason for this savagery may have its origins in the 
fact that, as he claims when asked why he works even though he is superfluously 
rich, "`I... want... to... fit... in"'. 158 This halting articulation of his desire to belong 
to a society he routinely eviscerates is paradoxical only in so far as we fail to 
designate the imaginary mode of the psychopath as being precisely the facsimile 
of the society of yuppie New York. 159 What Bateman's homicidal activities 
represent is an attempt to wrest meaning from the soporific homogeneity of a 
culture in which the only value is exchange and therefore in which `everyone is 
interchangeable anyway'. 160 
Such numbing indifference to particulars is, perversely, a kind of 
hyperbolic pluralism, characteristic of the late capitalist vanguard, in which even 
the most intractable individuation is effortlessly absorbed in the abstract and thus 
'57 Bret Easton Ellis, American Psycho (London: Picador, 1991), p. 377. 
'58Ibid., p. 237. 
159 For Elizabeth Young, Bateman `is Everyyuppie', an aggregate indistinctness of consumerist 
practices whose existence can only be divined from the signature on his American Express Gold 
Card slips. `The Beast in the Jungle, The Figure in the Carpet', p. 103. 
160 American Psycho, p. 379. The interchangeable subject is also the subject of democracy as 
Zilek notes: `The subject of democracy ... 
is none other than the Cartesian subject in all its 
abstraction, the empty punctuality we reach after subtracting all its particular contents. In other 
words there is a structural homology between the Cartesian procedure of radical doubt that 
produces the cogito, an empty point or reflective self-reference as a remainder, and the preambles 
of every democratic proclamation "all people without regard to (race, sex, religion, wealth, social 
status)". We should not fail to notice the violent act of abstraction at work in this "without regard 
to"; it is an abstraction of all positive features, a dissolution of all substantial, innate links, which 
produces an entity strictly correlative to the Cartesian cogito as a point of pure, nonsubstantial 
subjectivity. ' Slavoj Zilek, Looking Awry: An Introduction To Jacques Lacan Through Popular 
Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: MIT Press, 1992), p. 163. 
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ruthlessly divested of its meaning. As Eagleton comments, `[c]apitalism is the 
most pluralistic order history has ever known, restlessly transgressing boundaries 
and dismantling oppositions, pitching together diverse life-forms and continually 
overflowing the measure'. 161 If the appellation `yuppie' indexes the perfection of 
consumerism, it is only realized by disabling all evaluative machinery and 
leaving in its stead the singular calibration of the commodity form. The 
taxonomic obsession of even the most diluted of late capitalist societies - (What 
hair type do you have? What skin tone? What car? What child? What politics? 
What life style? ) - is thus pushed to its limits in American Psycho by the 
interminable cataloguing of clothes, restaurants, equipment, manners and people: 
... vases and felt 
fedoras with feather headbands and alligator 
toiletry cases with gilt-silver bottles and brushes and shoehorns that 
cost two hundred dollars and candlesticks and pillow covers and 
gloves and slippers and powder puffs and handknitted cotton 
snowflake sweaters and leather skates and Porsche-design ski goggles 
and antique apothecary bottles and diamond earrings and boots and 
vodka glasses and card cases and cameras and mahogany servers and 
scarves and aftershaves and photo albums and salt and pepper shakers 
and ceramic-toaster cookie jars and two-hundred-dollar shoehorns 162 and backpacks and aluminium lunch pails and pillow covers... 
The inscription of commodities within the inventories that pepper American 
Psycho provides a structural qualification of their individual value as the 
transmute seamlessly into each other, thereby sundering each item from its 
161 The Illusions of Postmodernism p. 133. 162 American Psycho, p. 179. Many critics have identified the list as a key trope of postmodernist 
fiction, usually arguing, with Brian McHale, that its effect is one of `evacuating language of 
presence, leaving only a shell behind -a word list, a mere exhibition of words'. Brian McHale, 
Postmodernist Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987), p. 153.1 would concur with this argument but 
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prospective usefulness and robbing it of meaning. This is manifest here in the 
fact that the two hundred dollar shoehorn is listed twice and that, as with the other 
inventories, this list has no beginning and no end. Each object thus assumes the 
status of a signifier, with the effect that, as Jean Baudrillard notes, `[r]eferential 
value is annihilated, giving the structural play of value the upper hand'. '63 
Choice thus cheats itself in the same moment that its radical possibility is 
realized. Variety, in this instance, is relegated to mere form, a parodic abstraction 
which marks the self-cancelling recto and verso of absolute difference and 
absolute identity. It is little wonder, then, that `[s]ome kind of existential chasm 
opens before [Bateman] while [he's] browsing in Bloomingdale's'. '64 The 
pluralism that finds its deftest articulation in the lists of products leaves him 
bereft of any kind of ethical mooring from which to anchor his evaluations. If, 
symptomatically, he chooses to paper over the abyss by buying `six tubes of 
shaving cream while flirting nervously with girls who work there', it is equally a 
dramatization of the colonization of the commodity form that he decides `this 
emptiness has, at least in part, some connection with the way [he] treated Evelyn 
at Barcadia the other night, though there is always the possibility it could just as 
easily have something to do with the tracking device on [his] VCR'. 16' For, quite 
as much as the ready transplantation of the human and the mechanical in 
Neuromancer, American Psycho highlights the ease of trafficking between the 
add the proviso that this should be seen as a symptom of, among other factors, the incontinence of 
the commodity form being discussed here. 
163 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. by lain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage 
Publications, 1993,1976), p. 6. 
164 American Psycho, p. 179. 
165Ibid., pp. 179-180. 
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organic and the artificial. This process begins in the novel as an assertion of 
qualitative equipollency: 
screen. 
"He's rich, " I say. 
"Everybody's rich, " she says, concentrating on the TV 
"He's good-looking, " I tell her. 
"Everybody's good-looking, Patrick, " she says remotely. 
"He has a great body, " I say. 
"Everybody has a great body now, " she says. ' 
Quality is here alchemized into quantity, as what was a mark of differentiation 
within a social unit - what may be quaintly termed rank - now serves only as a 
badge of divarication from other social units. Thus it comes as little surprise that 
much of the humour of the novel arises from the protagonists' endless mistaking 
of each other for each other, to the point where Bateman manages to snare one of 
his victims, Owen, by playing on just this interchangeability. Equally, much of 
the disgust that American Psycho inspires turns on the vicious treatment of those 
characters, like the tramps, who remain forever outside the province of yuppie 
perfection: 
Coming out of the cab he eyes a beggar on the street - 
`Bingo: thirty" - wearing some sort of weird, tacky, filthy green 
jumpsuit, unshaven, dirty hair greased back, and jokingly Price holds 
the cab's door open for him. The bum, confused and mumbling, eyes 
locked shamefully on the pavement, holds an empty Styrofoam coffee 
cup out to us, clutched in a tentative hand. 
"I suppose he doesn't want the cab, " Price snickers, 
slamming the cab door. 
"Ask him if he takes American Express. " 
166 Ibid., p. 23. 
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"Do you take Am Ex? " 
The bum nods yes and moves away, shuffling slowly. 
It's cold for April and Price walks briskly down the street 
towards Evelyn's brownstone, whistling "If I Were A Rich 
167 Man.... 
Here the qualitative impoverishment of the individual beggar is transmogrified 
into an instance of quantity (the thirtieth beggar Price has counted on their short 
taxi journey); the clothes of the tramp signifying an absolute difference ('sort of 
weird') from those interchangeable designer garments that measure the absolute 
identity of the yuppie demesne and which Bateman's narrative tirelessly, and for 
the reader tiresomely, describes. 
It is but a short step from such seeming expressions of moral lassitude to a 
total recuperation of the Lebenswelt within the operations of the commodity form, 
as individuals become just one more fetishized object in the chain of abstraction 
that disinterestedly links all objects together. In this nightmare of blandness, 
where all content is subject to an indefinite truancy - (to the point where such 
consumer lullabies as the wok of Genesis, Whitney Houston and Huey Lewis and 
the News aptly provide the soundtrack for a psychopath) - Bateman's 
topography, `the geography around which my reality revolved', is rendered as a 
kind of pure aridity. 168 Absolute hedonism turns back on itself to become total 
asceticism, such that `where there was nature and earth, life and water, I saw a 
167 Ibid., p. 7. 
1611 Ibid., p. 375. 
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desert landscape that was unending'. 169 Everything from sex to salt cellars, 
slumgullion to stereos, is grist for the equivalency mill in which infelicities are 
carved up and blankly spat out in the manner of Bertolt Brecht's stockyard 
sausage machines, even while Bateman sleeps: 
The dreams are an endless reel of car wrecks and disaster 
footage, electric chairs and grisly suicides, syringes and mutilated 
pinup girls, flying saucers, marble Jacuzzis, pink peppercorns. '70 
As Bateman notes, `surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning 
in... this was civilisation as I saw it'. 171 Of course, if meaning is only produced 
by difference, then a homogeneity of surface forestalls this at source and fosters 
the kind of society in which all residual humanism is effaced. Bateman's banal 
confession of brutality can thus be equally banally absorbed by those around him: 
I pause, distracted, and then stand up. Before walking into 
the bathroom I mutter, "And then? I beat the living shit out of her. " 
I open the medicine cabinet for a condom and, as I re-enter the 
bedroom, say "She had misspelled disabled. I mean that's not the 
reason I did what I did but... you know. " I shrug. "She was too 
ugly to rape. " 
Daisy stands up, placing the spoon next to the Haagen-Dazs 
on the Gilbert Rode-designed nightstand. 
169 Ibid., p. 374. 
170 Ibid., p. 371. For Eagleton, `[e]ach act of commodity exchange is at once uniquely 
differentiated and a monotonous replaying of the same old story. The epitome of the commodity 
is thus the cult of fashion, in which the familiar returns with some slight variation, the very old 
and the very new caught up together in some oxymoronic logic of identity-in-difference. ' The 
Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 317. This, of course, is the same imaginary logic that Guy Debord has 
identified as underwriting the society of the spectacle: `Like modern society, the spectacle is at 
once united and divided. In both the unity is grounded in a split. As it emerges in the spectacle, 
however, this contradiction is itself contradicted by virtue of a reversal of its meaning: division is 
presented as unity, and unity as division. ' Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by 
Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994,1967), p. 36. 
171 American Psycho, p. 375. 
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I point. "No. Put it in the carton. " 
"Oh, sorry, " she says. 
She admires a Palazetti vase while I slip on the condom. I 
get on top of her and we have sex and lying beneath me she is only a 
shape, even with all the halogen lamps burning. 172 
As elsewhere in the novel, Bateman's admission of homicidal culpabilities, which 
can almost be seen as a plea to make a difference, to make meaning (especially 
his taped confession), is readily factored into the all pervasive identity of the 
world around him, to the point where his statements are no more meaningful than 
any others. Bateman is not cut adrift from society, but rather fully "`in touch 
with... humanity"'. 173 His oft-quizzed expertise on manners and presentation 
marks him out as a paradigmatic instance of his class. In this respect, we can 
understand the obsession with etiquette in the novel as merely an alibi for the 
deeper moral precepts which have been sublated by the dialectic of the market 
place and preserved in the fetish of dress codes. 
Whilst manners once functioned as a discreet compact between puissance 
and pleasure, invigorating the social Lebenswelt with a set of naturally felt 
consensual practices that served as a bulwark against the rather more unpleasant 
coerciveness of the law, then the yuppie sociolect of American Psycho would 
seem to represent a wholesale collapse into means rather than ends, that is, means 
as ends. Which is to say that whereas the aesthetic qua manners (in Edmund 
172 Ibid., p. 213. Leigh Brock argues, not altogether persuasively, that `[i]f Ellis didn't describe 
Bateman's cold removal of himself from both his crimes and victims, the graphic violence would 
overwhelm the readers' and it is thus that `[t]he exceedingly graphic episodes become more dull 
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Burke's work for example) was seen as a means of securing social cohesion, in 
American Psycho pleasurable conduct becomes its own end, and thus, like the 
work of art itself, sinks into a kind of autotelic solipsism divorced from the social 
machinery it was designed to bolster. What begins with the idea of aestheticizing 
morality, finishes with the morality of aesthetics. If manners once served as a 
kind of perpetual serenade by the law, then such subliminal wooing may now be 
said to have assumed its own telos, a feature that is emblematized in that most 
pervasive and pernicious of terms - `lifestyle'. Manners, in American Psycho, 
are subject to a moral kenosis as the ethical content of conduct is flushed out, 
leaving behind the pleasing husk of their form, such that `the meticulous 
disciplining of the body' which Eagleton ascribes to eighteenth century manners 
is here parodied in a narcissistic obsession with tans, taut bellies and how many 
bench presses Bateman can do in the shortest possible time. 174 If, then, 
`pleasurable conduct is the true index of successful hegemony' and `[t]he 
maladroit or aesthetically disproportioned thus signals in its modest way a certain 
crisis of political power', the etiquettal obsession of Bateman and his coterie 
would suggest that such hegemonization has secured itself as thoroughly as 
possible. 175 One of the novel's epigraphs, an extract from Fortune magazine's 
`Miss Manners', points to just this conclusion: 
than interesting'. Leigh Brock, `Distancing in Bret Easton Ellis' American Psycho', Notes on 
Contemporary Literature, 24, (1994), 6-8, (p. 7). 
173 American Psycho, p. 341. 
174 The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p. 41. 
175 Ibid., p. 42. 
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That's what civilisation is about - doing it in a mannerly and 
not an antagonistic way. One of the places we went wrong was the 
naturalistic Rousseauean movement of the Sixties in which people 
said, "Why can't you just say what's on your mind? " In civilisation 
there have to be some restraints. If we followed every impulse, we'd 
be killing one another. 176 
The irony here, of course, is that Bateman does end up killing people, precisely 
because he follows `every impulse', for manners are just such a set of covertly 
organized impulses. They are the most refined apparatuses of capitalist 
hegemony and his butchery is thus no more than the splenetic expression of the 
logic of capital in its least unsullied form. For if capital has now achieved a kind 
of global consensus, it is a consensus riven with antagonisms which find their 
seat deep in the heart of the postmodem subject. As one of the other epigraphs to 
American Psycho attests, characters like Bateman `not only exist in our society, 
but indeed, must exist, considering the circumstances under which our society has 
generally been formed'. 'n 
Miss Manners' plea to act `in a mannerly and not an antagonistic way' is a 
reminder of the imaginary topography of postmodernist hegemony and how, upon 
this terrain, resemblances, conformities and sympathies work to occlude the 
oppressive liabilities exacted by the law. Which is to say that dissent is always- 
already implicated in the moment of consensus. At one level, then, Bateman's 
mirrored relationship to the world is little more than a stark dramatization of the 
176 American Psycho, p. 1. For Ellis, Bateman is '"A mixture of GQ and Stereo Review and 
Fangoria... and Vanity Fair"'. Elizabeth Young, `The Beast in the Jungle, The Figure in the 
Carpet', p. 101. 
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erotic-aggressive tension that subtends the nexus between imago and infant, as he 
makes love to those he massacres. For Jacqueline Rose, `this relation of the 
libidinal object-tie to identification reveals perhaps at its clearest the paradox that 
the subject finds or recognizes itself through an image which simultaneously 
alienates it, and hence, potentially confronts it. This is the basis of the close 
relationship between narcissism and aggressivity. "78 It is a relationship that we 
can find also operating in the characterization of Case and the talismanic anger 
accompanying him throughout Neuromancer. 
He still had his anger. That was like being rolled in some 
alley and waking to discover your wallet still in your pocket, 
untouched. He warmed himself with it, unable to give it a name or an 
object. 179 
Accepting that Case and Bateman are fully hegemonized subjects, we can see 
their respective aggressivities as a `working through' of the imaginary logic of the 
law. Which is to say that, on the one hand, the law is a narcissistic entity, 
regulated by itself and therefore self-authorizing, and that, on the other hand, this 
totalization occludes a bifurcation constitutively essential to its autonomy. It is a 
point also noted by Eagleton: 
The law is the law it must be obeyed for its own sake, since 
if one can adduce reasons for obeying it it ceases in that moment to be 
absolute. In this empty tautology, then, can be glimpsed something of 
"' American Psycho, p. 1. 72 Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of V ision (London: Verso, 1996,1986), p. 174. ý" Neurovnmwcer, p. 186. 
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the madness of the law, which since it is a law unto itself, answerable 
to no other authority, is sheerly anarchic. 180 
Inscribed within the law is a lawlessness essential to it that stems from the 
aboriginal compact by which the law came into being in the first place, when, in a 
moment of violent self-authorization, it announces a legality without reference to 
any other law but itself. As Zizek comments, "`[alt the beginning" of the law, 
there is a certain "outlaw", a certain Real of violence which coincides with the act 
itself of the establishment of the reign of law. 181 For it to be efficacious the law 
must then proceed, as it were, with its fingers trailing in lethic waters, while still 
maintaining a crepuscular awareness of the fact that its primal scene has to and 
`will persist as a repressed traumatic kernel, since to eradicate this would be to 
abolish the condition of legality as such'. 182 The name of this forgetting is that 
set of aesthetic practices we have been calling hegemony. Just as the infant is 
seduced by his Gestalt into an anticipation of powers he does not have, so the 
populace is seduced by the totality of the law into expunging the memory of the 
law's fragmented and ultimately fragile grounding. 
It is therefore altogether appropriate that Bateman's confessional narrative 
discloses the normally occult fissuring of his subjectivity at just that point when 
180 Terry Eagleton, Heathcl and The Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture (London: Verso, 
1995), p. 45. 
18 Slavoj 2iiek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment As a Political Factor (London: 
Verso, 1991), p. 204. 192 Heathcli ff and the Great Hunger, p. 46. 
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he encounters for the first time the brute fact of the law behind the eternal 
seductiveness of hegemony: 
... racing 
blindly down Greenwich I lose control entirely, the 
cab swerves into a Korean deli, next to a karaoke restaurant called 
Lotus Blossom I've been to with Japanese clients, the cab rolling over 
fruit stands, smashing through a wall of glass, the body of a cashier 
thudding across the hood, Patrick tries to put the cab in reverse but 
nothing happens, he staggers out of the cab, leaning against it, a 
nerve-racking silence follows, "nice going Bateman, " he mutters, 
limping out of the store, the body on the hood moaning in agony, 
Patrick with no idea where the cop running toward him across the 
street has come from, he's yelling something into his walkie-talkie, 
thinking Patrick is stunned, but Patrick surprises him by lunging out 
before the cop can get to his gun and he knocks him over onto the 
sidewalk... g 
The narcissistic totality of the `I', which has organized the narrative coherence of 
American Psycho until this point in the novel, here splinters, acceding to the 
alienation of the third person singular to the extent of taking that to the second 
power ("`nice going Bateman"'). Crucially this occurs when the consensual gives 
way to the coercive and Bateman recognizes the contingency of the law by 
attacking the policeman. The obscene face of the law thus comes to see itself in 
the mirror that is Bateman, as the repressed returns to re-enact the law's own 
conditions of possibility by staging a bloody battle for the right to assert 
legitimacy, which provisionally ends with Bateman `shoot[ing] him in the 
face'. 184 That it is a battle for legitimacy is realized in the coded shift of personal 
pronouns: 
183 American Psycho, p. 349. 
'841bid., p. 349. 
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... the terror 
he thought had passed engulfing him again, 
thinking; I have no idea what I've done to increase my chances of 
getting caught, I shot a saxophonist? A saxophonist? Who was 
probably a mime too? For that I get this? And in the near distance he 
can hear other cars coming... '85 
The imaginary unity of the subject and the law is manifest in the `I' here which 
implicitly acknowledges that what he has done is wrong and that he could 
therefore be theoretically caught. This sense of culpability is then dissolved by a 
series of questions about the value of the person he executed, to which the law 
can clearly offer no transcendental answers. In turn, this results in the re- 
fracturing of the imaginary unity, manifest in the form of the third person 
singular, as Bateman seeks to assert his own law and does so by killing more 
policemen. 
This encounter with the law, then, constitutes Bateman's moment of 
subjectification, providing we take that to mean, as we have been doing so far, the 
persistence of a certain opacity in the signifying chain. As Ernesto Laclau argues, 
`I am a subject precisely because I cannot be an absolute consciousness, because 
something constitutively alien confronts me'. 186 In this instance the absolutism of 
185 Ibid., p. 350. 186 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation (London: Verso, 1996), p. 21. In the 'Preface' to Liiek's The 
Sublime Object of Ideology, Laclau advances the necessity for such a formulation in its `break 
with structure-subject dualism, positing the question of "social agency" in terms which clearly go 
beyond all objectivism. There is subject because the substance - objectivity - does not manage to 
constitute itself fully; the location of the subject is that of a fissure at the very centre of the 
structure. The traditional debate as to the relationship between agent and structure thus appears 
fundamentally displaced: the issue is no longer a problem of autonomy, of determinism versus 
free will, in which two entities fully constituted as "objectivities" mutually limit each other. On 
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the law `alienates' the absolutism of Bateman and thus is disclosed the 
constitutive fracturing of the third person singular. Later in the novel this 
manifests itself more properly as a self-consciousness about the illusory 
construction of self, 
... there 
is an idea of a Patrick Bateman, some kind of 
abstraction, but there is no real me, only an entity, something illusory, 
and though I can hide my cold gaze and you can shake my hand and 
feel flesh gripping yours and maybe you can even sense our lifestyles 
are probably comparable: I simply am not there. '87 
The solipsism of the imaginary order leaves its subject bereft of the objectivity 
upon which subjectivity needs to be grounded, shearing it from the referent and 
stranding Bateman in the realm of pure ideation, one `sign' among others. At the 
level of form this is manifest in American Psycho by the adherence throughout 
the novel to the present tense, as Bateman is consigned to a perpetual fugacity. 
Its effect at the level of content is precisely to abnegate the import of content, 
each sentence being interchangeable with another in a kind of temporal, and 
ultimately historical, paralysis that finds no release in the claustrophobic last 
words of the novel: 'THIS IS NOT AN EXIT'. '88 
the contrary, the subject emerges as a result of the failure of substance in the process of its self- 
constitution. ' Ernesto Laclau, 'Preface', in Slavoj Liiek, The Sublime Object of Ideology 
(London: Verso, 1989), p. xv. It is in this light that we may read Lacan's otherwise misleading 
remark: 'What do we call a subject? Quite precisely, what in the development of objectivation, is 
outside of the subject. ' Jacques Lacan, Seminar 1: Freud's Papers on Technique - 1953-54, trans. by John Forrester (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 194. 187 American Psycho, pp. 376-377. 188 Ibid., p. 399. 
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The ellipses that begin and end each segment of the text in the chapter 
concerning Bateman's encounter with the law would then seem to betoken a 
constitutive vacancy which can be read variously in terms of diachrony, 
objectivity and subjectivity, but ultimately can be thought of as an evacuation of 
content. As with the inventories of commodities, these 'paragraphs' are as close 
to assuming the form of a list of actions as it is possible to imagine without 
actually forsaking narrative completely. Each action is packaged by commas 
(`leaning against it, a nerve-racking silence follows') which mark the limits of 
equivalence at the level of sense, which if it is not yet the phoneme, is at least no 
longer that older syntactical unit of the sentence. That the form of the confession 
should properly assume the form of the commodity catalogue during Bateman's 
encounter with the law signifies the disjunction between his hegemonization by 
capital (which we notarised earlier with the term `yuppie') and society's 
adherence to that diluted form of capitalism known as liberalism. However, the 
former is increasingly trespassing on the latter with the result that more so than 
ever before, the law of private property provides the informing principle behind 
the hegemony of late capitalism, transforming everything into an imaginary 
relationship with itself, as Marx argues: 
With the mass of new objects grows the realm of alien 
powers to which man is subjected, and each new product is a new 
potentiality of mutual fraud and mutual pillage. Man becomes ever 
poorer as a man. And needs ever more money if he is to achieve 
mastery over the hostile being. [... ] The quantity of money becomes 
more and more its sole important property. Just as it reduces itself in 
the course of its own movement to something quantitative. Lack of 
moderation and intemperance become its true standard. ... the 
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expansion of production and needs becomes the inventive and ever 
calculating slave of inhuman, refined, unnatural and imaginary 
appetites - for private property does not know how to transform crude 
need into human need. Its idealism is fantasy, caprice and 
infatuation. 189 
We may trace some of this sorry appetence for money in Bateman's obsession 
with `the mysterious Fisher account', which proceeds despite the fact that the 
narrative fails to recount him doing any work on the accounts he already has. 190 
Equally, Bateman admits to stopping `at an automated teller where just for the 
hell of it I take out another hundred dollars, feeling better for having an even five 
hundred in my wallet'. 191 Money becomes valued here for its own sake, 
describing a circular correspondence that is ultimately merely quantitative. 
It is only in Bateman's encounter with the law that we may glimpse a 
betrayal of this circular logic, as the synchrony of the imaginary order gives way 
to a subreption of the diachronic. For the tautology of `the law is the law' works 
to occlude its own historicity, that is its conditions of possibility, but precisely in 
that work is disclosed those conditions, as Zizek argues: 
Let us return to the case of capitalism: what one can present 
dialectically is the "synchronous" functioning of the capitalist system 
in so far as this system has already "posited its presuppositions", 
reordered its external starting points so that they now function as 
inner moments of the closed circle of its self-reproduction. The role 
of historical description is, however, to "go through" the fantasy 
189 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, trans. by Gregor Benton, in Early 
Writings (London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1974,1844), pp. 358-359. 
190 American Psycho, p. 216. 
191 Ibid., p. 128. 
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which masks this vicious circle: to denounce the mythical narration 
by means of which the synchronous system retroactively organizes its 
own past, its own origins, and to render visible the contingent reality 
full of blood and brute force. 192 
Capitalism's fantasy is, as Marx argues, the myth of primitive accumulation 
which `plays approximately the same role in political economy as original sin 
does in theology': 
[T]he accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; 
surplus-value presupposes capitalist production; capitalist production 
presupposes the availability of considerable masses of capital and 
labour-power in the hands of commodity producers. The whole 
movement, therefore, seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, 
which we can only get out of by assuming a primitive accumulation 
(the "previous accumulation" of Adam Smith) which precedes 
capitalist accumulation; an accumulation which is not the result of the 
capitalist mode of production but its point of departure. 193 
Opposed to this myth of the profligate and the frugal, Marx contends that `[I]n 
actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, 
in short, force, play the greatest part'. 194 Bateman, a kind of ne plus ultra of 
capitalist subjectivity, is himself the repressed diachrony of the synchronic myth. 
The ritual torture and execution he enacts on those around him is a staging of the 
conditions of possibility of the "surplus wealth" that initiates capitalism, 
conditions of possibility that are inscribed in law. These barbarous statutes, as 
outlined by Marx in Chapter 28 of Capital, include whipping `until the blood 
192 For They Know Not What They Do, p.. 212. 193 Karl Marx, Capital; A Critique of Political Economy - Volume 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes 
(London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1976,1867), p. 873. 
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streams from their bodies', slicing off half an ear, slavery, branding and finally 
execution without mercy. 195 Bateman's excoriation of his victims can thus be 
understood as an allegorical stripping away of historical layers, an almost childish 
dismembering of the synchronic machine to discover the secret mechanism of 
meaning (diachrony) which elsewhere completely eludes him. The fact that he 
never finds anything except his `utter indifference toward it', is not surprising 
because it is Bateman qua the pathology of capitalism as a historical process that 
is the real meaning. '96 Like the infant who retroactively posits the corps morcele 
as the fantasy matrix of its totality, Bateman can find no origin for his "myth", no 
primal scene from which to index the conception of his subject position, for there 
is, as Gallop points out, `nothing there'. 197 
As is now clear, then, Bateman's confrontation with a law that is designed 
to protect his interests as a capitalist operates in American Psycho as a kind of 
faultline whose eruption lays bare the contingency of his subjectivity, the law, 
and indeed, the historical stasis of postmodernity. This break with the narcissistic 
circuit of signifiers comes when he `decide[s] to make public what has been, 
until now, my private dementia' by confessing to his crimes as if they were 
crimes on Carnes' answer machine. 198 The demarcation between self and other, 
which we have earlier noted in terms of a split in personal pronouns, here 
assumes a fully social dimension as a split between private and public, or self and 
'94 Ibid., p. 874. 
195 Ibid., p. 896. 
196 American Psycho, p. 377. 
197 ReadingLacan, p. 86. 
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Other. However, Carnes grants no more credence to this statement than he does 
to any other, locked as he is, with Bateman, into an imaginary order that resists 
such evaluations. This rebuttal confirms Bateman's own eschewal of history and 
intersubjectivity, and he is therefore finally able to declare: `I am a noncontingent 
human being'. '99 Such a declaration of the dissolution of particulars in the 
universal, however, betrays a history and an overdetermination that can only be 
covertly wished away. It is precisely at that point when Bateman states that 
`[t]his confession has meant nothing', that we know (smuggled in with the rare 
appearance of the past tense) meaning begins. 200 
198 American Psycho, p. 352. 
1" Ibid., p. 377. 
200 Ibid., p. 377. 
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Chapter Two - Broken Hallelujahs: 
Mystery, History and Anamorphosis in 
Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 491 
1: The Mystical Estate of Thomas Pynchon 
He is, perhaps, most famous for not wanting to be famous. As with the 
author Bill Gray in Don DeLillo's Mao II (upon which he has favourably 
commented), articles and monographs about his work inevitably find their initial 
focus in `his disappearance, his concealment, his retirement, his alleged change of 
identity, his rumoured suicide, his return to work, his work-in-progress, his death, 
his rumoured return'. ' Indeed, he has been grouped with DeLillo, J. D. Salinger 
and William Wharton as a member of what Ron Rosenbaum has called the `Party 
of Silence', a coterie whose `varieties of reticence and concealment and self- 
effacement cumulatively constitute a provocative dissent from the culture of self- 
promotion that has swept contemporary publishing'. 3 However, the fact that he 
1A condensed version of this chapter was initially presented as a paper to the Scottish 
Renaissance Seminar ('The Margins of the Renaissance' Conference at the University of Stirling, 
4 October 1997). I am grateful for the comments made by all the participants, particularly Vance 
Adair, John Drakakis and Terence Hawkes. 2 Don DeLillo, Mao II (London: Vintage, 1992,1991), p. 3 1. Pynchon's rare comments ('This 
novel's a beauty. DeLillo takes us on a breathtaking journey, beyond the official version of our 
daily history, behind all easy assumptions about who we're supposed to be, with a vision as bold 
and a voice as eloquent and morally focused as any in American writing. ') appear on the dust- 
lacket of this edition. 
Ron Rosenbaum, `The Man in the Glass House', Independent on Sunuday, 7 September 1997, 
p. 7. 
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has `always been an absence rather than a presence'4 has only prompted critics to 
articulate his silences for him, fastening upon his diffidence either as if it were an 
iconoclastic publicity mechanism or a key explanatory aid to be factored into a 
successful reading of his texts. In the most spectacular, if slightly satirical, 
example of the former, John Calvin Batchelor has even argued that his name is a 
pseudonym for J. D. Salinger. 5 Of the latter adducements of his name, Humphrey 
Carpenter is typical in making the following connection: 
Suppressing all but the barest biographical information about 
himself - his birthdate (1937) and early career - he has managed to 
remain so elusive that his very existence has been called in to doubt. 
Could he just be a pseudonym? This tactic is entirely in keeping with 
[his] novels, which play tantalisingly surrealist narrative games of 
hide and seek. ' 
Despite maintaining elsewhere in this article that `it is time he cast off the cloak 
of invisibility and made contact with his audience', Carpenter seems happy 
enough here to assuage these anxieties by co-opting his absence (as the only kind 
of authorial guide available) for a critical strategy with which to approach his 
novels. 7 `He' is, of course, Thomas Pynchon. 
4 Ibid, P. S. s John Calvin Batchelor, `Thomas Pynchon is Not Thomas Pynchon; or, This is the End of the 
Plot Which Has No Name', Soho Weekly News, 22-28 April 1976. Pynchon's response to this 
inventive speculation was the laconic `Not bad, keep trying'. Tony Tanner, Thomas Pynchon 
ýL, ondon; Methuen, 1982), p. 18. 
Humphrey Carpenter, `The American Goon Show', The Sunday Times ('Books Section'), 4 May 
1997, p. 8. 
7Ibid., p. 8. 
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Such invocations of the phantasmal `Pynchon' must stand as some of the 
more esoteric declensions of authorization in literary criticism, even though 
DeLillo's Bill Gray discerns in them a thoroughly vernacular theme: "`When a 
writer doesn't show his face, he becomes a local symptom of God's famous 
reluctance to appear"'. 8 If, like God, Pynchon is always and in every way spoken 
for, some of his more astute critics have recognized in this a bitter irony, not only 
because he is actively invisible as an author, but also because the very feature 
which most commentators have lauded in his work, its indeterminacy, is one that 
gives the slip to such notions. J. Kerry Grant is exemplary in noting of The 
Crying of Lot 49, for instance, that `even after a number of readings, the novel 
resists interpretation to an extraordinary degree, especially if "interpretation" is 
taken to mean the effort to tease out a unitary and more or less comprehensive 
account of the novel's message from the tangled network of metaphor and 
allusion that is Pynchon's trademark'. 9 Such ambiguity inevitably disturbs 
notions of propriety and authority because, as Roland Barthes attests, 
`multivalence... is a transgression of ownership'. 1° It is therefore rather 
unsettling to find that, for Michael Berube, `it is almost characteristic of 
Pynchon's readers... to complain about Pynchon's readers' in the name of 
Pynchon himself. " It is as if, he goes on, that `[b]eneath the Pynchon's critic's 
admonitions to other Pynchon critics, in other words, we may sense a kind of 
8 Mao lI, p. 36. 9 J. Kerry Grant, A Companion to 'The Crying of Lot 49' (Athens and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), p. xii. 
10 Roland Barthes, SZ, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 45. 
11 Michael Berube, Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers: Tolson, Pynchon and The Politics of the 
Canon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 283. 
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regressive nostalgia for the Author'. '2 Alec McHoul and David Wills have also 
picked up on this irony in one of the rare sustained attempts to interrogate 
Pynchon utilizing critical theory: 
In fact it is very rare to encounter a reading of Pynchon's 
work which does not at some stage revert to a precritical notion of the 
author as not only integral consciousness but also identifiable 
historical person, and that in spite of the fact that the person is 
recognized as an enigma, and the `author', in at least one of the 
novels, dissolves into an array of conflicting narrative voices. 13 
By forging the authorial signature of Pynchon to use as a kind of veridical 
warrant for specific readings, such critics inevitably attest to their own role as 
cultural guardians, a role for which the signature figures as a placatory alibi. 
Indeed, Pynchon's invisibility is central to the disclosure of the institutional 
prerogatives which condition the dissemination of not just his texts and their 
meanings, but also those of his more publicity-friendly colleagues, as Berube 
argues: 
... 
Pynchon's absence and near-silence throw into high relief 
the cultural center's power of representation, whereby academic 
critics are explicitly confronted with their power to re-present a 
contemporary writer and thereby to make him somehow 
representative insofar as he is made canonical. '4 
12 Ibid., p. 305. 13 Alec McHoul and David Wills, Writing Pynchon: Strategies in Fictional Analysis (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), p. 6. 
'4 Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers: Tolson, Pynchon and the Politics of the Canon, p. 306. 
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We may make the provisional observation, then, that, despite eliding the process 
beneath the proprietal guise of the sign, all authors' names function as signifiers 
to which the critic appends a signified. Thus, Pynchon's manifest status as a 
signifier renders this elision conspicuous by occasioning an implicit comparison 
with authors' names which do apparently operate as signs. 15 
Pynchon's malleability qua signifier has perhaps abetted the work of 
canonization his writings have been subject to. He is, as Berube notes `one of the 
most written-about post-war writers in English'. 16 Specifically, Pynchon's work 
has maintained a singular presence in the emergent postmodern canon. Indeed, 
the enduring quarantine of the `Pynchon' personality contrasts tellingly with his 
infectious ubiquity in the canonizing volumes of critics as diverse as Linda 
Hutcheon, Brian McHale, Fredric Jameson, Edmund Smyth, Geoffrey Lord, 
Christopher Nash and Steven Connor. '7 As we have already noted, much of the 
reason for Pynchon's emblematic status as a postmodern writer can be found in 
the ambivalence generated by his texts. This ambivalence is then taken to be 
15 Such a distinction relies on the fact that `[t]he sign is defined by a fixed relationship between 
the signifier and the signified represented by the signifier - its signification - whereas the 
signifier, through its incessant sliding, referring to the other signifiers in the chain, brings forth the 
effect-of-sense'. Slavoj Ziiek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and 
Causality (London: Verso, 1994), p. 47. 
16 Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers: Tolson, Pynchon and the Politics of the Canon, p. 51. 
'7 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 
1988); Brian McHale, Constructing Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1992); Fredric Jameson, 
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991); Edmund J. 
Smyth, ed., Postmodernism and Contemporaryfiction (London: B. T. Batsford, 1991); Geoffrey 
Lord, Postmodernism and Notions of National Difference: A Comparison of Postmodern Fiction 
in Britain and America (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996); Christopher Nash, World Postmodern 
Fiction: A Guide (London: Longman, 1993); and, Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An 
Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). It is worth 
pointing out that, with the exception of McHale and Lord, most of these critics merely cite 
Pynchon as exemplary of postmodernism without discussing his work in any detail. 
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characteristic of postmodernity itself in the kind of connection that Hutcheon 
makes here, for example: 
We are emerging from a resolutely formalist age - which 
some call modernism. Its questioning of and simultaneous yearning 
for some order which would have a privileged explanatory power is 
exactly what has forced postmodernism to try to move beyond this 
"referential agnosticism". Its attempts to do so are always self- 
reflexive; they may be mutually contradictory at times; they may raise 
more questions than they answer. But that is the only way they can 
approach what Thomas Pynchon once called "pulsing Stelliferous 
Meaning". 18 
Patricia Waugh has located this contradictory character of Pynchon's work in the 
conflict of registers he deploys as they instantiate what DeLillo has famously 
termed the `white noise' 19 of the postmodern: 
... the systems and structures presented to the reader never 
add up to a body of meaning or an interpretation. Documentation, 
obsessional systems, the languages of commerce, of the legal system, 
of popular culture, of advertising: hundreds of systems compete with 
each other, resisting assimilation to any one received paradigm, and 
thus the normal channels of data-processing. 20 
Faced with such competing systems, `Pynchon's characters are, ' according to 
David Seed, `constantly driven by the impulse to locate themselves within larger 
schemes which would authenticate their own experience, but waver between the 
18 A Poetic of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, p. 157. The quotation can be found in The 
Crying of Lot 49, p. 56. 
19 Don DeLillo, White Noise (London: Picador, 1986,1984). 
20 Patricia Waugh, Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (London: 
Routledge, 1988,1984), p. 39. 
129 
appalling extremes of total randomness (where no pattern is discernible) and 
paranoia (where everything is subsumed into pattern)'. 21 Pynchon's texts, then, 
like Pynchon himself, seem to bear witness to the preponderance of the enigma of 
the signifier at the expense of the transparency of the sign. Which is to say, as 
Leo Bersani concedes about Gravity's Rainbow, that `our most important 
discovery will be that [Pynchon's work] resists analysis'. 22 
In this respect, Pynchon's second novel, The Crying of Lot 49, is 
emblematic of his work as a whole. 23 While it was not initially afforded the sort 
of praise that greeted his first novel, Patrick O'Donnell has argued that `[t]he 
criticism that has emerged in the twenty-three years since [its] publication... 
suggests that it is a much more subtle and complex novel than most of its earlier 
reviewers, both positive and negative, allowed' 24 Set in 1964, The Crying of Lot 
49 narrates the futile attempt of Oedipa Maas, a Californian housewife, to execute 
the estate of her recently deceased ex-lover, and financial mogul, Pierce 
Inverarity. For O'Donnell, Oedipa, as the central character of the novel, `can be 
seen to embody the condition of indeterminacy - which enables the act of inquiry 
21 David Seed, 'In Pursuit of the Receding Plot: Some American Postmodernists', in 
Postmodernism and Contemporary Fiction, pp. 36-53 (p. 49). 
22 Leo Bersani, The Culture of Redemption (Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p. 194. 
23 Pynchon's novels and the editions used here are; V(1963); The Crying of Lot 49 (London: 
Picador, 1979,1967); Gravity's Rainbow (London: Picador, 1975,1973); Vineland (1990); and 
Mason and Dixon (1997). His early short stories are collected as Slow Learner (London: Vintage, 
1995,1984). 
24 Patrick O'Donnell, ed., New Essays on 'The Crying of Lot 49' (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 8. 
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and the scrutiny of existing conditions - that can be set against the assumptions 
and certainties of Western positivism'. 25 
Such `assumptions and certainties' perhaps succumb to their first self- 
doubts a mere five words into the opening chapter with the inaugural declaration 
of Oedipa's name. `Few commentaries on the novel, ' Grant asserts, `are silent on 
the subject of Oedipa's name'26; `[i]t is, ' for Tanner, `right out of the line of 
plausibility'. 27 Indeed, a certain credulity may be invoked by the onomastic 
condition of any of Pynchon's characters. Absurdity seems almost wilfully to 
attend such names as Dr Hilarius, Randolph Driblette, Genghis Cohen, Mike 
Fallopian, Diocletian Blobb and Messrs Warpe, Wistfull, Kubitschek and 
McMingus. This absurdity arises from the neo-Dickensian baptisms of the 
characters in which pedestrian titles are refused for the services of more 
spectacular monikers. However, whereas in Dickens the spectacular 
improbability of these sobriquets finds a kind of sober redress in their allegorical 
function, Pynchon's names are far more giddily limber in their assignations. 
They advertize a semantic density which, on closer inspection, either yields too 
much or too little, as Debra A. Castillo comments: 
Pynchon's... names playfully generate a series of potential 
stories, perhaps even necessary fictions, but he gives us both too 
much and too little nominative significance. In hesitating between 
dream and materiality, the overdetermined and the literal, he provokes 
25 Ibid., p. 9. 
26 A Companion to 'The Crying of Lot 49, p. 3. 27 Thomas Pynchon, p. 60. 
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a ritual reluctance to choose a single story, a single identity, an 
unequivocal name, a clear motive, a definitive solution. 28 
The characters' names promise a wealth of signification both by virtue of their 
difference from a vernacular onomastics and their identification with a specific 
literary tradition of antonomasia. However, if this is so at the level of the 
signifier, adductions for such an interpretation prove difficult to track down and 
the reader is forced to concede that the signified consigns itself to the former, 
rather than the latter, economy of naming. As Castillo suggests here, in 
producing such a deadlock, these names then provide a local dramatization of the 
general themes of ambivalence in the novel as a whole. 
We may examine this ambivalence in more concrete terms by attending to 
the example of Mucho Maas, Oedipa's husband. The connotations of his name 
are rich in number, but it is this very wealth which impoverishes its analytical 
utility. `Mucho' is Spanish for `a lot', he is haunted by working in a car-lot - his 
`lot' in life, as it were - the narrator constantly informs us that there are a lot of 
clues, and the novel is named after the crying of a `lot' which finishes the 
narrative. The resonances are certainly abundant, but in the diversity of their 
attachments they are also superfluous: too much ultimately means too little. 
Equally, we may find a kind of semantic hubris at work in Mucho's surname. 
Cathy N. Davidson finds that, in translation, "Maas', is the Afrikaans word for 
`web' or `net", thus suggesting `someone trapped in various intermingling mazes 
28 Debra A Castillo, `Borges and Pynchon: The Tenuous Symmetries of Art', in New Essays on 
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and meshes'. 29 Judith Chambers, on the other hand, points out that `in Dutch 
`Maas' means `mesh' or `stitch' and is an idiom for `to slip through the meshes 
and find an avenue of escape' . 
30 With a somewhat greater licence, Tanner notes 
that "Maas' has been read as suggesting Newton's second law of motion in 
which `mass' is the term denoting a quantity of inertia. So the name suggests at 
once activity and passivity. 31 Indeed, if we follow this tack, we might perhaps 
concede that `Maas' read as `mass' refers to `a lot' of something. Such 
tautological ironies are perhaps endorsed if we consider that `mass' can be 
defined as 'a large coherent body of matter without a definite shape' or as `a 
collection of the component parts of something': in other words, as something 
definitely there but not definitely something. 32 
The onomastic economy of The Crying of Lot 49 readily accedes to such a 
definition, even if it is difficult to tally this with the particular instance of Mucho 
Maas. In this respect, one final sift through the semantic detritus of his surname 
might disclose its tendentious connection to the religious Mass which celebrates 
the Eucharist, that most symbolic of naming acts which situates the world of 
things within the world of meaning. All names formally mimic the act of 
consecration by recuperating the sheerly material to the plenitude of the 
metaphysical, and this, perhaps, could be Pynchon's point. As the titles of the 
'The Crying of Lot 49, pp. 21-46 (p. 28. -29). 29 Cathy N. Davidson, 'Oedipa as Androgyne in Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49', 
Contemporary Literature, 18, (1977), 38-50, (p. 43). 
30 Judith Chambers, Thomas Pynchon (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), p. 101. 31 Thomas Pynchon, p. 60. 
32 Collins Dictionary of the English Language, ed. by Patrick Hanks, 2"d edn (London and 
Glasgow: Collins, 1986). 
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characters seem to refuse a specific content-level designation, they thus force our 
attention back to the level of form itself, a form which, in the next step, then 
becomes its own content. This content is a kind of paternity suit of the sign in 
which competing signifieds vie for the authority of filiation. It is a trial, one may 
even say a labour, for which there is always insufficient evidence. Indeed, the 
terse rejoinder Oedipa challenges Koteks with early in her quest "`Sorting isn't 
work? "' - pays grim testament to the exasperating toil involved in the process of 
meaning production. 33 Any adjudication must therefore be based `[u]pon 
incertitude, upon unlikelihood', giving rise to the famous doubt voiced by 
Stephen Dedalus that `[p]aternity may be a legal fiction' 34 
It is perhaps instructive to invoke Ulysses as a counterpoint to the work of 
Pynchon here. In part, such a comparison serves a more generic purpose, because 
if The Crying of Lot 49 has been deemed as thoroughly representative of 
postmodernism then, equally, Ulysses, according to Maurice Beebe and many 
others, 'can be seen as a demonstration and summation of the major features of 
the entire [modernist] movement'. 35 Like Pynchon's novel, Ulysses appears to 
exile the signified and proclaim the signifier king. The Homeric correspondences 
that structure the narrative would seem to stand as the most obvious and telling 
example of this. However, as soon as we establish the Odyssey as an intertext - 
and how could we fail to given the title, the propaedeutic letters written by Joyce 
33 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 59. 34 James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Minerva, 1994,1936), p. 219. 35 Maurice Beebe, `Ulysses and the Age of Modernism, in 'Ulysses': Fifty Years, ed. by Thomas 
F. Staley (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 172-188 (p. 176). 
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and the vast apparatus criticus surrounding the novel - the kingdom of the 
signifier comes to seem much more like a regency, a warming of the throne for an 
infant signified. Unlike the nomadic cosmology generated by the onomastics of 
The Crying of Lot 49, `the Joycean text', for Bersani, `escapes from the reader's 
dangerous freedom merely by insisting that it be read with an excruciatingly close 
attention and a nearly superhuman memory': 
It asks that we be nothing but the exegetical machinery necessary to 
complete its sense. Ulysses is constantly proposing homework, work 
we can do outside the text (checking Dublin geography, rereading 
Homer, Dante, Goethe, Shakespeare, Arnold, the theosophists, Gaelic 
legends), and in thus insisting on how much it needs us, it also saves 
itself from us. [... ] Ulysses promises a critical utopia: the final 
elucidation of its sense, the day when all the connections will have 
been discovered and collected in a critical Book that would 
objectively repeat Ulysses, which, in being the exegetical double of 
its source, would express the quidditas of Joyce's novel, would be 
Ulysses replayed as the whole truth of Ulysses. 6 
Put simply, the task of interpretation is genuinely forbidding for both novels; the 
difference resides in the fact that in Ulysses `it has already been done by the 
author and we simply have to catch up with him'. 37 
We cannot, of course, catch up with Pynchon, and not only because we do 
not know who or where he is; although, in this respect, and in opposition to 
Joyce, his only published comment on the text -'a "novel"... in which I seem to 
However, as Brian McHale and others have noted, `Ulysses has lately entered upon a strange 
second career as apostmodernist text'. Constructing Postmodernism, p. 43. 
36 The Culture of Redemption, p. 175. 37 Ibid., p. 175. 
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have forgotten most of what I thought I'd learned up till then' - seems designed 
merely to deflect critical attention. 38 Nor do we fail to catch him because we lack 
the Olympian views afforded by clambering up stacks of expository handbooks, 
for, as Berube notes, `what is distinctive for nonspecialists in Pynchon criticism 
is... its sheer volume, its status as the newest burgeoning light industry in the 
critical enterprise zone'. 39 Indeed, the extravagance of this analytical project, like 
the onomastic prodigality it seeks to master, only serves to attest to the 
promiscuity of the signifier in Pynchon. With The Crying of Lot 49 we are 
squarely faced with the void of parturition, the `mystical estate' of filiation4° in 
which, for Freud, `paternity is a hypothesis, based on an inference and a 
premise' 41 It is with just such an hypothesis that Ulysses would seem to flirt 
only to fetishize it as fact, as Bersani laments: 
For authors, the anguish of paternity is experienced as an 
uncertainty about the property of their work, about who owns it and if 
it is indeed their own. [... ] In our tireless elucidation of Ulysses, we 
certify Joyce's paternity, we bring his work back to him, we eliminate 
what Stephen describes as the natural enmity between father and son 
by showing how the book gives birth to its author. 42 
Pynchon, who we may perhaps say is father in name only, has forsaken the 
anxieties of authorial paternity for those of readerly conception. The speculative 
38 Slow Learner, p. 22. Marc W. Redfield observes of this comment that `blindness and irony are 
indistinguishable, the difference between them becoming provocatively irrelevant'. Marc W. 
Redfield, `Pynchon's Postmodern Sublime', PMLA, 104: 3, (1989), 152-162, (p. 162). 
39 Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers: Tolson, Pynchon and the Politics of the Canon, p. 285. 
40 Ulysses, p. 218. 
41 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, ed. and trans. by James Strachey, The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 23 (London: Hogarth, 
1953-74), p. 114. 
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pedigree of the Pynchonian name, its denotative wantonness, problematizes the 
genealogy of its signifying litter and thereby reveals it to be merely a letter. 
Stripped of its status as a sign, the bastard signifier is thus refused a destiny in the 
same manoeuvre, forced out of a self-ratifying tradition and into a genuinely 
novel production of meaning. In this respect, no other name in the novel, at least 
in one of its readings, offers a more striking commentary on the problematic of 
inheritance and lineage that that of its central character. 
2: 
-Oedipus 
Tex 
In a letter to Carl Jung, written two months before their voyage to 
America, Freud confessed to an uncertainty over the content of the Clark lectures 
he would be giving there: `What, ' he ponders, `am I to say to those people? '43 
His deliberations led him to conclude `that the audience is... at our mercy, under 
obligation to applaud whatever we bring them'. 4 The vaguely menacing register 
of these comments is only underscored by the revelation to Jung shortly before 
landing, of the nature of his gift to the unwitting New World: "'They don't know 
that I am bringing them the plague"'. 45 We may assume with Andre Green that 
42 The Culture of Redemption, p. 177. 
43 Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung, The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence Between Sigmund 
Freud and C. G. Jung, ed. by William McGuire, trans. by Ralph Mannheim and R. F. C. Hull 
London: Penguin, 1991,1974), p. 153. 
Ibid., p. 153. 
45 Andre Green, `Oedipus, Freud, and Us', trans. by C. Coman, in Psychoanalytic Approaches to 
Literature and Film, ed. by Maurice Charney and Joseph Reppen (London and Cranbury: 
Associated University Presses, 1987), pp. 215-237 (p. 227). Shoshana Felman also refers to this 
remark in rather more cautionary terms: `Freud, apparently, said to Jung (who reported it to 
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this remark `constitutes[s] a statement that one would attribute to Oedipus as he 
approaches Thebes, a city that in one sense he has just freed. The plague, in 
Freud's case... is no other than unconscious thought against which culture will 
fight to the end... t. 46 `Culture', in the form of a number of postmodern authors, 
has duly exercised itself over the incipient Oedipalization of the New World. If 
D. M. Thomas's Ferenczi claims optimistically of the trip that `America is eager 
to receive our movement'47, E. L. Doctorow's narrator is rather less sanguine: 
Of course Freud's immediate reception in America was not 
auspicious. A few professional alienists understood his importance, 
but to most of the public he appeared as some kind of German 
sexologist, an exponent of free love who used big words to talk about 
dirty things. At least a decade would have to pass before Freud 
would have his revenge and see his ideas begin to destroy sex in 
America forever. 48 
Precisely what the narrator means by this last remark is not altogether clear, but 
we may perhaps discern the workings of a crude Oedipal algorithm beneath the 
hyperbole. For, shortly after returning to Europe, Jung wrote that `[i]n America 
the mother is decidedly the dominant member of the family. American culture 
really is a bottomless abyss; the men become a flock of sheep and the women 
Lacan): "They don't know that we bring with us the Plague"'. Shoshana Felman, 'Beyond 
Oedipus: The Specimen Story of Psychoanalysis', in Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism, ed. by 
Maud Elfiman (Harlow: Longman, 1994), pp. 76-102 (p. 102). 
46 `Oedipus, Freud, and Us', p. 227. It is perhaps worth noting here that only after his 1909 trip to 
America did Freud publicly rename the'Kerncomplex' as the'Oedipus complex', c. f. Sigmund 
Freud, `A Special Type of Choice of Object Made by Men: Contributions to the Psychology of 
Love I' (1910), in The Penguin Freud Library, Volume 7, ed. by Angela Richards and Albert 
Dickson, trans. by James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1973-91), pp. 227-242 (p. 238). Hereafter 
cited as P. F. L. This action may well have had something to do with the `Oedipal' strain 
beginning to obtain in his relationship with Jung. For more on this see note 50. 
47 D. M. Thomas, The White Hotel (London: Penguin, 1981), p. 9. 
48 E. L. Doctorow, Ragtime (London: Picador, 1984,1974), p. 34. 
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play the ravening wolves. '49 However, once America had been exposed to the 
father of psychoanalysis (`Pater' as Jung called him50), with his gift of the 
`plague' from an `entropic European civilisation'51, then such reverence for the 
mother was seemingly doomed, as Doctorow's narrator bemoans: 
Houdini was destined to be, with Al Jonson, the last of the 
great shameless mother lovers, a nineteenth-century movement that 
included such men as Poe, John Brown, Lincoln and James McNeil 
Whistler. 52 
Ever since his unhappy discovery of the New World, then, Freud's infection has 
spread to the point where all culture is riddled, we might say, with the same 
lament, a lament most succinctly expressed by Roland Barthes' rhetorical 
question: `Doesn't every narrative lead back to Oedipus? '53 
If every story is, indeed, basically the tale of Oedipus, The Crying of Lot 
49 is, perhaps, a singular instance of this precept. Our warrant for this assertion 
is, of course, initially drawn from Oedipa's name; as Grant points out `[t]he 
49 The Freud/JungLetters, p. 163. 
50 Ibid., p. 164. It is perhaps worth noting that during the period leading up to and including the 
trip to America, Freud and Jung became embroiled in something of an Oedipal contest, as the 
former implies in writing to the latter: `It is remarkable that on the same evening that I formally 
adopted you as an eldest son, anointing you as my successor and crown prince... than then and 
there you should have divested me of any paternal dignity, and that the divesting seems to have 
given you as much pleasure as investing your person gave me'. C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, 
Re, Jlections, ed. by Aniela Jaffe, trans. by Richard and Clara Winston (London: Fontana, 1995, 
1961), p. 397. D. M. Thomas gives this full play by allowing his fictional Ferenczi to note that 
`Jung said to me later, ' following one of Freud's outbursts aboard the outgoing ship, `that at that 
moment Freud had lost authority, as far as he was concerned'. The White Hotel, p. 11. 
s' Ragtime, p. 36. 
52 Ibid., p. 34. 53 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1975,1973), p. 47. 
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association of Oedipa with the Sophoclean Oedipus is almost a leitmotif of 
critical writing on the novel, with Freud coming in a close second' 54 Tony 
Tanner, however, scoffs at the utility of this connection: 
... given that the riddle Oedipus 
finally has to solve concerns 
his own parents, parricide and incest, and given that this in no way 
applies to Oedipa, we may pause. 55 
Our pause, pace Tanner, affords us the opportunity of both dismissing the 
invocation of the Sophoclean Oedipus as a literal paradigm for The Crying of Lot 
49, whilst also allowing us to attend to the thematic resonances betokened by the 
comparison. In particular, we might note that the `parricide' Tanner refers to 
finds an explicit echo in the nature of Oedipa's quest. If she is not investigating 
the death of her own father (such biological affiliations are, significantly, only 
manifest in the moment of their transgression), she does, however, spend the 
novel tracking down the deathly effects of Pierce Inverarity, a `founding father 56 
whose `legacy was America'. 57 Oedipa, we might provisionally argue, is thus 
attempting to construct a genealogy - (Tanner's `parents') - of the American 
nation and her place in it. 
34 A Companion to 'The Crying of Lot 49, p. 4. 
ss Thomas Pynchon, p. 60. It is perhaps worth noting Terry P. Caeser's assertion, referred to with 
approval by Tanner, that "'Maas" can be voiced to sound like "my ass"; this Oedipa is no 
Oedipus, or only one at the earnest reader's peril'. Terry P. Caeser, 'A Note on Pynchon's 
Naming', Pynchon Notes, 5, (1981), 5-10, (p. 5). Given the illustrious associations of his own 
name, we can only guess why Caeser chooses to voice such ridicule. it may well be, as McHoul 
and Wills observe, that '[a]t best, or at most, what Pynchon writings have given rise to is a certain 
informality, something of a modulation in the tone of academic address'. Writing Pyizchon: 
Strategies in Fictional Analysis, p. 1. 
56 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 16. 
57 Ibid., p. 123. 
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What dogs Oedipa's genealogical project, however, is a form of incest. If 
incest finds more or less literal expression in The Crying of Lot 49 as the 
contravention of agnatic laws, such as when, for example, Oedipa spies a boy 
`kissing his mother passionately goodbye, using his tongue'58, it also achieves a 
multivalent presence as a relation of tautology. This relation, which we have 
already designated as imaginary, perhaps finds its most striking depiction in the 
description of Mucho's car lot: 
Even if enough exposure to the unvarying grey sickness had 
somehow managed to immunise him, he could still never accept the 
way each owner, each shadow, filed in only to exchange a dented, 
malfunctioning version of himself for another, just as futureless, 
automotive projection of somebody else's life. As if it were the most 
natural thing. To Mucho it was horrible. Endless, convoluted 
incest. 59 
The first, and not entirely incidental, feature to be noted about the remarkable 
passage from which this quotation is plucked, is the reference to `sickness'. This 
invokes a comparison with the Oedipal plague besetting Thebes, and phrases like 
`infected by its grey'60 and `the infected city'61 bolster this connection throughout 
the novel. Its association with the process of exchange here is also telling, but, 
even more invidious is the latter's representation as incest. If the term itself 
suggests the obviation of any differential matrix from which meaning may be 
58 Ibid., p. 85. 
59 Ibid., p. 8. 
601bid., p. 90. 
61 Ibid., p. 80. 
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gleaned, then the pejorative figuration of the commodity form ( as `horrible', 
`sickness' and `incest') also attests to the role of value in this process, or, more 
precisely, its transmutation from a qualitative use to a quantitative exchange. The 
`unvarying grey sickness' is not merely indicative of a reference to abstraction 
per se in this respect, for, as Fredric Jameson proposes, `[s]ameness... is not 
merely the concept of the category of this particular object (several different 
things being steaks, cars, linen, or books) but also, and above all, the equivalence 
of their value'. 2 This value is, then, tautological, an incestuous construct in 
which we can recognize Malcolm Bowie's succinct delineation of the imaginary 
as `the scene of a desperate delusional attempt to be and to remain "what one is" 
by gathering to oneself ever more instances of sameness, resemblance and self- 
replication'. 63 The infection of otherness by the plague of self is, for Marx, a 
defining characteristic of the commodity form, for `[w]hat chiefly distinguishes a 
commodity from its owner is the fact that every other commodity counts for it 
only as the form of appearance of its own value'. M 
As in Neuromancer, the encryption of all haecceities within the secret of 
the commodity form also extends to the codification of space itself. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than the aptly-named San Narciso, the `domicile, and 
headquarters' of Pierce Inverarity and `the place he'd... put down the plinth 
course of capital on which everything afterwards had been built': 
62 Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of Dialectic (London: Verso, 
1996,1990), p. 23. 
63 Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991), p. 92. 
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Like many named places in California it was less an 
identifiable city than a group of concepts - census tracts, special 
purpose bond-issue districts, shopping nuclei, all overlaid with 
access-roads to its own freeway. ... 
if there was any vital difference 
between it and the rest of Southern California, it was invisible on first 
glance. 65 
As the name `San Narciso' suggest, 'difference' is here dissipated in the solution 
of `capital' which gives rise to the city in the first place. Urban particulars are 
thus subordinated to a general principle of abstract equivalency or `concepts'. 
This subordination then exacts its price in terms of deracination, as all specific 
meaning for the city is always-already forestalled by referral to an abstract langue 
that must necessarily be elsewhere. In this respect the logic of San Narciso is very 
much bound to its founding premises, for, as Jameson observes, 'money is... both 
abstract (making everything equivalent) and empty and uninteresting, since its 
interest lies outside itself 66 The secret source of this `interest' is, of course, 
ultimately labour, as Lyle, in Don DeLillo's Players, comes to understand during 
the course of a similar urban lament: 
He felt lessened somehow. Freighter cranes slanted across 
the tops of sheds in the Brooklyn dock area. It was the city, the heat, 
an endless sense of repetition. The district repeated itself in blocks of 
monochromatic stone. He was present in things. There was more of 
him here through the idle nights than he took home with him to vent 
and liberate. He thought about nights. He imagined the district never 
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. by Been Fowkes 
jLondon: Penguin/New Left Review, 1990,1976), p. 179. 
s The Crying of Lot 49, p. 14. 66 Fredric Jameson, `Culture and Finance Capital', Critical Enquiry, 24: 1, (1997), 246-265, 
(p. 264). 
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visited, empty of human transaction, and how buildings such as these 
would seem to hold untouchable matter, enormous codifications of 
organic decay. He tried to imagine the immense complexity of going 
home. 67 
The `endless sense of repetition' that Lyle feels here may be read as an awareness 
of form qua abstraction, because it is only with the liberation of an object from its 
quiddity in the moment of conceptualization that the conditions of possibility for 
iteration are initially met. Repetition is, in this sense, a haemorraghing of content 
and one that Lyle traces to an excentric secretion in the very building s of the city 
itself - `[t]here was more of him here... than he took home with him'. If he feels 
`lessened somehow', his vitality sapped and stored as inorganic matter in the 
`blocks of monochromatic stone', it is because, as Terry Eagleton writes, `[w]hen 
capital employs labour rather than vice versa, the dead come to assume a 
vampiric power over the living, since capital itself is simply "dead" or stored 
labour'. 68 The city thus holds a kind of uncanny fascination, concealing the 
living in the dead and the dead in the living. Unhomeliness thereby comes to 
assume an intolerable ubiquity which renders even the attempt to plot a trajectory 
for a symbolic `home', through the convoluted layers of mediation, a task of 
`immense complexity'. 
As such, it also prompts a thoroughgoing alienation and, in this respect, 
we may note that Oedipa, maintaining a kind of symbolic detachment from her 
milieu is more of a driver than a fäneur. It may perhaps be instructive at this 
67 Don DeLillo, Players (London: Vintage, 1977), p. 49. 
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point to invoke Ulysses once more. In particular we may profitably attend to the 
perambulations of Bloom through Dublin at the beginning of `The Lotus Eaters': 
By lorries along Sir John Rogerson's Quay Mr Bloom 
walked soberly, past Windmill lane, Leask's the linseed crusher's, the 
postal telegraph office. [... ] And past the sailors' homes. He turned 
from the morning noises of the quayside and walked through Lime 
street. By Brady's cottages a boy for the skins lolled, his bucket of 
offal linked, smoking a chewed fagbutt. [... ] Tell him if he smokes 
he won't grow. [... ] He crossed Townsend street, passed the 
frowning face of Bethel. [... ] And past Nichols' the undertaker's. 
[... ] In Westland row he halted before the window of the Belfast and 
Oriental Tea Company and read the legends of lead-papered 
packets.... He turned away and sauntered across the road. 69 
Bloom's leisurely ramble around the docks and thoroughfares of Dublin follows 
in the tracks of Baudelaire's fläneur as he was theorized by Walter Benjamin: 
The street became a dwelling for the fläneur; he is as much 
at home among the facades of houses as a citizen is in his four walls. 
To him the shiny, enamelled signs of businesses are at least as good a 
wall ornament as an oil painting is to a bourgeois in his salon. 70 
The gemütlich metropolis of Bloom and the fläneur, however, contrasts tellingly 
with the blunt refusals of Oedipa's urban experience. If, for Bloom, the city's 
homeliness proceeds from the 'slow grace 71 of his discursion, his ambulatory 
encounters with fellow denizens and their wares, then Oedipa's alienation arises 
68 Terry Eagleton, Marx (London: Phoenix, 1997), p. 32. 
69 Ulysses, pp. 73-74. 
70 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. by 
Harry Zohn (London: Verso, 1997,1973), p. 37. 
71 Ulysses, p. 74. 
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from her `70mph'72 dash along the unnamed Blitzbahns where `address numbers 
were in the 70 and then 80,000s She had never known numbers to run so high. It 
seemed unnatural. '73 Indeed, all aleatory commerce with either people or things 
is obviated `by miles of fence topped with barbed wire and interrupted now and 
then by guard towers'. 74 Even the celerity of her odyssey fails to confer any 
advantages upon Oedipa because it merely turns out to be the `illusion of speed, 
freedom, wind in your hair, unreeling landscape'. 75 The reason it is an illusion 
lies in the fact that, as another postmodern author, Milan Kundera observes, it is 
merely fleetness by proxy: 
Speed is the form of ecstasy the technical revolution has 
bestowed on man. As opposed to a motorcyclist, the runner is always 
present in his body, forever required to think about his blisters, his 
exhaustion; when he runs he feels his weight, his age, more conscious 
than ever of himself and of his time of life. This all changes when 
man delegates the faculty of speed to a machine: from then on, his 
own body is outside the process, and gives over to a speed that is non- 
corporeal, non-material, pure speed, speed itself, ecstasy speed. 76 
There is a certain felicity in Kundera's use of the word `ecstasy' to designate the 
experience imparted by mechanical speed, for ecstasy, as its Greek etymology in 
ekstasis suggests, is a form of displacement. In this respect, it articulates a 
variation on the subjective unkenneling we have already noted as part of Lyle's 
metropolitan ontology. This ecstasy then finds appropriate expression as a kind 
72 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 15. 
73 Ibid., p. 15. 
74 Ibid., p. 15. 
75 Ibid., p. 16. 76 Milan Kundera, Slowness, trans. by Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber, 1996), p. 4. 
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of arterial lotus in The Crying of Lot 49 where Oedipa is described as `some 
single melted crystal of urban horse' in the `hypodermic needle' of the 
narcotizing road. 77 
The difference between Bloom's and Oedipa's peregrinations through 
their respective cities stems from their contrary understandings of urban space. 
We may, following John Lechte, characterize this as the difference obtaining 
between a spatial idiolect and a civic grammar: 
The proper meaning of urban space is the meaning based 
exclusively on causality and determination. Its inevitable 
accompaniment is a functionalist notion of space. The space of the 
idiolect, by contrast, is produced by an absolutely singular 
appropriation of space. Considered from the perspective of the 
collectivity of idiolects, the singular appropriation of space gives way 
to random distributions of all kinds, distributions which are people 
walking in the city. 78 
We may interpret Bloom's aleatory stroll, then with his leisurely excursions (both 
mental and physical), as an idiolectic appropriation of space. In contrast, the 
`group of concepts' which Oedipa discerns on her approach to San Narciso 
betrays her inscription within the abstractive syntax of the city planners and, 
ultimately, `the plinth course of capital on which everything afterwards had been 
built'. 79 Indeed, there is a sense in which Oedipa's city is not built in space at all, 
but rather on time. The specialized zones of San Narciso, `with access roads to 
n The Crying of Lot 49, p. 16. 78 John Lechte, `(Not) Belonging in Postmodern Space', in Postmodern Cities and Spaces, ed. by 
Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996,1995), pp. 99-1 11 (p. 105). 
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its own freeway'80, disclose a preoccupation with the facility of commerce and an 
ease of movement. Such expeditiousness can only be realized by the instrumental 
elision of spatiality by temporality: space, in other words, is displaced. 
Symptomatic of this exile is Oedipa's search for the meaning of San 
Narciso other than in the city itself: 
... she thought of the time she'd opened a transistor radio to 
replace a battery and seen her first printed circuit. The ordered swirl 
of houses and streets, from this high angle, sprang at her now with the 
same unexpected, astonishing clarity as the circuit card had. Though 
she knew even less about radios than about Southern California, there 
were to both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed 
meaning, of an intent to communicate. " 
Picking up on the notion of the riddle of circuit and city here, we may note the 
striking correspondence with Marx's remark that `[v]alue... does not have its 
description branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labour 
into a social hieroglyphic'. 82 If labour is, ultimately, the occulted meaning of 
both chipboard and civic centre, the secret of their immediate resemblance is 
bound to the facilitation of profit from that labour. Commenting on a 1990 
exhibition in New York's Museum of Modem Art entitled `Information Art: 
Diagramming Microchips', Scott Bukatman (in a context unrelated to The Crying 
of Lot 49) notes that... 
79 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 14. 
80 Ibid., p. 14. 
1 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 82 Capital, Volume 1, p. 167. 
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... the show presented enlargements of computer-produced diagrams reminiscent of an aerial view of urban sprawl (this 
resemblance is no coincidence - the chip, like the city, is designed for 
ease of circulation, constant flow, and dense maximization of 
available space). " 
The circuit, then, with its connotative resonances listed here by Bukatman, 
appears as an adequate figure for the city because both designs proceed from the 
same instrumental logic; a logic which, to recall Lechte's rhetorical analogy, 
fosters the aphorism at the expense of the apostrophe. Indeed, the irony of the 
comparison is, perhaps, that rather than disclosing a productive difference it only 
admits of a mimesis of form from which no meaning can be gleaned: as 
Bukatman observes, `the enlargement and aestheticization of the chip does not 
render it any more accessible'. 84 
Oedipa's life is similarly cocooned by identity, at least in the beginning of 
the novel: 
... she wondered, wondered, shuffling 
back through a fat 
deckful of days which seemed (wouldn't she be the first to admit it? ) 
more or less identical, or all pointing the same way subtly like a 
conjurer's deck... 85 
83 Scott Bukatman, Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 109. 
84Ibid., P. M. 85 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 8. 
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Summing up the critical doxa on this feature of the text, Grant argues that 
`Oedipa's life is banal and predictable, a not-quite parody of a middle-class 
suburban routine'. 86 Much of this imaginary banality is figured by the narrator 
using the metaphorics of insulation. One instance of this occurs when Roseman 
attempts to play `footsie' with Oedipa, but, wearing boots, she `couldn't feel 
much of anything. So, insulated, she decided not to make any fuss. '87 There is a 
sense here in which Oedipa, during the moment of decision, recognizes the 
insularity of her existence. It is a view confirmed by the narrator in a description 
where the absence of deictic qualifications significantly impedes our ability to 
locate precisely the dawn of her awareness: 
As things developed, she was to have all manner of 
revelations. Hardly about Pierce Inverarity, or herself; but about what 
remained yet had somehow, before this, stayed away. There had 
hung the sense of buffeting, insulation, she had noticed the absence of 
an intensity, as if watching a movie, just perceptibly out of focus, that 
the projectionist refused to fix. 88 
The temporal, and therefore semantic, ductility of `before this', torn as it is 
between the analeptic and the proleptic determinations of the first sentence, 
suggests we might more profitably interpret Oedipa's self-reflexivity as a process 
which retroactively posits its origins. Indeed, the above comments proceed from 
the diegetic present of the novel (her meeting with Roseman) and lead into an 
96 A Companion to The Crying of Lot 49', p. 12. 
7 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 12. 
sa Ibid., p. 12. 
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excursus on her trip with Inverarity to Mexico City at least a year before the 
narrative begins. Whilst there, they discover an exhibition by Remedios Varos: 
... 
in the central paintings of a triptych, titled `Bordando el 
Manto Terrestre', were a number of frail girls with heart-shaped 
faces, huge eyes, spun-gold hair, prisoners in the top room of a 
circular tower, embroidering a kind of tapestry which spilled out the 
slit windows and into a void, seeking hopelessly to fill the void: for 
all the other buildings and creatures, all the waves, ships and forests 
of the earth were contained in this tapestry, and the tapestry was the 
world. 89 
The description of the tower here as a self-replicating solipsistic totality would 
seem to designate an imaginary consciousness which recalls Lacan's remark that 
`the formation of the I is symbolized in dreams by a fortress'. 90 This memory 
serves to qualify a memory previous even to her meeting Inverarity of when she 
`had also gently conned herself into the curious, Rapunzel-like role of a pensive 
girl somehow, magically, prisoner among the pines and salt fogs of Kinneret, 
looking for somebody to say hey, let down your hair'. 91 It is, of course, Pierce 
who proves to be that `somebody', symbolically slipping `the lock on her tower 
door... using one of his many credit cards for a shim'. 92 However, given what we 
have said so far about the imaginary logic of capital, it is not surprising that his 
presence fails to secure her release and that `all that had gone on between them 
ß9lbid., p. 13. 90 Jacques Lacan, L`crits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1997,197), 
5. 
91 
'Z 
The Crying ofLot 49, p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
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had never really escaped the confinement of that tower'. 93 Indeed, `the tower, ' as 
the narrator declares, 'is everywhere'. 94 
The narrator, at one juncture in the novel, however, explicitly, if 
somewhat diffidently, identifies the point where Oedipa breaches the imaginary 
relations emblematized by the tower: 
If one object behind her discovery of what she was to label 
the Tristero System or often only The Tristero (as if it might be 
something's secret title) were to bring to an end her encapsulation in 
her tower, then that night's infidelity with Metzger would logically be 
the starting point for it; logically. 95 
Again, there is a certain temporal reluctance informing the narrative here, and, 
again, it is associated with an imaginary self-consciousness ('her encapsulation in 
her tower'). David Seed has also commented on the grammatical mobility of this 
passage, noting that `Pynchon constantly draws back from attributing too definite 
an awareness to Oedipa. The Jamesian periphrastic tenses ('was to label' `would 
come to haunt', etc. ) suggest a knowledge of subsequent events - Pynchon is not 
tying himself rigidly to the moment - and yet the tone of the passage reflects 
Oedipa's early sense of puzzlement'. 96 Our sense of puzzlement is perhaps 
accentuated by the meaning of the word `object': does it denote a thing or an 
aim? If it is the latter, then, of course, it betokens Oedipa's volitional 
931bid., p. 13. 
941bid., p. 13. 
95 Ibid., p. 29. 
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displacement from the tower using the Tristero for leverage, paradoxically before 
she has even heard of the organization (this is the first mention of it in the novel); 
and if it is the former, it is not clear what it could designate because the bringing 
`to an end [of] her encapsulation' is an action, not a thing. The syntactic 
choreography of the sentence might lead us to read `object behind' as `effect of 
but, as the repetition of `logically' suggests, reasoning here is seductive yet not 
completely persuasive. There is, we might say, a certain senselessness persisting 
in this `object' and for any explanation of it we must turn to the episode 
recommended as `the starting point for it'. 
This episode revolves around the game of `Strip Botticelli'97 that Metzger 
initiates with Oedipa at `Echo Courts', with its imaginary milieu of `silence and 
paralysis', `stillness' and `flat' `dead still air'. 98 During the game she must 
remove an item of clothing for every question she asks him concerning the 
outcome of a film he starred in as a child. Mindful of the contingencies such an 
interrogation might produce, she symbolically insulates herself by `putting on as 
much as she could of the clothing she'd brought with her'. 99 It is in this state of 
sartorial repletion that... 
... [s]he made the mistake of looking at herself in the full- length mirror, saw a beach ball with feet and laughed so violently she 
fell over, taking a can of hair spray on the sink with her. The can hit 
96 David Seed, The Fictional Labyrinths of Thomas Pynchon (Iowa City: University of Iowa 
Press, 1988), p. 129. 
97 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 23. 
98 Ibid., p. 16. 
99 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the floor, something broke, and with a great outsurge of pressure the 
stuff commenced atomizing, propelling the can swiftly about the 
bathroom. 10° 
If Oedipa's mistake here is partly dependent on her discerning the 
preposterousness of her solipsistic protection, then it is the relation of this to the 
febrile spray can which comes to assume more importance for Lois Tyson. 
Without quite invoking a textual warrant for this interpretation, Tyson identifies 
the violent trajectory of the can as a `metaphor for the complexity of historical 
events, both past and current, and for the impossibility of acquiring any sure 
knowledge of them'. IOI While the respective flight paths of the can and of history 
may be characterized as uncertain (although `something fast enough, God or a 
digital machine, might have computed in advance the complex web of its 
travel' 102), it is the can's relation to the mirror which perhaps countenances 
Tyson's exegesis: `[t]he can collided with a mirror and bounced away, leaving a 
silvery reticulated bloom of glass to hang a second before it all fell jingling into 
the sink'. 103 In a highly suggestive, yet strangely unique obiter dictum, Tyson 
perceives in the image of the mirror the imaginary `sense of self and world 
[which] is then shattered by the Lacanian Symbolic Order'. 104 In support of 
Tyson's peremptory observations, we may note that the `silvery reticulated 
bloom' here (and its reappearance as a `net of invisible cracks propagating 
100 Ibid., p. 23. 
101 Lois Tyson, `Existential Subjectivity on Trial: The Crying of Lot 49 and the Politics of 
Despair', Pynchon Notes, 28-29, (1991), 5-25, (p. 19). 
I02 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 24. 
103 Ibid., p. 24. 
104 'Existential Subjectivity on Trial: The Crying of Lot 49 and the Politics of Despair', p. 19. 
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leisurely through the air between' Oedipa and Fallopian'05) is an appropriate 
trope for the symbolic network, and that the can's rebarbative carving of the air, 
accompanied by a soundtrack of `screams and chopped-off prayers of dying 
infantry' 106 from the television, is an agreeably grisly reminder of the violent 
precepts of castration. But perhaps more pedestrian evidence for this assertion 
can be found in a later incident: 
Things grew less and less clear. At some point she went into 
the bathroom, tried to find her image in the mirror and couldn't. She 
had a moment of nearly pure terror. Then she remembered that the 
mirror had broken and fallen in the sink. 107 
If, in Lacanian theory, the imago does not, strictly speaking, disappear with the 
advent of symbolization, its loss for Oedipa here registers a fracturing of her 
imaginary universe which corresponds to entry into the symbolic. As the narrator 
proclaims, `[t]hings grew less and less clear', `[t]hings... did not delay in turning 
curious'. 108 
We have already noted how this transition in orders is indexed by the `end 
[to] her encapsulation in her tower', but it is also charted, form this point on in 
the novel, by a series of refusals for an imaginary retreat. One of the more 
striking examples of this is occasioned by Oedipa's trip to Inverarity's Fangoso 
Lagoons: 
105 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 116. 
106 Ibid., p. 24. 
107 Ibid., p. 27. 
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Oedipa had believed... in some principle of the sea as 
redemption for Southern California... some unvoiced idea that no 
matter what you did to its edges the true Pacific stayed inviolate and 
integrated or assumed the ugliness at any edge into some more 
general truth. Perhaps it was only that notion, its and hope, she 
sensed as this forenoon they made their seaward thrust, which would 
stop short of any sea. 109 
In this description of the Pacific we can clearly recognize the rubric of the 
imaginary and its seductive integrity. Indeed, it recalls Freud's comments on the 
`oceanic feeling' of the pre-Oedipal ego, `a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of 
being one with the external world as a whole'. "" Here, however, the `oceanic 
feeling' becomes an `arid hope', and, in a deft ironical twist, the imaginary 
principle of integration is itself refused integration, has to `stop short of any sea'. 
As is implied here, it is not that Oedipa moves from the imaginary to the 
symbolic in exclusive succession; for she is constantly tempted by imaginary 
lures and enticed by the prospect of making the world over in the ego's image, 
witnessed, for example, in the `ageing night-watchman, nibbling at a bar of Ivory 
soap, who had trained his virtuoso stomach to accept also lotions, air fresheners, 
fabrics, tobaccos and waxes in a hopeless attempt to assimilate it all, all the 
promise, productivity, betrayal, ulcers, before it was too late'. " Rather, the 
novel admits of the co-existence and interpenetration of the two registers: `Shall I 
los Ibid., p. 29. 'o' Ibid., p. 37. 110 Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, (1930), P. F. L., Volume 12, pp. 243-340 
(?. 252). 
t1 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 85. 
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project a world? ' ponders Oedipa, or "`Verify my sources[? ]"'. 112 For Jameson 
this is the proper condition of the subject, as the `Imaginary and Symbolic... are 
normally, in mature experience... inseparable'. 113 The complexities of this nexus 
are, perhaps, most vividly realized in the novel's paranoia. 
As a word `paranoia' is mentioned over fifteen times in The Crying of Lot 
49, yet as a concept it informs not only this text but Pynchon's entire oeuvre. It is 
essentially a speculative project: the `reflex of seeking other orders behind the 
visible, ' remarks the narrator of Gravity's Rainbow, is `also known as 
paranoia'. 114 The difficulty for Pynchon's characters, however, lies in 
distinguishing between a healthy suspicion and `the cold and sweatless meat- 
hooks of a psychosis'. "' It is a distinction neatly summarized by Teresa 
Brennan: 
... 
if one were to offer a brief distinction between paranoid 
and non-paranoid speculation, it would be that the former is 
conducted from the standpoint of the ego: events and causes are 
speculated about in a self-referential way; any synthesis of the 
relation between those events and causes closes off knowledge of 
connections that jeopardize the ego's position. In non-paranoid 
speculation, this is not the case; speculation about the connections 
between things is open-ended. [... ] These connections are made 
through the symbolic; we could say that they are made from the 
`position' of the `I', which is the reverse of that of the moi. 116 
1 12 Ibid., p. 56 and p. 116 respectively. 
113 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: 
Routledge, 1996,1981), p. 175. 
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If Oedipa wonders whether her engagement with the Tristero condemns her to the 
imaginary defiles of the moi, the modality of `the true paranoid for whom all is 
organized in spheres joyful or threatening about the central pulse of himself" 17, it 
is an option which the novel itself finally, as it were, refuses. Finality, however, 
is what The Crying of Lot 49 ultimately excludes. There is a clear opposition set 
up between the interregnal present participle and the concretization of this as a 
noun. It can be see most clearly in the wavering between `the cry that might 
abolish the night" 18, which occurs at the centre of the novel, and the waiting for 
`the crying of lot 49'119 which ends it. The significance of this lies in the fact that 
to end with a present participle is, in effect, not to end at all, but, rather, to leave 
the narrative, as Brennan proposes, `open-ended'. 
With this rough sketch of Oedipa's symbolic assumption in mind, then, 
we might return to inspect the `starting point for it' in the game of Strip Botticelli 
she enjoys with Metzger. In doing this we are following the operations of a 
narrative which, during an extraordinary passage, reinscribes the game within a 
more potent symbolic framework: 
So began, for Oedipa, the languid sinister blooming of The 
Tristero. Or rather, her attendance at some unique performance, 
prolonged as if it were the last of the night, something a little extra for 
whoever'd stayed this late. As if the breakaway gowns, net bras, 
jewelled garters and G-strings of historical figuration that would fall 
away were layered dense as Oedipa's own street-clothes in that game 
with Metzger in front of the Baby Igor movie; as if a plunge towards 
The Crying of Lot 49, p. 89. 12 Ibid., p. 81. 
119 Ibid., p. 126. 
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dawn indefinite black hours long would indeed be necessary before 
The Tristero could be revealed in its terrible nakedness. 120 
Perhaps the first point of note here is the depiction of history as a process of `de- 
insulating', a kind of alethic striptease in which layers of representation are 
discarded in the seductive prospect of finally laying bare the truth. Such 
divestiture reminds us of Freud's comments on the action of Oedipus Rex which 
`consists in nothing other than the process of revealing, with cunning delays and 
ever-mounting excitement -a process that can be likened to the work of psycho- 
analysis'. '2' If this also stands as a fair analogy of the structure of The Crying of 
Lot 49, with Oedipa peeling off layer after layer of American society, there is, 
however, one important difference to be remarked. The truth of this performance 
would appear to be the final exfoliation which discloses a `terrible nakedness'; 
likewise, in Oedipus Rex, the eponymous hero and the audience, robbed of the 
armature of repression, must finally confront `feelings of repulsion' and 
`horror' 122: however, while the technologies of revision clearly and ultimately fail 
in the play, here, `the terrible nakedness' is only to be supposed as the telos of the 
process of unclothing. In fact, the novel does not actually divest itself of this 
secret and its final paragraphs are concerned to vex the reader's anticipation one 
last time by showing Oedipa waiting for a representative of the Tristero to `reveal 
[... ] himself' so she can `find out.., who the man really was'. 123 
120 Ibid., p. 36. 12' Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, (1900), P. F. L., Volume 4, p. 363. 
122 Ibid., p. 366. 
123 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 126. Indeed, Louis Althusser argues that a metaphorics of stripping 
which does not take into account the effects of representation is characteristic of empiricism: `The 
empiricist conception may be thought of as a variant of the conception of vision, with the mere 
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The Tristero, however, retains a kind of exaggerated modesty throughout 
the novel, its identity either obscured or disguised: 
Suddenly, in lithe and terrible silence, with dancers' grace, 
three figures. Long-limbed, effeminate, dressed in black tights, 
leotards and gloves, black silk hose pulled over their faces, come 
capering onstage and stop.... Their faces behind the stockings are 
shadowy and deformed. They wait. The lights all go out. '24 
The Tristero is, then, in a sense invisible, and it is this very invisibility which 
worries at Oedipa's proclivities for psychosis, gnawing `the ganglia of her 
optimism' 125, because, as the narrator notes, in such a situation, the `[p]ossibilities 
for paranoia become abundant'. 126 The testimony of this paranoia points to the 
abiding characteristic of the Tristero: it is only disclosed in its effects. With this 
in mind, we may find a series of resonances begin to accrue to the figure of the 
striptease we are concerned to explicate. To begin with, we may observe that the 
truth of the Tristero, its `terrible nakedness', can only be apprehended after a 
`plunge towards dawn indefinite black hours long'. This, of course, is the period 
of night that conventionally plays host to the untrammelled raptures of the 
unconscious. Again, we might find it instructive to invoke Freud here and his 
difference that transparency is not given from the beginning, but is separated from itself precisely 
by the veil, the dross of impurities, of the inessential which steals the essence from us, and which 
abstraction, by its techniques of separation and scouring, sets aside, in order to give us the real 
presence of the pure naked essence, knowledge of which is then merely sight'. Louis Althusser 
and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1970, 
1986), p. 36. 
'24 Ibid., p. 49. 
'25 Ibid., p. 85. 
126 Ibid., p. 114. 
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observation that `whenever we go to sleep we throw off our hard-won morality 
like a garment, and put it on again next morning. This stripping of ourselves is 
not, of course, dangerous, because we are paralysed, condemned to inactivity by 
the state of sleep. ' 127 If the coincidence of figures in Freud's and Pynchon's 
works seems somewhat gratuitous, it attests, nevertheless, to the prevalence of a 
metaphorics of disrobing in our understanding of the unconscious, one which 
finds the latter veiled, swathed and swaddled by the circumspection of culture. 
What we must be careful to distinguish here is that it is this very probity which 
realizes the indiscretions of the unconscious in the first place. If, to continue the 
analogy, clothing dramatizes the nakedness it seeks to cover, then, equally, we 
can only discern the unconscious in the disturbances registered by the rectitude 
that produced it. To put it another way, clothes are the effect of a nudity which 
does not otherwise exist, just as dreams and parapraxes are the effects of an 
unconscious we could not otherwise know. We can now, perhaps, begin to see 
the analogy that seems to be being drawn between the unconscious and the 
Tristero which, as we have already averred, is also only disclosed in its effects. 
We may, moreover, press this analogy even further (provided, of course, 
that we acknowledge that the purely formal correspondences we are elaborating 
here are testified to by a content later on), Our reason for doing so lies in the 
technical precision with which the various discarded items of the striptease are 
implicitly compared to `historical figuration' rather than, say, merely `history'. 
127 Sigmund Freud, `Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', (1915), P. F. L., Volume 12, 
pp. 57-89 (p. 73). 
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This would seem to suggest a certain conviction regarding our understanding of 
the latter, one in which we may concur with Jameson when he avers that ... 
... 
history is not a text, not a narrative, master or otherwise, 
but that, as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except in textual 
form, and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily 
passes through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the 
political unconscious. 128 
History, in other words, is only disclosed in its effects. Like the Lacanian real, 
with which Jameson associates it here, history is only ever manifest as a kind of 
cultural parapraxis, a cause that must be presupposed to exist in order to account 
for the way things are. In this it is of a piece with the fact that `[w]e only grasp 
the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of it which is articulated 
by passing into words'. 129 It is as an effect, therefore, that we may understand 
that the `unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic' 130 and thus the 
way in which Jameson can attribute narrativizing powers to the political 
unconscious. In this regard, what seems to be being proposed in The Crying of 
Lot 49 is that the Tristero functions as a kind of shorthand for the history of the 
unconscious, a history which Oedipa attempts to integrate within the symbolic 
network. 
129 The Political Unconscious, p. 35. 129 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: Seminar VII - 1959-1960, ed. by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 32. 
130 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Before we take our leave of the figure of the striptease, however, we 
should address what may turn out to be its most important yield. There is a sense 
in which the postulation of an unconscious `displayed' by the text was 
presupposed by the drama of Oedipa's symbolic accession which we noted 
earlier. This is, of course, because Oedipalization exacts its price in terms of 
repression. The scene of the destruction of the imaginary's sundry fascinations 
by the symbolic, that is, `the starting point for it', is located by the narrator in the 
game of Strip Botticelli. We are now in a position to attest to this by adducing 
the change in narrative form from the original passage to its repetition, i. e., the re- 
writing of the game as a metaphor for historical figuration, its reproduction as a 
trope. That this transposition of the literal to the figural can be understood as 
testimony to the fact of Oedipalization may be determined by reference to the 
function of the Name-of-the-Father. As the abstractive designation `Name' 
suggests, the Name-of-the-Father announces the substitutive economy of the 
symbolic order, which is itself, we may note with Jameson, a substitution for the 
imaginary: 
... the passage 
from the Imaginary stage to the Symbolic 
Order is marked by the infant's experience of... Name-of-the-Father, 
a formulation which unites the classical Freudian account of the 
Oedipus complex and the castration anxiety to the essentially 
linguistic discovery of the distinction between the paternal function 
itself - the term "father" - and that individual biological parent to 
whom he has hitherto related in a more properly Imaginary mode. 131 
131 The Political Unconscious, pp. 175-176. 
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The Name-of-the-Father, in other words, signifies a movement from the literal to 
the metaphorical. The exigency of this transition is attested to by the prohibitory 
function which it affords, because without a sense of kinship networks, an 
understanding of the symbolic relations between persons, there could be no sense 
of who is father, mother, child, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt and therefore no 
interdiction of incest. We can therefore follow Lacan in his observation that `[i]t 
is in the name of the father that we must recognize the support of the symbolic 
function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure 
of the law'. 132 
Probably the most striking articulation of this problematic in 
contemporary fiction is Donald Barthelme's The Dead Father, whose eponymous 
protagonist is no more than the function of his name, a feature which is merely 
underscored by his absurd literalization as a giant of `[o]verall length, 3,200 
cubits'. 133 Here, as in other postmodern fictions, myth is inflected by the 
vernacular, rather than, as in the modernist paradigm, the vernacular being 
inflected by myth. The curious status this engenders is remarked by the narrator 
who notes that the Dead Father is `[d]ead, but still with us, still with us, but 
dead'. 134 Indeed, we may take this as a definition of the Name-of-the-Father in so 
far as it describes the paternal function in which the dead father lingers on by 
virtue of his absence. It is a paradox most concisely summarized by the novel's 
`A Manual for Sons': 
132 'crits, p. 67. 
133 Donald Barthelme, The Dead Father (New York: Penguin, 1986,1975), p. 4. 
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Fathers are like blocks of marbles, giant cubes, highly 
polished, with veins and seams, placed squarely in your path. They 
block your path. They cannot be climbed over, neither can they be 
slithered past. They are the "past", and very likely the slither, if the 
slither is thought of as that accommodating maneuver you make to 
escape notice, or get by unscathed. 135 
The dead father indexes a primal loss, a "past", which is inscribed in every 
attempt to move beyond that loss, every meaning which might seem a new 
meaning. As such, the Name-of-the-Father persists in ubiquity: 
Tell me, said Julie, did you ever want to paint or draw or 
etch? Yourself? 
It was not necessary, said the Dead Father, because I am the 
Father. All lines my lines. All figure and all ground mine, out of my 
head. All colors mine. You take my meaning. 
We had no choice, said Julie. 
136 
Similarly, of course, Pierce persists in everything that Oedipa encounters, leaving 
her trying to make `sense of what Inverarity had left behind, never suspecting that 
the legacy was America'. 137 That this must be understood in symbolic terms is 
attested to by the literalization of the paternal metaphor in The Dead Father, 
where the eponymous `hero' abandons himself to impossible acts of procreation: 
I fathered upon her in those nights the poker chip, the cash 
register, the juice extractor, the kazoo, the rubber pretzel, the cuckoo 
'34 Ibid., p. 3. 
iss Ibid., p. 129. 
136 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 137 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 123. 
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clock, the key chain, the dime bank, the pantograph, the bubble pipe, 
the punching bag both light and heavy, the ink blot, the nose drop, the 
midget Bible, the slot-machine slug, and many other useful and 
humane cultural artefacts, as well as some thousands of children of 
the ordinary sort. I fathered as well upon her various institutions 
useful and humane such as the credit union, the dog pound, and 
parapsychology. I fathered as well various realms and territories all 
superior in terrain, climatology, laws and customs to this one. 138 
As is clear here, then, the inheritance of the Name-of-the-Father, its progeny and 
lineage, is to be understood as the symbolic order itself, which is nothing other 
than the conditions of possibility for the meaning Oedipa seeks to produce. 
If the metaphorization of the game of Strip Botticelli, and Oedipa's 
refusal of incestuous or imaginary relations subsequent to it, indexes the function 
of the Name-of-the-Father, we may perhaps witness its effects in the larger action 
of the narrative too, which may be said to consist of troping America itself. The 
figure for this in the novel is, of course, Oedipa's paranoia. Recalling the 
definition that Pynchon provides for this in Gravity's Rainbow, that is, as the 
`reflex of seeking other orders behind the visible', we can see that paranoia 
functions as a form of substitution which always understands `the visible' locum 
tenens. In a similar vein, Bersani argues that `[t]he paranoid sees the visible as a 
simulated double of the real; it deceptively repeats the real'. 139 The stress on 
simulation and repetition here, however, would seem to situate Bersani's concept 
within the rubric of the imaginary. Indeed, he goes on to propose that `[w]e must 
then begin to suspect the paranoid structure itself as a device by which 
138 The Dead Father, p. 36. 
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consciousness maintains the polarity of self and nonself, thus preserving the 
concept of identity'. 140 Such a proposal allies Pynchon's paranoia to Lacan's 
definition of psychosis which turns on the subject's foreclosure of the Name-of- 
the-Father and subsequent regression to a kind of artificial imaginary. However, 
we have already observed, as does Bersani, that Pynchon is more concerned to 
`depathologiz[e] the paranoid structure of thought' 141, and the way this is done, it 
may be suggested, is by articulating paranoia as a function of the Name-of-the- 
Father. For what Oedipa finds when she traces the path from the vehicle of 
America to its tenor is not identity but a differential relation. Indeed, it is a point 
the narrator of The Crying of Lot 49 explicitly comments upon when Oedipa 
considers the variety of American who... 
... all act 
in the same special relevance to the word, or 
whatever it is the word is there, buffering, to protect us from. The act 
of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, depending where you 
were, inside, safe, or outside, lost. Oedipa did not know where she 
was. 142 
Here, in what N. Katherine Hayles describes as `one of the text's most enigmatic 
passages' 143, we can see a late manifestation of the metaphorics of insulation. 
Indeed, we may understand with Oedipa that this insulation, or, more pertinently, 
139 The Culture of Redemption, p. 189. 
140 Ibid., p. 189. 
141 Ibid., p. 181. Summing up the duality of the concept of paranoia in Lacan's work, Jerry Aline 
Flieger notes that 'paranoia is not always a psychosis but is also a mode of discovery'. Jerry 
Aline Flieger, 'The Listening Eye: Postmodernism, Paranoia and the Hypervisible', Diacritics, 
26: 1, (1996), 90-107, (p. 103). 
142 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 89. 
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this `buffering', indexes a division effected by `the word'. Oedipa, of course, has 
`lost the direct, epileptic Word, the cry that might abolish the nighti144 and that 
word is `America' or at least that version of it which is sanctioned by her 
"`Young Republican[ism]"'. las However, in troping `America' ('[t]he act of 
metaphor'), that is, in recognizing it as a vehicle which, for the purposes of 
'safe[ty]', elides its tenor, Oedipa comes to perceive that there is a loss upon 
which the whole process is predicated. This lost tenor is represented in the novel 
by the Tristero, the vehicle's unconscious we might say following our earlier 
discussion. The loss inherent to the process of substitution and the metaphorical 
economy of the symbolic, then, thus, formally corresponds to the `lost', the 
disenfranchised Americans who are `in exile from somewhere else invisible yet 
congruent with the cheered land [Oedipa] lived in'. 146 Without the loss of the 
`lost', America no longer makes sense to Oedipa: 
For there either was some Tristero beyond the appearance of 
the legacy America, or there was just America and if there was just 
America then it seemed the only way she could continue, and manage 
to be at all relevant to it, was an alien, unfurrowed, assumed full 
circle into some paranoia. '47 
If, as Lacan maintains, it is in `the foreclosure of Name-of-the-Father in the place 
of the Other, and in the failure of the paternal metaphor, that [we may] designate 
tai N. Katherine Hayles, '"A Metaphor of God Knew How Many Parts": The Engine That Drives 
'The Crying of Lot 49", in New Essays on 'The Crying of Lot 49, Patrick O'Donnell, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 97-125, (p. 115). 
'44 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 81. 
las Ibid., p. 51. 
'46 Ibid., p. 125. 147 Ibid., p. 126. 
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the defect that gives psychosis its essential condition' 148, then the possibility that 
Oedipa entertains of there being no other America, no lost tenor and ultimately 
therefore no loss at all would signify just such a foreclosure, precisely because the 
Name-of-the-Father is constitutive of this loss in the first place. We may thus 
profitably adduce Grant's analysis which reasons that this passage illustrates how 
Oedipa `will be able to live in "just America" only if she can believe in the 
possibilities represented by the Tristero, which she must create for herself if it 
turns out that it has no independent existence'. 149 Inflecting this within the rubric 
of our exposition, we may understand `some paranoia' here as a reference to 
psychosis, rather than to paranoia as a form of metaphoric cognition. In other 
words, Grant's injunction that `she must create for herself' corresponds to the 
paranoiac construction in psychosis which, as Zizek observes, we utilize `to pull 
ourselves out of the real "illness", the "end of the world", the breakdown of the 
symbolic universe'. 150 
It is, as Lacan points out, `religion [which] has taught us to refer to... 
Name-of-the-Father' 151 and, in this respect, The Crying of Lot 49 more than 
honours its debts by deploying sacral references and allusions so complex and 
numerous that the novel has been interpreted variously as an account of either the 
Annunciation or the Pentecost, and even both at the same time. 152 Overriding all 
14" Ecrits, p. 215. 
149 A Companion to The Crying of Lot 49, p. 139. 
150 Slavoj Ziiek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular Culture 
(London: MIT Press, 1995,1991), p. 19. "sl Ecrits, p. 199. 
132 The definitive account of the religious context of The Crying of Lot 49 can be found in Edward 
Mendelson, `The Sacred, the Profane, and The Crying of Lot 49', in Pynchon: A Collection of 
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these associations, however, is `the name of God' with which the novel opens. '" 
Indeed, there are, as Grant points out, thirty three name-checks for `God' 
throughout The Crying of Lot 49.154 As is implied here, it is the name of god that 
is invoked on these occasions, rent, as it were, from any specific sacral context, 
and its first invocation follows immediately on from the opening sentence's 
annunciation of Oedipa's nam[ing as] executor, or she supposes executrix, of the 
estate of one Pierce Inverarity'. '55 The loose connection between God and 
Inverarity here may be firmed up by recalling that the latter, like the former, 
operates in the novel as a name only and it is, moreover, in his name that Oedipa 
acts, indeed, is prompted to act in the first place. We may say, then, that Pierce 
functions for Oedipa as the Name-of-the-Father - he is, after all, `a founding 
father' 156 - and that his death instigates her accession to the symbolic order, for, 
as Lacan avers, `the symbolic Father is... the dead Father'. 157 It comes as little 
surprise, therefore, to learn that Pierce's initial presence in the narrative is marked 
by absence; he is represented by a `letter' 158 notarizing his death, a form in which 
Critical Essays, Edward Mendelson, (Engelwood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 97-111, 
(passim. ). The argument that the ending finds Oedipa as the centre of some (un)holy alliance of 
both the Annunciation and the Pentecost is proposed by Robert N. Watson: 'Oedipa'l gestation of 
a new, Tristero sell; the Annunciation of the meaning of that pregnancy, and her Pentecostal 
moment of finding unexpected foreign speech on her tongue, all culminate together when Oedipa 
finds herself bidding for the Tristero'. Robert N. Watson, `Who Bids for Tristero? The 
Conversion of Pynchon's Oedipa Maas', Southern Humanities Review, 17, (1983), 55-75, (p. 69). 
153 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 5. '54 A Companion to 'The Crying of Lot 49, p. 9. 
155 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 5. 156 Ibid., p. 16. 
157, crits, p. 199. In the context of Mendelson's and Watson's arguments, it could be claimed that 
the intersubjective register of the symbolic resembles a kind of Pentecostal speaking in tongues. 
However, it is perhaps not insignificant here that Lacan reserves this kind of language for his 
discussion of psychosis, noting that, as regards the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, there is 
a `connection between the register of paternity and the blossoming of revelations, of 
annunciations regarding generation, namely, precisely what the subject is literally unable to 
conceive'. The Psychoses, p. 306. 153 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 5. 
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we may otherwise recognize the signifier and its registration in the symbolic. 
Indeed, if the onomastic economy of the symbolic finds Oedipa a place in the 
opening page, with her naming as `executrix', then by the end of the novel she 
has experienced a wide range of positions across the network, including `Margo', 
Rapunzel', `Barbie', `Arnold Snarb', `Edna Mosh' and `Grace Bortz'. 159 Perhaps 
her most significant name in this respect is Mucho's ultra-nominal `Oed'160 
which, for William Gleason, `suggest[s] the OED [and] highlights the book's 
reliance on words and wordplay'. 161 With these names in mind we may thus 
concur with Francois Regnault when he comments that... 
... [w]hen you say "the 
Name-of-the-Father, " you can 
consider the "of' as either a subjective genitive - the names God goes 
by, the names you call God (the "divine names" are a well-known 
problem in theolor) - or an objective genitive - the names a father 
gives his children. 2 
Pierce, then, is the Name that gives birth to the many names of Oedipa and, in 
doing so, opens the up the field of signification for her. In this regard we may 
aver that such content finds its expression in the form of the novel, for there is a 
sense in which Pynchon stands in substantially the same relation to the reader as 
Pierce does in relation to Oedipa. 
159 Ibid., p. 6, p. 12, p. 27, p. 76, p. 96 and p. 118 respectively. 
160 Ibid., p. 7. 
161 William Gleason, `The Postmodern Labyrinths of Lot 49', Critique, 3: 2, (1993), 83-99, (p. 92). 
162 Francois Regnault, `The Name-of-the-Father', in Reading Seminar XI: Lacan's 'Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis'. ed. by Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink and Maire 
Jaanus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 65-74 (p. 68). 
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Recalling our initial discussion we may now venture that Pynchon, or, 
more properly, `Pynchon', is, in fact, the Name-of-the-Father and that it is 
precisely the function of his fabled absence to deliver the reader into a kind of 
novelistic symbolic. Such a notion finds its expression in Barthes' classical 
formulation: `the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the 
Author". 163 Indeed, it seems quite clear that Barthes' essential manoeuvre here is 
the regulation of the reading process by the Name-of-the-Father. The corpus of 
the author, as it were, enjoins us `to substitute language itself for the person who 
until then had been supposed to be its owner'. 164 Haunting the text by his very 
absence... 
... the author 
is never more than the instance writing, just as I 
is nothing other than the instance saying I: language knows a 
`subject', not a `person', and this subject, empty outside of the very 
enunciation which defines it, suffices to make language `hold 
together', suffices, that is to say, to exhaust it. 165 
The wealth and poverty of the onomastic economy of The Crying of Lot 49 we 
noted earlier may thus be read as a function of the Name-of-the-Father. For the 
rags and robes with which these names may be decked out indexes their opacity 
as signs, that is the status we ascribed to them of being pure form -a form which 
Barthes finds here in pronouns - and one which may or may not find its content. 
163 Roland Barthes, `The Death of the Author', in Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader, ed. by 
David Lodge, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: Longman, 1988), pp. 167-172 (p. 172). 164 Ibid., p. 168. 165 Ibid., p. 169. 
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It is a plasticity which, as we have seen instanced by Joyce, Freud and now 
Lacan, finds its source in the `mystical estate' of paternity: 
... 
if the symbolic context requires it, paternity will 
nonetheless be attributed to the fact that the woman met a spirit at 
some fountain or some rock in which he is supposed to live. It is 
certainly this that demonstrates that the attribution of procreation to 
the father can only be the effect of a pure signifier, of a recognition, 
not of a real father, but of what religion has taught us to refer to as the 
Name-of-the-Father. 166 
At the diegetic level of The Crying of Lot 49, it is Pierce's status as just such a 
`pure signifier' that renders Oedipa's task of inventorying his estate so very 
difficult: 
San Narciso at that moment lost..., gave up its residue of 
uniqueness for her; became a name again, was assumed back into the 
American community of crust and mantle. Pierce Inverarity was 
really dead. She walked down a stretch of railroad track next to the 
highway. Spurs ran off here and there into factory property. Pierce 
may have owned all these factories too. But did it matter now if he'd 
owned all of San Narciso? San Narciso was a name... There was the 
true continuity, San Narciso had no boundaries. No one knew yet 
how to draw them. 167 
The rhetorical question here admits of the pure signifier's troubling ambivalence, 
its reckless superfluity which bespeaks a simultaneous inadequacy where 
everything just as easily means nothing. It is an ambiguity grimly illustrated by 
J 
' Ecrits, p. 199. 
167 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 123. 
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the various acronyms that Oedipa discovers throughout the novel, such as 
`W. A. S. T. E. ', `D. E. A. T. H. ' and `N. A. D. A. '. 168 
There is, of course, an analogous tension to be negotiated at the level of 
exegesis, one which accounts for the identifications Castillo discerns in the 
manner that `Pynchon's critics... have delighted in taking Oedipa's role'. 169 We 
have already witnessed this tension in the paradoxical invocation of Pynchon's 
name, as though it were actually Pynchon, in order to substantiate readings that 
his very absence expedited in the first place. If, as Benjamin avers, `[d]eath is the 
sanction of everything that the storyteller can tell'170, then the tales that are told, it 
seems, are always inflected by a grieving for that death. We may, perhaps, cast 
this problematic in a slightly different register. This depends on our 
understanding Barthes' `death of the Author' as a kind of Oedipalization of the 
reading process, an understanding that is underscored by his insistence upon 
`suppressing the author. 171 This `suppression', we might say, constitutes the 
unconscious of the reader, or, more accurately of the text - for what Barthes is 
really describing is the birth of the text qua signifier ('If the Oedipus complex 
isn't the introduction of the signifier, ' declares Lacan imperiously, `then I ask to 
be shown any conception of it whatsoever. ' 172) - which suggests that all 
subsequent encounters with the text will be predicated upon an unconscious 
168 Ibid, p. 84, p. 100 and p. 116 respectively. 169 'Borges and Pynchon: The Tenuous Symmetries of Art', pp. 27-28. 170 Walter Benjamin, `The Storyteller: Reflections on the Work of Nikolai Leskov', in 
Illuminations, ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), pp. 83-109 
(p. 94). 
11 'The Death of the Author', p. 196. 172 The Psychoses, p. 189. 
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desire to restore that mythical imaginary relationship of an unmediated contact 
between writer and reader. 
In this regard, our exegeses are always laments that describe the originary 
lack by which they are constituted in the first place. The particular pleasure of 
Pynchon's corpus is its privileging of this backward glance, its role as a strop, or, 
even further back, a strophe, upon which the keen edge of desire is continually 
sharpened. For if his absence demands of us that we bury Pynchon, we must do 
so in the knowledge that he is henceforth entombed in every phoneme and phrase 
of his text, and that `this death, ' cautions Lacan, `constitutes in the subject the 
eternalization of his desire'. 173 All our readings are thus ghosted by the 
knowledge of a primal felicity in the vain pursuit of which we can only ever, as it 
were, snatch at thin air, glimpsing the shadow of its retreat around the corner. 
Our compensation, however, is the exuberance of this chase, its staging of desire 
as such, in distinction to its satiation; for, as Zi ek records, 'the realization of 
desire does not consist in its being "fulfilled", "fully satisfied", it coincides rather 
with the reproduction of desire as such, with its circular movement'. 174 Again, 
we may recall our earlier analysis of Ulysses here to serve as a useful 
counterpoint to The Crying of Lot 49, for, as Bersani discerns: 
Compared to Pynchon's novel, Joyce's Ulysses, for all the 
work it requires, is play for a child-detective. Certainly Joyce wants 
us to suffer, but there will also be a term to our suffering. The 
puzzles of Ulysses are like stations of the cross; they are ritual 
frs merits, p. 104. 
174 Looking Awry, p. 7. 
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agonies through which we must pass in order finally to be at one, far 
above the consciousness of any character in the novel, with Joyce's 
remarkable cohesive consciousness. Nothing could be more different 
from [Pynchon's work]. 175 
This difference, we may suggest, is the one designated by Lacan as separating 
aim from goal, in which `aim' itself conveniently expresses the ambivalence. 
Zizek summarizes the distinction noting that `[t]he goal is the final destination, 
while the aim is what we intend to do, i. e., the way itself . 176 Thus, for Lacan, 
`aim is simply [a] return into circuit'. 177 The Crying of Lot 49 we may say, then, 
is predicated upon the signifier qua aim, while Ulysses is predicated upon the 
signified qua goal. If Pynchon is dead, therefore, Joyce is merely hiding and will 
spring from the cupboard when the game is up. 
For our purposes, Andre Green offers an admirably terse definition of the 
Oedipal paradigm we have been attending to here when he claims that it `aims 
less at finding the object than at finding it again'. 17' The implication of what we 
have seen so far is that what is found again, and again and again, is the Oedipal 
paradigm itself. As such, it recalls Barthes' comment that every story is 
ultimately that of Oedipus. If Pynchon is the constitutive repression for our 
accession to the reading symbolic, then equally Pierce is the constitutive 
repression for Oedipa's symbolization, just as the `W. A. S. T. E. ' embodied in the 
175 The Culture of Redemption, p. 187. 
176 Looking Awry, p. 5. 
177 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1994,1977), p. 179. 178 `Oedipus, Freud, and Us', p. 225. 
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Tristero is the constitutive repression for Oedipa's America. In this regard it is a 
structure which boldly refashions the meaning of Benjamin's contention that 
`[w]hat draws the reader to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering life 
with a death he reads about'. 17' However, if there is a corpse, there is also a 
crime, for, as Lacan remarks, `the symbol manifests itself first of all as the 
murder of the thing'. 180 And if there is a crime there must be a detective too. 
There is a recognition of this in Oedipus Rex which is, for Tanner, `one of the 
first great detective stories in Western literature'181, and, as such, enables Hannah 
Charney to argue `the special relevance of Oedipus to detective fiction'. 182 This 
recognition of the imperative of the detective indexes the role of recognition as 
such in the Oedipal drama. Commenting on this Shoshana Felman notes that `the 
subject must - like Oedipus - recognize what he misrecognizes, namely, his 
desire, and his history, inasmuch as they are, both, unconscious (that is, insofar as 
his life-history differs from what he can know, or own, as his life-story)'. 183 The 
detective, we might say then, embodies the function of recognition, a function 
without which there is no crime in the first place. It is this function which is 
currently amiss, repressed as it were, in our interpretative schema, and it is to this 
and its attendant temporality which we must now turn. 
179 `The Storyteller', p. 101. 180 Ecrits, p. 104. 
191 Thomas Pynchon, p. 60. 
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3: Ex Postal Facto 
For David Seed, The Crying of Lot 49 finds Pynchon `drawing once again 
on the detective genre' 184 ; it is a point echoed by Geoffrey Lord, who claims that 
there is a `clear link between The Crying of Lot 49 and the detective story'. 185 
This link resides in the invocation of `the assumptions and methods of detective 
fiction but not the ultimate logic of its conclusion: in the end the mystery is not 
solved, and order is not restored'. 186 Oedipa, we might say, undertakes an 
investigation into the mysteries surrounding Pierce's estate, employing all the 
rational procedures associated with such a task (including questioning witnesses 
and maintaining forensic probity), only to fail in determining a solution. As 
readers, our identification with Oedipa is largely based on mimicking her role as a 
detective. We faithfully sift through the novel's clues with her in an attempt to 
re-assemble the meaning behind the mystery only to discover the vanity of our 
faith on the last page. The genre of detective fiction is thus apparently proposed 
only in the act of its refusal. Tanner has discerned in this refusal a form of 
reversal: 
With a detective story you start with a mystery and move 
towards a final clarification, all the apparently disparate, suggestive 
bits of evidence finally being bound together in one illuminating 
pattern; whereas in Pynchon's novel we move from a state of degree- 
182 Hannah Charney, `Oedipal Patterns in the Detective Novel', in Psychoanalytic Approaches to 
Literature and Film, pp. 238-243 (p. 238). 183 `Beyond Oedipus: The Specimen Story of Psychoanalysis', p. 82. 194 David Seed, `In Pursuit of the Receding Plot: Some American Postmodernists', in 
Postmodernism and Contemporary Fiction, ed. by Edmund J. Smyth, pp. 36-53, (p. 50). 185 Postmodernism and Notions of National Difference, pp. 63-64. 86 Ibid., p. 65. 
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zero mystery - just the quotidian mixture of an average Californian 
day - to a condition of increasing mystery and dubiety. 
' 7 
We may perhaps infer from this the plot of The Crying of Lot 49 signifies not just 
a difference form detective fiction in particular, but literature generally. For, as 
Jameson reports, `the detective story plot merely follows the basic tendency of all 
literary plots or intrigue in general, which is marked by the resolution of 
multiplicity back into some primal unity'. 18" It does, of course, more than 
`merely follow' in the sense of `joining in'. Indeed, it may be suggested that one 
of the conditions of possibility for detective fiction is literature's consciousness of 
its own formal conventions. These teleological conventions are then 
foregrounded as content in the works of Edgar Allan Poe, Arthur Conan Doyle 
and Agatha Christie and perhaps find their most concise expression in the 
vocabulary of the solution - `unriddle', `unlock', `unravel', `fathom', 
`rationalize', `decipher', `get to the bottom of, etc.. The reverence for narrative 
telos in these works can be read as an x-ray of traditional narrative forms, a 
glimpse behind the muscle and flesh of character and theme onto the skeletal 
structure which sustains them. In this respect, we may note with Tzvetan 
Todorov that `a tendency to description... remains entirely alien to the detective 
novel' 189 precisely because, if it did not, such excesses would obscure the genre's 
most valuable property as a genre which is its purity of form. Following on from 
187 Thomas Pynchon, p. 56. 188 Fredric Jameson, `On Raymond Chandler', in The Poetics of Murder: Detective Fiction and 
Literary Theory, ed. by Glen W. Most and William W. Stone (San Diego, New York; London: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983), pp. 122-148, (pp. 145-146). 
189 Tzvetan Todorov, `The Typology of Detective Fiction', in Moden: Criticism and Theory, ed. 
by David Lodge, trans. by Richard Howard, pp. 158-165 (p. 162). 
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this, then, Pynchon's refusal of the narrative chronology of detective fiction can 
be read as a problematization of the `primal unity' of `all literary plots'. 
Jameson's suggestive description here hints at the imaginary character of the telos 
in whose image the rest of the text is made over. Which is to say that the value 
and function of all elements of a story are normally determined by reference to its 
teleology, and that, of course, includes the combinations of material that are 
either incorporated or excluded in the first place. It is therefore unsurprising that, 
at the level of content, the moment of telos is usually represented by a gathering 
of suspects in to a drawing-room or other such confined place, for the temporal 
circularity of such narratives may be understood precisely as a spatial relation, an 
organization of parts in a synchronic whole, rather than as a diachrony. In 
refusing this (despite locking Oedipa in a room at the end of the novel), and, 
instead, starting with a `primal unity' which fragments into `multiplicity', The 
Crying of Lot 49 dramatizes at the level of form the movement from imaginary to 
symbolic which have already witnessed in its content. 
It may well prove useful at this stage to invoke Todorov's classic 
delineation of the typology of detective fiction, one which neatly articulates the 
distinctions made in other discussions of the form. To begin with, he notes that 
detective fiction is essentially a tale of two stories, the story proper and its 
plotting within the narrative: 
The first, that of the crime, is in fact the story of an absence: 
its most accurate characteristic is that it cannot be immediately 
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present in the book. [... ] The status of the second story is... just as 
excessive; it is a story which has no importance in itself, which serves 
only as a mediator between the reader and the story of the crime. [... ] 
We are concerned then in the whodunit with two stories of which one 
is absent but real, the other present but insignificant. 190 
We will, of course, immediately recognize in this description the Oedipal 
paradigm which likewise consists in disclosing the repression upon which it is 
founded. Oedipus Rex, Andre Green reminds us, is predicated on `a regressive 
proceeding toward the darkness of origin'. 191 Indeed, this circling around a 
constitutive absence prompts Geoffrey H. Hartman to remark that `[i]nstead of a 
whodunit we get a whodonut, a story with a hole in it. 192 The insufficiency of 
the narrative in The Crying of Lot 49 can thus be seen as an exaggeration of an 
already existing tendency, one which refuses the ultimate accommodation of the 
traditional form. In this case, the second story is never fully told; its goal of 
retelling the first story, to recall our earlier discussion, is never reached but 
remains at the level of aim. In this respect, the form of The Crying of Lot 49 is 
closer to the second of Todorov's detective genres, the one most often associated 
with the United States, and which he terms the thriller: 
... this kind of detective fiction fuses the two stories or in 
other words, suppresses the first and vitalizes the second. We are no 
longer told about a crime anterior to the moment of the narrative; the 
narrative coincides with the action. No thriller is presented in the 
form of memoirs: there is no point reached where the narrator 
10 'The Typology of Detective Fiction', pp. 160-161. 191 `Oedipus, Freud, and Us', p. 220. 192 Geoffrey H. Hartman, `Literature High and Low; The Case of the Mystery Story', in The 
Poetics of Murder: Detective Fiction andLiterary Theory, ed. by Glen W. Most and William W. 
Stone, pp. 210-229 (p214). 
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comprehends all past events, we do not even know if he will reach the 
end of the story alive. Prospection takes the place of retrospection. 193 
Several critics have argued for the special relevance of the American thriller 
genre to The Crying of Lot 49. Brian McHale, for example, notes that it `adheres 
rather faithfully to the conventions of the LA private-eye sub-genre' 194, while 
Tanner similarly proposes that `[t]he model for the story would seem to be the 
Californian detective story - an established tradition including the works of 
writers such as Raymond Chandler, Ross McDonald and Eric Stanley 
Gardner'. 195 Indeed, there is an explicit acknowledgement of this relation in The 
Crying of Lot 49 when Oedipa is described as being `like the private eye in any 
long-ago radio drama, believing all you needed was grit, resourcefulness, 
exemption from hidebound cops' rules, to solve any great mystery'. 196 The 
narrator even goes so far as to suggest with Todorov that `we do not even know if 
[s]he will reach the end of the story alive' by alluding to this generic imperative 
in the statement that `the private eye sooner or later has to get beat up on'. 197 
What is of interest in the thriller as a form is that in these novels 
`mystery... become[s] a pure pretext' for the real work of `concentrat[ing] on the 
description of a milieu'. 198 While not actually picking up on Todorov here, it is 
193 `The Typology of Detective Fiction', p. 161. 194 Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London and New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 22. 195 Thomas Pynchon, p. 56. 196 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 85. 197 Ibid., p. 85. 
198 `The Typology of Detective Fiction', pp. 164-165. 
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this idea which largely informs Jameson's superb essay on the work of Raymond 
Chandler: 
Since there is no longer any privileged experience in which 
the whole of the social structure can be grasped, a figure must be 
invented who can be superimposed on the society as a whole, whose 
routine and life pattern serve somehow to tie its separate and isolated 
parts together. [... ] In doing this the detective in a sense once again 
fulfils the demands of the function of knowledge rather than that of 
lived experience: through him we are able to see, to know, the society 
as a whole. 199 
We may recognize in this description the picaresque trajectory of Oedipa in The 
Crying of Lot 49 (and also perhaps of Stencil and Benny Profane in V. and of 
Tyrone Slothrop in Gravity's Rainbow) who, like Marlowe, `as an involuntary 
explorer of the society... visits either those places you don't look at or those 
places you can't look at: the anonymous or the wealthy and secretive'. 200 if 
Pynchon's novel is primarily concerned to disclose the former (the `preterite' as 
they become in Gravity's Rainbow) then this process is expedited by an intimacy 
with the latter (the `elect') in the shape of Pierce's estate. In thus putting a face 
to the anonymous of America The Crying of Lot 49 portrays what Jameson terms 
`the converse, the darker concrete reality, of an abstract illusion about the United 
States'201: 
A kind of reverence attaches to the abstract, a disabused 
cynicism to the concrete. As in certain types of mental obsession and 
'"'On Raymond Chandler', pp. 127-128. 200 Ibid., p. 128. 201 Ibid., p. 129. 
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dissociation, the American is able to observe local injustice, racism, 
corruption, educational incompetence, with a practiced eye, while he 
continues to entertain boundless optimism as to the greatness of the 
country, taken as a whole. 202 
Recalling our earlier description of Oedipa's urban experience, where she was 
characterized as a `driver', we can perhaps now understand her getting out of the 
car for any number of pedestrian excursions around the city as a move from the 
abstract to the concrete. In a similar vein, William Gleason notes that initially 
`[s]he views the city from above (as a designer) and sees it - for the moment - 
synchronically. But Oedipa will not remain a Daedalian observer; she will enter 
San Narciso's curving streets as a Thesean explorer, intent to discover 
meaning'. 203 This meaning is expressed as a tenderness for detritus, one which 
finds its occasion in the sheer material density of Pynchon's descriptions. The 
awkward quiddity of this prose, which makes Pynchon such a reluctant read, 
offers its own reward in the expedition of a differential registering of delicacy; its 
bulk paradoxically affording a membrane-like sensitivity to the concrete detail, 
comparable with an ear cocked for a particular sound amidst the welter of white 
noise. Histories and prospects worthy of continents can thus be detected in the 
`wrecked face' of an old man that Oedipa spies huddled in a doorway: 
What voices overheard, Hinders of luminescent gods 
glimpsed among the wallpaper's stained foliage, candlestubs lit to 
rotate in the air over him, prefiguring the cigarette he or a friend must 
fall asleep someday smoking, thus to end among the flaming, secret 
salts held all those years by the insatiable stuffing of a mattress that 
202 Ibid., p. 130. 
203 `The Postmodern Labyrinths of Lot 49', p. 84. 
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could keep vestiges of every nightmare sweat, helpless overflowing 
bladder, visciously tearfully consummated wet dream, like the 
memory bank to a computer of the lost? She was overcome all at 
once by a need to touch him, as if she could not believe in him, or 
would not remember him, without it. 204 
The struggles of the syntax here, like the distortions of a message over the tannoy 
system at a station, attest to the difficulty of Pynchon's task; for the force of this 
and other such passages proceeds from the manner in which its meaning must 
flicker in and out. A feeling for rubbish, in other words, needs to bear witness to 
its status as ephemera, to refer in its mode of testimony to its fragility amidst the 
brute textures of contemporary existence. In a similar vein, Jameson remarks on 
the literary representation of insignificance in daily experience, noting that `it 
eludes the registering apparatus of great literature': 
[M]ake of it some Joycean epiphany and the reader is 
obliged to take this moment as the center of his world, as something 
directly infused with symbolic meaning; and at once the most fragile 
and precious quality of the perception is irrevocably damaged, its 
slightness is lost, it can no longer be half glimpsed, half 
disregarded. 205 
However, Jameson goes on to observe that if we `put such an experience in the 
framework of the detective story... everything changes: attention flows back 
onto the neglected perception and sees it in renewed, heightened form without 
damaging its structure'. 206 What he means by this may be understood as a kind of 
204 The Crying of Lot 49, pp. 86-87. 205 'On Raymond Chandler', p. 125. 206 Ibid., p. 125. 
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deliberation by sleight-of-hand. Detection demands a scrutiny of all available 
data, including, of course, what is habitually neglected; as long as this scrutiny is 
a function of detection, is its pretext to recall Todorov, then it is itself a form of 
neglect and therefore maintains a felicity to the quality of neglect. If, on the other 
hand, such a scrutiny is the end in itself, then it invests this neglect with a purpose 
which fundamentally alters the authenticity of its representation. The form of the 
thriller circumvents this by tricking spontaneity and self-consciousness into an 
otherwise impossible co-existence. 207 The result of this is that even the more 
obviously schematic attentions to detritus in The Crying of Lot 49, such as 
`W. A. S. T. E. ' and `entropy', are lent an authenticity they would not otherwise 
have if the novel was apparently predicated on them alone. 
One of the more striking characteristics of the milieu or `crime scene' that 
Oedipa's investigations lead her to explore is its qualification by, or association 
with, dreams. References to this masterly inactivity exceed by far those of any 
other concept and occur on almost every page of the novel, to the extent that their 
prominence has, as far as I am aware, escaped critical notice, presumably by dint 
of the scale of such dissemination. We are informed, for example, that 
`everything she... dreamed, remembered, would somehow come to be woven into 
The Tristero'; that fingers have owners who `were asleep and the moled, freckled 
hands out roaming dream-landscapes'; that Oedipa is `all alone in a nightmare'; 
207 Of course, with a form whose primary injunction is to contextualize, this discloses certain 
inadequacies in the critical adduction of quotations. However, we may perhaps content ourselves 
here by noting in regard to the above extract from The Crying of Lot 49 that Oedipa's encounter 
with the old man is expedited by the conceit of detection, for she is captivated by the back of his 
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that she keeps waking from a nightmare about something in a mirror'; that `[i]n a 
Golden Gate Park she came on a circle of children in their nightclothes, who told 
her they were dreaming the gathering. But that the dream was really no different 
from being awake'; that she has `stumbled indeed... on to a secret richness and 
concealed density of dream'; that San Narciso is `an incident among our climactic 
records of dreams and what dreams became among our accumulated daylight'; 
and that, in consideration of all this, `[l]ater, possibly, she would have trouble 
sorting the night into real and dreamed'. 208 In one respect, the description of the 
hidden interstices of San Narciso as a dream land can be understood as a function 
of the historical unconscious which we have already seen impinging upon 
Oedipa's urban symbolic; for, as the narrative declares, `[w]hat fragments of 
dreams came had to do with the post horn', that is, with the Tristero209 In 
another respect, but one which, as we shall see, is bound to this function, such 
references to the dream state are endemic to the form of postmodern detective 
fiction. By this latter term we can designate a whole series of contemporary 
works that take as their chronotope various mutations of the generic paradigm of 
detective fiction. If we have already had occasion to observe that this is the 
common measure of all teleological texts, we might perhaps advance as examples 
some of the more avowedly detective-oriented fictions, novels such as Peter 
Ackroyd's Hawksmoor, Patrick Süskind's Perfume, Paul Auster's The New York 
Trilogy, Graham Swift's Waterland and John Banville's The Book of Evidence. 
left hand on which `she made out the post horn, tattooed in old ink now beginning to blur and 
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In these narratives too we find that a dream state attends the scene of the crime. 
The discovery of Freddie Parr's body in Waterland, for example, occurs during 
`the extra hour's sleep [Tom Crick] was allowed as a studious schoolboy 9210 , and 
it is only later when he realizes that he has apprehended the boy (and the 
murderer) in a hypnopompic condition, `that [he] came out of a dream'. 211 
Similarly, in The Name of the Rose the discovery of Venantius' body is 
coincidental with a state in which `monks were nodding with sleepiness'. 212 
Finally, during the climactic murder scene of Perfume, Grenouille momentarily 
shuts his eyes: 
When he opened them again, he saw Laure lying on her bed, 
naked and dead and shorn clean and sparkling white. It was like his 
nightmare, the one he had dreamt in Grasse the night before last and 
had forgotten again. Every detail came back to him now as if in a 
blazing flash. In that instant everything was exactly as it had been in 
the dream, only very much brighter. 213 
The connection between dreams and crime scenes in these examples is only 
apparently arbitrary, and to understand it properly we must turn our attention to 
their analogous structures. 
For psychoanalysis, the interpretation of dreams may be evinced as a 
conflict of aesthetic practices. On the one hand dreams display an organicism 
210 Graham Swift, Waterland (London: Picador, 1984,1983), p. 22. 
211 Ibid., p. 25. 
212 Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, trans. by William Weaver (London: Minerva, 1992, 
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213 Patrick Süskind, Perfume: The Story of a Murderer, trans. by John E. Woods (London: 
Penguin, 1987,1985), p. 229. 
188 
which seemingly gathers up incommensurable details within its folds, and on the 
other hand, there remains a truculent particularism which constantly gives all 
totalities the slip. If the individual feature of a dream is, in one way, the lynchpin 
of the dream's seeming unity, it is, in another way, an embarrassing excess that 
threatens to topple the project of totalization which secondary revision has set for 
it. With the efficiency of a Joyce at the height of his allegorical hubris, secondary 
revision `fills up the gaps in the dream structure with shreds and patches. As a 
result of its efforts, the dream loses its appearance of absurdity and 
disconnectedness and approximates to the model of an intelligible experience'. 214 
The task of the psychoanalyst is then centred upon rearticulating the 
heterogeneity of a dream as it is occulted by secondary revision. It is thus akin to 
a practice of dismemberment. 
Indeed, the unity upon which such a practice is performed operates as an 
imaginary lure, designed to seduce the unwary analyst and assuage the curiosity 
of his knife. It is in this sense, Zizek argues, that the crime scene may be 
considered analogous to the dream, for `the scene of the crime with which the 
detective is confronted is also, as a rule, a false image put together by the 
murderer in order to efface the traces of his act'. 215 Inevitably, then, the process 
of detection, as with analysis, begins by fastening upon a detail or a clue 
structurally at odds with its mise en scene. It will be remembered that this is 
precisely the procedure adopted by Dupin in the first of his stories, `The Murder 
215 
214 The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 630. 215 LookingAwry, p. 53 
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in the Rue Morgue', where the solution to the mystery dwells in the outrd 
character of the `peculiar voice, [the] unusual agility, and [the] startling absence 
of motive in a murder so singularly atrocious'. 216 Even with cases somewhat 
more mundane than those concerning the misadventures of a febrile orang-utan, it 
is still singularity which conspires against the imaginary machinations of the 
criminal, as Ziiek notes: 
What we have here is a detail that in itself is usually quite 
insignificant..., but which nonetheless with regard to its structural 
position denatures the scene of the crime and produces a quasi- 
Brechtian effect of estrangement - like the alteration of a small detail 
in a well-known picture that all of a sudden renders the whole picture 
strange and uncanny. 217 
Such, of course, is the character of Tristero's "`stamps that were almost kosher- 
looking but not quite"'218 All of these stamps feature details that, while 
inconspicuous in themselves, appear anomalous when situated within the 
orthodoxy of a U. S. Postage stamp. For example, `[i]n the 3c Mothers of 
America Issue, put out on Mother's Day, 1934, the flowers to the lower left of 
Whistler's Mother had been replaced by Venus's fly-trap, belladonna, poison 
sumac and a few others Oedipa had never seen'. 219 
We might profitably address these structural aberrations in terms of 
anamorphosis. As a figure in painting, anamorphosis is that part of a picture 
216 Edgar Allan Poe, Selected Tales (London: Penguin Popular Classic, 1994), p. 143. 
217 LookingAwry, p. 53. 
218 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 120. 
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which sticks out from the rest of the representation, denaturing it and thereby 
propelling the production of a supplementary reading. The most celebrated 
example of this genre is Hans Holbein's The Ambassadors which depicts two 
noble emissaries disporting themselves before all the accoutrements of 
Renaissance culture. However, this display of accomplishments is offset by a 
disruptive stain in the foreground of the picture which, at an angle, presents itself 
as the distorted form of a skull. The effect of this on the meaning of the picture 
is, as Zizek observes, one of 
rendering all its constituents "suspicious", and thus 
open[ing] up the abyss of the search for a meaning - nothing is what 
it seems to be, everything is to be interpreted, everything is supposed 
to possess some supplementary meaning. The ground of the 
established, familiar signification opens up; we find ourselves in a 
realm of total ambiguity, but this very lack propels us to produce ever 
new "hidden meanings": it is a driving force of endless 
compulsion. 22° 
The function of the Tristero, as it is manifest in the stamps of lot 49 for example, 
lies in its generation of a suspicion about the banal topography of Oedipa's 
California. Initially harbouring `[n]o suspicion at all that it might have something 
to tell her', it is only when Oedipa has been `sensitized' that she realizes `[m]uch 
of the revelation was to come through the stamp collection'. 221 Appropriately, 
'[i]t got seriously under way, this sensitizing', with a letter which, it is pointed 
219 Ibid., p. 120. 220 Looking Awry., p. 91. 221 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 29. 
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out, 'had nothing much to say'. 222 The fact that the letter is `more or less devoid 
of significant content' leads J. Kerry Grant to suggest that `the medium... is more 
important than the message'. 223 If this is so, it is precisely because of the 
meaninglessness of the message, its very inexplicability, like the anamorphic 
stain. This then compels Oedipa to interrogate the medium, to `look more closely 
at its outside' where she finds her first intimation of the Tristero in the apparently 
misspelled injunction to `REPORT ALL OBSCENE MAIL TO YOUR POTSMASTER'. 224 
That this first aberration sets in motion Oedipa's `endless compulsion' to 
track down the Tristero is evinced by the anamorphic diction deployed 
throughout The Crying of Lot 49 to delineate her encounters with the traces of 
this shadowy organization. We are told, for example, that she would `see the 
world refracted through those tears, those specific tears'225, that a Mexican girl 
traces `post horns... in the haze of her breath on the window'226, and that the 
sailor's post horn tattoo was now `beginning to blur and spread'. 227 Indeed, 
Oedipa's first moment of awareness of a supplementary meaning is precipitated 
by, and is articulated as a process of, `looking awry': 
She drove into San Narciso on a Sunday, in a rented Impala. 
Nothing was happening. She looked down a slope, needing to squint 
for the sunlight, on to a vast sprawl of houses.... The ordered swirl of 
houses and streets, from this high angle, sprang at her with the same 
unexpected, astonishing clarity as [a] circuit card had. ... there were 
222 Ibid., p. 29. 223 A Companion to 'The Crying of Lot 49, p. 48. 224 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 30. 225 Ibid., p. 13 (my italics). 
226 Ibid., p. 84 (my italics). 
227 Ibid., p. 86 (my italics). 
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to both outward patterns a hieroglyphic sense of concealed 
meaning... As if, on some other frequency, or out of the eye of some 
whirlwind rotating too slow for her heated skin even to feel the 
centrifugal coolness of, words were being spoken. She suspected that 
much. 22 
It is worth noting here that the whirlwind of her suspicion moves in a 
`centrifugal' direction, pointing to the widening of the frame of reference 
occasioned by fastening upon the anamorphic detail. This is explicitly pointed 
out by the narrator when it is stated that `revelations... now seemed to come 
crowding in exponentially, as if the more she collected the more would come to 
her'. 229 
Indeed, we may perhaps argue that the epistemological topography of 
most detective fiction is predicated upon the centrifugal terrain of the 
anamorphosis. Returning to our earlier example of Poe's `The Murders in the 
Rue Morgue', we may note that Dupin advocates just such an anamorphic 
hermeneutics of suspicion: 
Truth is not always in a well. [... ] To look at a star by 
glances - to view it in a sidelong way, by turning toward 
it the 
exterior portions of the retina... is to behold the star distinctly - is to 
have the best appreciation of its lustre -a lustre which grows dim just 
in proportion as we turn our vision fully upon it. .. 
At is possible to 
make even Venus herself vanish from the firmament by a scrutiny too 
sustained, too concentrated, or too direct. 230 
228 Ibid., pp. 14-15 (my italics). 
229 Ibid., p. 56. 
230 Selected Tales, p. 133. 
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If detection is here, in one of the very first example of the genre, rendered as a 
process of looking awry, then we may equally find such a paradigm at work in a 
recent winner of The Crime Writers' Association Silver Dagger Award and one 
of the most popular detective novels of the 1990s - Peter Hoeg's Miss Smilla's 
Feeling for Snow. In it the detective's suspicion is occasioned by her willingness 
and her ability to remark the differences articulated by footprints in the snow. 
This ability enables her to disclose a supplementary knowledge in the face of 
seemingly neutral signification: 
In a big city you adopt a particular way of regarding the 
world. A focused, sporadically selective view. When you scan a 
desert or an ice floe, you see with different eyes. You let the details 
slip out of focus in favour of the whole. This way of seeing reveals a 
different reality. If you look at someone's face in this manner, it 
starts to dissolve into a shifting series of masks. 231 
We may note here that the anamorphic gaze heralds a process of dissolution in the 
object under scrutiny as its apparent organicism decoagulates, like dream work 
under analysis, into its constituent elements. 
However, in revealing a `different reality' the anamorphic gaze also 
fosters an all consuming suspicion, for, as Lacan comments, `[d]istortion may 
lend itself.., to all the paranoiac ambiguities'. 232 In this respect, as we have 
already noted, many critics concur with Jameson that The Crying of Lot 49 `wants 
231 Peter Hoeg, Miss Smilla's Feeling for Snow, trans. by Farrar Strauss & Giroux Inc. and Iiarvill 
(London: Flamingo, 1994,1992), p. 220. 
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to contaminate its readers and beyond them to endow the present age itself with 
an impalpable but omnipresent culture of paranoia'. 233 This paranoia, as a 
function of anamorphosis, may be understood as a radical mistrust of denotative 
meaning. Such mistrust then finds expression in the ascription of `quiet 
ambiguity'234 or `fierce ambivalence'235 to the object world and thus a general 
feeling that things are `not too clear'. 236 Borrowing from Hitchcock studies we 
may perhaps elaborate the anamorphic generation of suspicion more explicitly. 
What, Pascal Bonitzer wonders, is `required to turn a Lumiere brothers' sketch 
into a Hitchcockian fiction? '237 The object of Bonitzer's speculation is, in other 
words, the difference obtaining between the innocence of early cinema and the 
paranoiac, crime-stained universe of Hitchcock. Taking as his example a short 
film depicting a soldier courting a nanny engaged in pushing a pram around a 
park, he concludes that it is enough merely to inform the audience `a priori that 
the nanny has decided to drown the baby'. 238 This surplus knowledge then 
undermines the meaning of the whole sequence even if everything is filmed as 
before: 
When one sees the baby babbling in its pram, the soldier 
clowning around in an attempt to seduce the nanny, and the latter 
232 The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p. 87. 233 Fredric Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis; London: Indiana University Press; British Film Institute, 1992), 
17. 
34 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 6. 235 Ibid., p. 11. 236 Ibid, p. 32. 237 Pascal Bonitzer, `Hitchcockian Suspense' in Everythiq You Always Wanted To Know About 
Lacan, But Were Afraid To Ask Hitchcock, ed. by Slavoj Zilek (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 15-30 
(P. 19). 
238 ibid., p. 19. 
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simpering and shaking her rear, an underlying sense of horror serves 
to destroy the apparent meaning - what semiologists would call the 
`denotated' meaning - of the scene, and distorts all its signs.... The 
first `impression of reality' shifts to a secondary level, that of 
connotation. For the camera is no longer saying to us: `Look at this 
baby, how sweet it is', but rather: `Look at this baby, how sweet it is, 
it has only a few minutes to live, unless the soldier understands what 
is going on'. 239 
What is required in filmic terms to produce this effect is merely the juxtaposition 
of two shots: one where we learn of the nanny's murderous intent and another 
where we see the apparently innocent scene armed with the knowledge gleaned 
from the first shot. This, of course, is nothing more than dramatic irony. 
However, commenting upon Bonitzer's article, Mladen Dolar argues that this 
surplus knowledge is precisely the designation of the anamorphic stain. To 
understand this we must situate the latter not in the field of the visible but in the 
field of the gaze. 
In other words, anamorphosis exits as a condition of suspicion inhabiting 
the gaze and therefore does not have to exist as a visible blot. Thus, for example, 
Grant's endless consternation at Oedipa's nervousness - (`An odd response'240, `a 
rather gratuitous, "Twilight Zone" kind of aside'241) - in the face of an 
apparently unthreatening environment fails to distinguish between the `threat' 
contained in the gaze as a surplus knowledge and the visible `threat' of the 
Tristero stamps which function as the positive correlate of the former. The fact 
2391bid., pp. 19-20. 
240 A Companion to 'The Crying of Lot 49, p. 67. 241 Ibid., p. 108. 
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that she is continually nervous, even in the absence of a visible stimulus, attests to 
the manner in which her gaze is stained or skewed by what she already knows. 
This is perhaps most clearly emblematized in the exchange of `Significant 
Looks'242 accompanying the subject of the Tristero, the kind of `knowing look 
you get in your dreams from a certain unpleasant figure'. 243 A `knowing look', of 
course, is precisely a gaze that disables the neutrality of its occasion without 
denoting a referent that might justify it positively. The `lithe and terrible 
silence'244 attending the unforeseen deed which fosters these looks then comes to 
inform Oedipa's gaze, such as when she finds `panic growing inside her head' at 
Yoyodyne because `nobody spoke to her'. 245 Indeed, what this example discloses 
is that the surplus knowledge of the paranoid gaze is equally troubled by a lack 
that manifests itself in uncertainty, as Dolar notes: 
... surplus-knowledge also produces 
lack of knowledge, it 
confronts the spectator with his/her ignorance: if the initial setting 
was well known and predictable, then the surplus knowledge makes it 
opaque and uncertain, the outcome becomes entirely unpredictable, 
beyond the reach of knowledge - it becomes the place where the 
subject is tom between his/her surplus and lack of knowledge; the 
surplus turns in to lack. The objects lose their functionality, they 
become secret signs that have lost their (usual) meaning and are 
therefore open to a multiplicity of significations. So the function of 
the blot is finally nothing but the developed form and the reflected 
expression of the function of the gaze which is structured by the 
oscillation between the surplus and the lack. 246 
242 The Crying of f Lot 49, p. 48. 243Ibid, p. 53. 
244 Ibid., p. 49. 
245 Ibid., p. 58. 
246 Mladen Dolar, `The Spectator Who Knew Too Much', in Everything You Always Wanted To 
Know About Lacan, But Were Afraid To Ask Hitchcock, pp. 129-136 (p. 134). 
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What is interesting here is how the opacity of the anamorphic gaze institutes the 
production of a certain temporality which may be termed suspense. 
Indeed, we may follow Dolar in his designation of `the zero degree of 
suspense'247 as the minimal loss of transparency in the gaze. Suspense may be 
understood in these terms as the temporal correlate of the more spatially oriented 
paranoia. If, like the latter term, suspense betokens an uncertainty and a 
suspicion, it also announces a temporal viscosity, a stretching and compression of 
time that Roland Barthes has properly identified as dilation: 
... 
between question and answer there is a whole dilatory 
area whose emblem might be named "reticence", the rhetorical figure 
which interrupts the sentence, suspends it, turns it aside.... Whence, 
in the hermeneutic code, in comparison to those extreme terms 
(question and answer), the abundance of dilatory morphemes: the 
snare..., the equivocation..., the partial answer..., the suspended 
answer..., and jamming.... The variety of these terms (their 
inventive range) attests to the considerable labour the discourse must 
accomplish if it hopes to arrest the enigma, to keep it open. 248 
In the light of this, we may understand the detective story as a narrative engorged 
with delay and distended by `many demurs'249, always, as it were, `in retreat. 250 
It is, in fact, just such an aposiopetic discourse that the Tristero gives rise to: 
... a gentle chill, an ambiguity, begins to creep in among the 
words. Heretofore the naming of names has gone on either literally or 
247 Ibid., p. 134. 
248 SIZ, p. 75. 
249 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 62. 250 Ibid., p. 68. 
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as a metaphor. But now, as the duke gives his fatal command, a new 
mode of expression takes over. It can only be called a kind of ritual 
reluctance. Certain things, it is made clear, will not be spoken aloud; 
certain events will not be shown onstage.... 251 
The `ritual reluctance' identified here, which ultimately disables Oedipa's 
interrogative procedures, may be profitably delineated as the elision of the 
signified in favour of the signifier. This latter may then be considered as a kind 
of promissory note that both Oedipa and the reader hope to exchange for the 
signified once the `ritual' has been successfully completed, because, as Barthes 
attests, the aposiopetic story `brings narrative very close to the rite of initiation (a 
long path marked with pitfalls, obscurities, steps, suddenly comes out into the 
light)'. 252 
At this juncture we might profitably finish our consideration of Todorov's 
typology of detective fiction. Th differences between the whodunit and the 
thriller are, for him, primarily an effect of `two entirely different forms of 
interest': 
The first can be called curiosity, it proceeds from effect to 
cause: starting from a certain effect (a corpse and certain clues) we 
must find its cause (the culprit and his motive). The second form is 
suspense, and here the movement is from cause to effect: we are first 
shown the causes, the initial donnes (gangsters preparing a heist), and 
our interest is sustained by the expectation of what will happen, that 
is, certain effects (corpses, crimes, fights). 253 
251 Ibid., p. 48. 
252 
. pp. 75-76. 253 `The Typology of Detective Fiction', p. 161. 
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It would seem, then, that the anamorphic narrative of The Crying of Lot 49 is 
constituted in accordance with laws of suspense which are characteristic of the 
thriller. However, it may be argued that anamorphosis invokes both orders of 
temporality and that Pynchon's novel therefore does likewise. In so doing it can 
be considered as part off Todorov's third form of the detective story, one he 
rather unhelpfully terms `the suspense novel' and where the reader `wonders as 
much about the future as about the past'. 254 We have already seen how the 
anamorphic blot initiates a type of suspense, but it also fosters a sense of curiosity 
in the sense that Todorov describes it. This is because interpretation is founded 
upon a constitutive delay; it can never be coexistent with its object of enquiry. In 
other words, our analysis of the latter is always of the nature of a return, a 
doubling back, or, more precisely, a repetition. We may even term this the 
temporality of anamorphosis because, in apprehending it or, rather, it 
apprehending us, we are compelled to return to the picture to interpret it. The 
stain, proposes Zizek, `thus opens up the abyss of the search for a meaning - 
nothing is what it seems to be, everything is to be interpreted'. 255 
The anamorphic gaze is, then, one structured by repetition. To illustrate 
this we can return to our earlier analysis of the theme of detritus in The Crying of 
Lot 49. Grubbing amongst the ruins of society, we may recall that Oedipa 
initially sees the sailor in a door way; she then spots the anamorphic post horn 
254 Ibid., p. 164. 
255 LookingAwry, p. 91. 
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`tattooed in old ink now beginning to blur and spread' and, immediately, 
`[f]ascinated, she came into the shadows and ascended creaking steps, hesitating 
on each one'256; following which she and the narrative undertake a lengthy 
analysis of the sailor's face and life, from which we have already quoted. Thus 
we can say that Oedipa initially just sees him without apprehending him, but then, 
`fascinated' by the post horn qua anamorphosis, she both sees him and 
apprehends him. In other words, her anamorphic gaze sees him for the first time 
by seeing him again. We can also witness this retroactive temporality in 
Jameson's comments on detritus when he notes that `attention flows back onto 
the neglected perception and sees it in renewed, heightened form without 
damaging its structure'. 257 What is particularly revealing in this context is the 
manner in which Jameson goes on to characterize this retroversion, arguing that 
`there are certain moments in life which are accessible only at the price of a 
certain lack of intellectual focus: like objects at the edge of my field of vision 
which disappear when I turn to stare at them head on'. 258 We may read those 
`moments in life' as being anamorphic, for it is in the nature of the stain that it 
cannot be seen head on but can only be apprehended by looking awry. This 
askance vision then sees its original object of perception for the first time again - 
a paradox which is here indexed by Jameson's use of the tautological `renewed'. 
We are now in a position which will allow us to draw together a number 
of points. The detective story, we have already noted, is an encounter with the 
256 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 86. 257 `On Raymond Chandler', p. 125 (my italics). 
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unnarrated, the story of the murder, (in the case of The Crying of Lot 49, the 
murder, as it were, of the father). For the story of the murder to be told for the 
first time then, it must be told again by the detective. This is the logic 
underpinning one of the conclusions to Barbara Johnson's masterly study of Poe, 
Derrida and Lacan, where she notes that `Dupin finds the letter "in" the symbolic 
order not because he knows where to look, but because he knows what to 
repeat' 259 The beginning of a detective story is thus reached only at the end of 
the narrative when the story of the murder can be told for the first time by the 
detective. Reference to this convention is made in the very last words of 
Pynchon's novel - `the crying of lot 49'260 - which are, of course, also the first 
words we encounter on reading it. The narrative, in one sense then, neither begins 
nor ends but, rather, describes a recursive trajectory. Indeed, the difficulty of 
locating origins is constantly foregrounded throughout the text, particularly, and 
not coincidentally, in relation to the disclosure of the Tristero. For example, we 
are informed that Oedipa's `night's infidelity with Metzger would logically be the 
starting point for it'; that with meeting Mike Fallopian `[s]o began, for Oedipa, 
the languid sinister blooming of The Tristero'; and that `[t]he beginning of that 
performance was clear enough. It was while she and Metzger were waiting for 
the ancillary letters to be granted... out at Fangoso Lagoons'. 261 It is little 
258 Ibid., p. 125. 
259 Barbara Johnson, 'The Frame of reference: Poe, Lacan, Derrida', in The Purloined Poe: Lacan, 
Derrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading, ed. by John P. Muller and William J. Richardson 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993,1988), pp. 213-251(p. 245). 
26° The Crying of Lot 49, p. 127. 261 Ibid., p. 29, p. 36 and p. 36 respectively. Hanjo Berressem also notes the difficulty of pinning 
the Trystero down and uses their naming in The Courier's Tragedy to illustrate this: '[i]n the 
performance of the play, the only mention of the Trystero occurs in the following line: "No 
hallowed skein of stars can warc4 I Crow, /Who's once been set his tryst with Trystero". The 
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wonder then that `[l]ooking back she forgot which had come first'. 262 There is 
clearly more to this than mere narrative trickery, for what is at stake is 
symbolization as such. In this respect we may concur with Lilek when he 
comments that 
[a]t the beginning, there is the murder -a traumatic shock, 
an event that cannot be integrated into symbolic reality because it 
appears to interrupt the "normal" causal chain. From the moment of 
this eruption, even the most ordinary events of life seem loaded with 
threatening possibilities; everyday reality becomes a nightmarish 
dream as the "normal" link between cause and effect is suspended. 
This radical opening, this dissolution of symbolic reality, entails the 
transformation of the lawlike succession of events into a kind of 
"lawless sequence" and therefore bears witness to an encounter with 
the "impossible" real, resisting symbolization. 263 
We can see here that the `original' crime in detective narratives functions as an 
anamorphosis, disrupting the symbolic network until, with its repetition, it can be 
integrated within it, that is apprehended for the first time. As Liiek notes 
elsewhere, `the repetition announces the advent of the Law, of the Name-of-the- 
Father in place of the dead, assassinated father: the event which repeats itself 
receives its law retroactively, through repetition. The detective's act of 
interpretation is thus not really cognitive but performative, because it constructs a 
narrative sequence which did not previously exist. 
subsequent burglarizations of this line underscore the unreliability of the signifying chain. When 
Oedipa buys the text of the tragedy to find out more about the Trystero, she finds another version 
at the specific passage: "No hallowed skein of stars can ward, I trow (... J Who once has crossed 
the lusts ofAngelo". And in a footnote, based on the "Whitechapel version", yet another one: 
"This tryst or odious awry, 0 Niccolö".... ' Hanjo Berressem, Pynchon's Poetics: Interfacing 
Theory and Text (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), p. 96. 
262 Ibid., p. 29. 263 Looking Awry, p. 58. 
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If this, briefly, is the form of detective fiction, its importance in The 
Crying of Lot 49 proceeds from its playing host to and thereby expediting a 
particular conception of historicity. To understand this we must attend to the 
narrative's own intra-diegetic anamorphosis - The Courier's Tragedy. This 
generic imitation of a Jacobean revenge play forms the centrepiece of both 
Oedipa's and the reader's attempts at collocation. As she says of the history of 
the play - "`I think of nothing but"'. 
265 Indeed, Oedipa almost immediately 
identifies with the world of the play: 
[She] found herself after five minutes sucked utterly into the 
landscape evil Richard Wharfinger had fashioned for his seventeenth- 
century audiences, so preapocalyptic, death-wishful, sensually 
fatigued, unprepared, a little poiEnantly, for that abyss of civil war... 
only a few years ahead of them. 2 
What is so striking about this description is how, as one of the characters 
remarks, it bears "`a most bizarre resemblance"' to the twentieth century audience 
of the play, which is, as the narrator describes it, also preapocalyptic, death- 
wishful and sensually fatigued. 267 One of the most startling images of this is the 
`Negro woman... who kept going through rituals of miscarriage each for a 
different reason, deliberately as others might the ritual of birth, dedicated not to 
264 The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 62. 265 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 77. 266 Ibid., p. 43. 267 Ibid., p. 42. 
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continuity but to some kind of interregnum'. 68 In so doing she is registering an 
affinity with discontinuity and the destruction of lineage which is borne witness 
to by the form of Jacobean tragedy. Right from the beginning, then, the specific 
representation of The Courier's Tragedy seems to encourage an analogy between 
itself and the rest of The Crying of Lot 49. At the level of content it is possible, 
for example, to trace a connection between the play's author - Wharfinger, which 
literally means `the owner of a wharf or harbour - and Pierce Inverarity who 
owns the wharves of Fangoso Lagoons where we first hear about the play. This 
lagoon contains the bones of the GIs originally "`harvested... from the bottom of 
Lago di Pieta"'269, presumably the same `Lake of Pity'270 that in the seventeenth 
century saw the massacre of the Tone and Tassis couriers by the Trystero, 
Diocletian Blobb's account of which bears a strong resemblance to the slaughter 
of the `Faggian Lost Guard' next to a lake by Trystero-like characters in The 
Courier's Tragedy. Furthermore, the Lost Guard, like the Gis, like the cemetery 
dead removed for the "`East San Narciso Freeway"'271, have their bones 
reconstituted as charcoal and then ink and cigarette filters or fertiliser 
respectively. In the play, Niccolö survives the early threat to turn him into 
fertiliser272 only to succumb to what we assume is the Trystero, stuttering as he 
goes `what may be the shortest line ever written in blank verse: "T-t-t-t-t"'. 273 In 
turn, this apocopatic gasp finds an echo in the `chopped-off prayers of dying 
268 Ibid., p. 85. 
2691bid, p. 41. 
270 Ibid., p. 108. 
271 Ibid., p. 41. 
272 ibid., p. 44. 
273 Ibid., p. 49. 
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infantry' during Cashiered274, as well as in the sign traced in the dust by one of 
the Wells Fargo employees butchered (or so a plaque commemorates)275 on the 
banks of Lake Inverarity at Fangoso Lagoons by assailants answering the 
description of the Tristero. 
This complex network of repetitions and resonances between the play and 
the rest of the narrative, of which this is just a small example, is part of what John 
Johnstone identifies as The Crying of Lot 49's economy of the uncanny, in which 
`something familiar repeats itself, but with a noticeable difference, deviation or 
deformation'. 276 If this is so at the level of content, we may also observe such 
doubling at work in the form of the novel and the play. In so doing we can rely 
on Franco Moretti's excellent analysis of the genre of Jacobean tragedy in which, 
he argues, compared to its Elizabethan predecessor, `[n]o-one manages to control 
the plot, or even to understand much about it. The play now lacks a privileged 
point of observation, a centre such as the tragic hero had previously furnished'. 277 
If this is the case in The Courtier's Tragedy, it also holds for the main narrative in 
which, although Oedipa figures as the dominant centre of consciousness, there is 
no one character who is able to claim an Olympian summit from which to confer 
meaning. Partly this is due to the baroque complexities of intrigue and counter- 
intrigue which the characters in the play and the novel have to negotiate, for 
274 Ibid., p. 24. 
275 ibid., p. 62. 
276 John Johnstone, 'Towards the Schizo-Text: Paranoia as Semiotic regime in The Crying of Lot 
49', in New Essays on 'The Crying of Lot 49, ed. by Patrick O'Donnell, pp. 47-78 (p. 49). 277 Franco Moretti, `The Great Eclipse: Tragic Form as the Deconsecration of Sovereignty', in 
Shakespearean Tragedy, John Drakakis (London and New York: Longman, 1992), pp. 45-84 
(p. 71). 
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`there are now too many plots, overlapping and undoing one another 
incessantly'. 278 It is also partly due to the fact that, as Moretti argues: 
Meaning does not deceive, but rather dissolves: into 
appearance..., indeterminacy..., and inexplicable detail.... Nor is the 
problem even how to interpret such signs, but, more basically, to 
determine whether or not they are in fact signs. 279 
Again, in both cases, then, there is a manifest difficulty in comprehending a 
signifying excess, in making sense of signs that actually make no sense at all. 
This, it may be proposed, is precisely the status of the anamorphic stain: it is a 
signifier that initially means nothing, `the element that, ' Lizek avers, `when 
viewed straightforwardly, remains a meaningless stain, but which, as soon as we 
look at the picture from a precisely determined lateral perspective, all of a sudden 
acquires well-known contours'. 280 It is, of course, the `precisely determined 
lateral perspective' of the English civil war which enables Moretti to read in the 
stain of Jacobean tragedy the `well-known contours' of a rehearsal for revolution. 
His interpretation is thus necessarily retroactive, for, at the time, the signs in the 
play only had meaning in the future; they are addressed to a historical rupture 
which had not yet come but, rather, will have been. As such, it is entirely 
appropriate that 
[t]he unique `solution' of dramatic complications, the only 
`meeting place' of the dramatic agents, now consists in the reduction 
279 Ibid., p. 71. 
279 Ibid 
, p. 76. 280 LookingAwry, p. 90. 
207 
of everything to `nothing', a word that frequently recurs in this drama. 
We no longer have even Shakespeare's bloodless heirs to give the 
illusion of historical continuity, as virtually the entire court expires 
under our eyes. 281 
Indeed, just as in The Courier's Tragedy `the only character left alive in a stage 
dense with corpses is the colorless administrator, Gennaro'282, so Oedipa, the 
anodyne auditor, is the only character left at the end of the novel with some 
measure of sanity, all the others being either `on something, mad, possible 
enemies, dead'. 283 Like the woman `dedicated not to continuity but to some kind 
of interregnum', the novel and the play within it are both curiously pledged to a 
dead-end, to replaying the same motifs over and over again in a kind of listless 
refrain that appears to mean nothing to no-one. Given our earlier comments, this 
could be said to bear witness to the operations of the commodity form. Indeed, in 
playing host to a nexus of content and form between two genres several hundred 
years apart, The Crying of Lot 49 would seem to be offering a distinctly 
ahistorical vision which only serves to bolster the criticisms directed at 
postmodern fiction. However, there is perhaps another angle, another `precisely 
determined lateral perspective' as it were, in and from which to understand this. 
Indeed, the perceptive from which we may understand this narrative 
strategy is precisely that -a perspective, an interested or subjective position and 
one, it might be proposed, which expedites the apprehension of such a 
281 `The Great Eclipse', p. 71. 282 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 51. 283 Ibid., p. 118. 
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perspective in the first place. By this is meant the invocation of Benjamin's 
distinction between types of history. For him `[h]istory is the subject of a 
structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time filled by the 
presence of the now [Jetztzeit]' 284 The former time is the temporality of 
historicism, the latter that of historical materialism. The former unfolds 
continuously and is motivated by a certain conception of progress - that is the 
`progress of mankind itself, -something 
boundless, 
-something that 
automatically pursue[s] a straight course'. 285 Such a conception of progress 
clearly articulates its prejudice, as Benjamin notes when he `asks with whom the 
adherents of historicism actually empathize': 
The answer is inevitable: with the victor. And all the rulers 
are the heirs of those who conquered before them. [... ] Historical 
materialists know what that means. Whoever has emerged victorious 
participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the 
present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to 
traditional practice, the spoils are carried along in the procession. 
They are called cultural treasures.... They owe their existence not 
only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created 
them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries. There 
is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism. 286 
In the light of this we may say that The Crying of Lot 49 is predicated precisely 
on the disclosure of the barbarism constitutively repressed by civilization and, as 
such, it belongs fully on the side of historical materialism. For the latter, history 
284 Walter Benjamin, `Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Illuminations, ed. by Hannah 
Arendt, trans. by Harry Zohn, pp. 255-266 (p. 263). 285 Ibid., p. 263. 
286 Ibid., p. 258. 
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is populated by oppression and failure, and to grasp this necessitates being 
prepared `to blast open the continuum of history': 
Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their 
arrest as well. Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration 
pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it 
crystallizes into a monad. [... ] In this structure [the historical 
materialist] recognizes... a revolutionary chance in the fight for the 
oppressed past. He takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific 
era out of the homogenous course of history - blasting a specific life 287 out of the era or a specific work out of the lifework. 
In other words, the monad is a short-circuit of history, an immobilization of 
continuity in which disparate historical moments are placed in conjunction. As 
such, the monad announces the action of retroactivity: `it is literally, ' as Lilek 
argues, `the point of "suspended dialectics", of pure repetition where historical 
movement is placed within parentheses'. 88 Recalling our earlier discussion, we 
may say that for historicism historiography is a cognitive procedure, whereas for 
historical materialism it is performative, as Benjamin avers: 
The class struggle, which is always present to a historian 
influenced by Marx, is a fight for the crude and material things 
without which no refined and spiritual things could exist. 
Nevertheless, it is not in the form of the spoils which fall to the victor 
that the latter make their presence felt in the class struggle. They 
manifest themselves in this struggle as courage, humour, cunning, and 
fortitude. They have retroactive force and will constantly call in 
question every victory, past and present, of the rulers. 289 
287 Ibid., pp. 264-265. 
288 The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 140. 289 `Theses on the Philosophy of History', pp. 256-257. 
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This `calling into question' is a form of symbolic redemption in which 'what 
really was' is actually `what will have been'; in which, in other words, history's 
failures, those which are constitutively repressed by historicism and the 
historiography of the victors, are narrated for the first time by virtue of their 
repetition. As Zizek comments in this regard, `the revolution accomplishes a 
"tiger's leap into the past" not because it is in search of a kind of support in the 
past, in tradition, but in so far as this past which repeats itself in the revolution 
"comes from the future" - was already in itself pregnant with the open dimension 
of the future' 290 
In The Crying of Lot 49 we have already seen this structure of repetition 
and retroactivity rehearsed in the form of the detective story. This form thereby 
provides the co-ordinates with which the novel is able to map out its larger 
historical and political concern to elaborate the preterite, specifically in the 
monadic conjunction of the Jacobean and the postmodern. The monad qua stasis 
finds a kind of literal expression throughout The Crying of Lot 49 in Oedipa's 
loss of temporality; for example, we are informed `[s]he looked at her watch, but 
it had stopped'; that she and Metzger `had found a way to make itself slow 
down'; and that on seeing the W. A. S. T. E. symbol she is left `wondering how 
much time had gone by'. 291 As the latter suggests here, what comes to be 
retroactively symbolized in this conjunction is the Tristero in their role as what 
290 The Sublime Object of Ideology, pp. 141-142. 
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the Scurvhamites term "`the brute Other"", with their `constant theme, 
disinheritance'. 292 In other words, Oedipa is eventually `able to piece together 
[an] account of how the organization began' and to read it from `the precisely 
determined lateral perspective' of those `in exile form somewhere else invisible 
yet congruent with the cheered land she lived in'. 293 That this symbolization 
`comes from the future', as Zizek argues, is borne witness to by the novel's most 
expressive acronym - W. A. S. T. E. or `WE AWAIT SILENT TRISTERO'S 
EMPIRE'. 294 Here, history's waste products, its repressed, self-consciously 
admits of a time when it will mean, when, in other words, it will have been. This, 
at another level, is precisely what the Jacobean-postmodern monad ultimately 
discloses - the possibility of a retroactive redemption at all. For, in utilizing a 
pre-revolutionary period (the Jacobean) as the time of inflection, the narrative 
recalls a time of historical possibility in which the social order was destabilized 
and had yet to recongeal as it did following the revolution. There is thus a 
process of abstraction at work here, because what is redeemed is the point of 
rupture itself, the cracking of a continuity by which a retroactive redemption is 
actually enabled in the first place. 295 
291 The Crying of Lot 49, p. 22, p. 27 and p. 66 respectively. 292 Ibid., p. 108 and p. 110 respectively. 293 Ibid., p. 109 and p. 125 respectively. 
294 Ibid., p. 116. 
295 In this respect The Crying of Lot 49's redemption to the second power is at one with 
Benjamin's own project, for what the latter's monadic historiography represents is an attempt to 
disinter a radical temporality form the socio-temporal forms of modernity, a modernity which on 
his own pessimistic analysis is thoroughly alien to the older traditions of remembrance. Similarly, 
The Crying of Lot 49 seeks its form of remembrance within the incontinent imaginary of capital, 
inhabiting and refashioning that form for the purposes of releasing a `tradition' antipathetic to it. 
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Of course, the Jacobean period is presented as such because that is the 
position of the present, or at least the present of the novel. We can, for example, 
see something of this prospect for change intimated in the description of Oedipa's 
trip to Berkley campus: 
She moved through it carrying her fat book, attracted, 
unsure, a stranger, wanting to feel relevant but knowing how much of 
a search among alternate universes it would take. For she had 
undergone her own educating at a time of nerves, blandness and 
retreat among not only her fellow students but also most of the visible 
structure around and ahead of them, this having been a national reflex 
to certain pathologies in high places only death had had the power to 
cure, and this Berkley was like no somnolent Siwash out of her own 
past at all, but more akin to those Far Eastern or Latin American 
universities you read about, those autonomous culture media where 
the most beloved of folklores may be brought into doubt, cataclysmic 
of dissents voiced, suicidal of commitments chosen - the sort that 
bring governments down. 296 
In the light of this, or, rather, from this angle, the Jacobean period, like the 1960s, 
can be redeemed as a period in which the possibilities for a reconfiguration of 
history as a tradition of the oppressed will have been opened up; that is, in which 
continuity will have been interrupted, not sadly confirmed. As such, this 
accounts for the tension in the form of the novel between stasis and continuity, 
because if the former indexes, in Benjamin's terms, a revolutionary 
consciousness, then the latter allows that it has yet to come. The inflection of the 
Jacobean age within the present, then, redeems the potential that was lost in the 
continuing oppression of post-revolutionary England. We may perhaps 
characterize this as a hindsight that recognizes its own contingency. This, of 
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course, is also the structure of the narrative which, while it is written in the past 
tense and peppered with imperatives ('her next move should have been', [s]he 
should have left then'") that designate a point of accomplished symbolization, 
an end of history, also qualifies its hindsight by the many ways that we have 
identified in which the narrative does not end, in which it is still waiting to be 
finished. 
Perhaps the most pertinent example of the latter in this respect is the 
figure which ends the novel, for, as Tanner notes, `49 is the pentecostal number 
(the Sunday seven weeks after Easter), but Pentecost derives from the Greek for 
"fifty"'. '" The revelation of a `gift of tongues', which we might characterize 
here as the giving of a voice to the oppressed, is thus articulated as an imminent 
possibility at the same time that it is not actually realized. Indeed, the conditions 
of possibility for re-symbolization are everywhere granted in The Crying of Lot 
49: from the names of the characters right up to the name of Pynchon himself, 
every signifier is pregnant with future signifieds, with a contingency which may 
be realized in some other historical monad. What remains, wisely, unaffirmed is 
the `precisely determined lateral perspective' from which this resymbolization 
will have taken place. It is an ambiguity appropriately figured in the Tristero, the 
novel's totemic representatives of the oppressed. The latter, of course, are an 
organization whose ostensive function is the dissemination of meaning in the 
form of letters or mail. In contradistinction to other couriers, they are acclaimed 
296 Aid, p. 71. 2" Aid, p. 69 and p. 76 respectively. 
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for their reliability, falling in with whomsoever will aid their deliveries, `[t]heir 
entire emphasis... towards silence, impersonation, opposition masquerading as 
allegiance'? " In other words, they are there throughout history ferrying the mail, 
but their visibility is consistently mitigated by the conditions in which they 
operate. We therefore only know of their existence upon receiving a letter. We 
might say, then, that they are ultimately an instantiation of the principle we have, 
it seems, clearly been attending to all along - the principle that `a letter, ' as Lacan 
proposes, `always arrives at its destination' 300 
291 AM= Pys chop, p. 68. 299 The Dying of Lot 49, p. 120. 300 Jacques Lacan, `The Seminar on "The Purloined Letter"', in The Purloined Poe: Lacan, 
Derrida a7ad Psy choana/ylic Reading, ed. by John P. Muller and William J Richardson, pp. 28-54 
(p. 53). 
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Chapter Three - Future Shock: 
Style and the Temporality of Trauma in 
Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five 
1: Post-Stylistic Stress Recorder 
At the root of much that is characterized as postmodern theory lies the fact 
of brutalization. Never before have so many human beings been subject to so 
much cruelty and death at such levels of intensity for such an extended period of 
time. It has been, declares Eric Hobsbawm, `without doubt the most murderous 
century of which we have record, both by the scale, frequency and length of the 
warfare which filled it, barely ceasing for a moment in the 1920s, but also by the 
unparalleled scale of human catastrophes it produced, from the greatest famines 
in history to systematic genocide'. ' Such widespread slaughter necessarily 
impacts upon any general assessment of humanity's sense of itself. In particular, 
it problematizes the evaluation of our `progress' and, indeed, has come to taint 
the very concept itself Summing up the argument, Zygmunt Bauman contends 
that progress has now come to `mean paring off the functionless sufferings, the 
Eric Ilobsbawm, Age of Eraemes The Snort Twentieth Century - 1914-1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), p. 13. Something of this never-ending barbarism is captured in the sorrowful history of Cephallonia as it is delineated in Louis de Bernieres' Captain Corelli'sMcn dolin. Invaded by both the Italians and the Germans during World War Two, it soon after succumbs to 
an internecine conflict between the Royalists and Communists. As Pelagia, one of the novel's 
central characters, laments: 'She saw no future except the succession of one type of Fascism by 
another, on an island seemingly accursed and destined forever to be a part of someone else's 
game, a game whose cynical players changed but whose counters were fashioned out of bone and 
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relentless passage from a meaningless to the meaningful suffering: it means 
making the world more rational'. 2 This seemingly oxymoronic coupling of 
rationality and sufferance presents the contemporary author with an 
uncomfortable set of `raw' materials from which to fashion a work. As J. G. 
Ballard, one of the more illustrious survivors of `progress', comments, `[t]he 
marriage of reason and nightmare that has dominated the 20`h century has given 
birth to an ever more ambiguous world'. 3 Amongst the more pertinent effects of 
this `marriage', Ballard proposes that `the past, in social and psychological terms, 
became a casualty of Hiroshima and the nuclear age' 4 In such a situation, 
`what, ' he asks, `is the main task facing the writer? ' 
Can he, any longer, make use of the techniques and 
perspectives of the traditional 19th century novel, with its linear 
narrative, its measured chronology, its consular characters grandly 
inhabiting their domains within an ample time and space? Is his 
subject matter the sources of characters and personality sunk deep in 
the past, the unhurried inspection of roots, the examination of the 
most subtle nuances of social behaviour and personal relationships? 
Can he leave out anything he prefers not to understand, including his 
own motives, prejudices and psychopathology? 5 
blood, the flesh of all the innocent and weak'. Louis de Bernieres, Captain Corelli'sManxlolin 
(London: Minerva, 1995,1994), pp. 361-362. 
2 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 226. Bauman continues, 
noting that `[w]ith one stone of rationality, modernity killed two birds. It managed to recast as 
inferior and doomed all those forms of life which did not harness their own pains to the chariot of 
Reason. And it obtained a safe conduct for the pains it was about to inflict itself. ' Ibid, p. 226. It 
is worth pointing out that this view is by no means uncontested. Terry Eagleton, for example, 
berates those theorists who naively conflate all reason with its instrumental manifestations: 
`Nazism, for Lyotard as for some other postmodern thinkers, is one lethal destination of the 
Enlightenment's grandes recits, the tragic consummation of a terroristic Reason and totality. fie 
does not understand it as the upshot of a barbarous anti-Enlightenment irrationalism which, like 
certain aspects of postmodernism, junked history, refused argumentation, aestheticized politics 
and staked all on the charisma of those who told the stories. ' Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 396. 
3 J. G. Ballard, `Introduction' (1995), in Crash, by J. G. Ballard (London: Vintage, 1995,1973), 
rp. 4-6 (p. 4). 
Ibid., p. 4. 
s Ibid., p. 5. 
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In other words, given the ubiquitous effects of the 'marriage of nightmare and 
reason', how is the contemporary author supposed to register these effects and 
what techniques must be employed to do so? 
One of the most striking attempts to address these issues in recent years is 
Slaughterhouse-Five, Kurt Vonnegut's sixth novel. Slaughterhouse-Five narrates 
the story of Billy Pilgrim's experience as a Prisoner of War in Germany at the 
end of World War Two. During this imprisonment he `witnesses' the destruction 
of Dresden by Allied bombing. Pilgrim is joined in this by Vonnegut himself, 
who has made the experience an explicit topic of at least four of his books, 
including Slaughterhouse-Five. It was, he declares, `the largest massacre in 
European history', or, at the very least `the fastest killing of large numbers of 
people in a matter of hours'. 6 As Dresden was a city of no strategic importance, 
the only person to gain from its destruction has been Vonnegut himself who has, 
he claims, `so far received about five bucks for every corpse created by the 
firestorm'. 7 Such royalties have mainly been earned from sales of 
Slaughterhouse-Five which, as Jerome Klinkowitz points out, `turned out to be 
his first best-seller, catapulted him to sudden national fame, and brought his 
8 writing into serious intellectual esteem'. 
6 Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968,1961), p. x, and Kurt Vonnegut, 
Palm Sunday: An Autobiographical Collage (London: Vintage, 1994,1981), p. 406 respectively. 
7 Kurt Vonnegut, Fates Worse Than Death: An Autobiographical Collage of the 1980s (London: 
Vintage, 1992,1991), p. 101. 
8 Jerome Klinkowitz, Kurt Vonnegut (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), p. 63. It is worth 
pointing out that, for Robert Merrill, `Klinkowitz's book is perhaps the best single study of 
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Undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the popularity of 
Slaughterhouse-Five is Vonnegut's style of writing. 9 In sharp contrast to the 
dense, convoluted style of Thomas Pynchon, Vonnegut's writing, in the majority 
of his works, is characterized by a simplicity that is suggestive of the colloquial 
where it is not actually banal. At the level of form, Slaughterhouse-Five, for 
example, is seemingly composed of equally weighted paragraphs that occupy 
interchangeable positions in the `narrative'. In turn, such petrified paragraphs 
find their counterpart in the clauseless, self-contained statements which constitute 
the greater proportion of the sentences in the novel. 10 This simplicity of form is 
joined at the level of diction by an apparently unpretentious vernacularism, the 
tone of which is initiated with the very first paragraph: 
All this happened, more or less. The war parts, anyway, are 
pretty much true. One guy I knew really was shot in Dresden for 
taking a pot that wasn't his. Another guy I knew really did threaten to 
have his personal enemies killed by hired gunmen after the war. And 
so on. I've changed all the names. " 
There is an almost studied informality about the diction and syntax here that 
betokens the prelude to an intimate recounting of a story. Vague qualifications, 
like `more or less', and colloquial word use, such as `pretty much true', are joined 
Vonnegut'. Robert Merrill, `Introduction', in Critical Essays on Kurt Vonnegut, ed by Robert 
Merrill (Boston, Massachusetts: G. K. Hall, 1990), pp. 1-27 (p. 13). 
9 Of his popularity, Vonnegut notes simply that `[m]y books are probably more widely used in 
schools than those of any other living American fiction writer'. Palm Sunday, p. 318. 
10 As Klinkowitz, Vonnegut's most ardent critic, testifies, the latter's style is predicated upon 
`short sentences (sometimes just one word long), abbreviated paragraphs (of just a few sentences 
or less), [and] chapters so minuscule that more than a hundred of them can be packed into a 200- 
page book'. Kurt Vonnegut, p. 46. 
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by informal emphases, `really was, `really did', and elisions, `I've changed all the 
names'. Hovering somewhere in an easy niche between argot and belles-lettres 
there is very little that is either specifically literary or otherwise designed to 
appeal to a linguistic coterie. Indeed, Slaughterhouse-Five is almost invariably 
written in the simple past tense, often just of the verb `to be', and its sentences are 
generally bereft of the kind of extended metaphors, motifs and diction usually 
associated with a literary idiom. Even what conjunctives there are hint at a 
significance unsolicited by the solipsism of the sentences, in whose ration-book 
language commas are a luxury and colons a positive indulgence. It is, we might 
say, a certain kind of parataxis, one that apparently finds its matrix in the casual 
exigencies of quotidian speech. 
In his first autobiography, Palm Sunday, Vonnegut displays a suitably 
disingenuous cognizance of the vernacular stamp of his style: 
I trust my own writing most and others seem to trust it, too, 
when I sound most like a person from Indianapolis, which is what I 
am. 12 
Of course, the accent on the simile here - (`like a person form Indianapolis') - 
betrays a degree of artistic calculation that is far from the aleatory registers of 
common speech with its redundant terms, habituated phrasing and local idioms. 
In this it is fully of a piece with the carefully fashioned structures of expression to 
11 Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five, or, The Children's Crusade: A Duty Dance with Death 
(London: Triad Paladin, 1989,1969), p. 9. 
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be found throughout the Vonnegutian oeuvre. For Vonnegut's style is, in fact, 
composed of a patterned contradiction which its wholesome simplicity only 
ostensibly seeks to occlude. In contradistinction to the self-professed 
vernacularism of his work, we may say that his novels bear mute witness to the 
history of Literature itself. In Slaughterhouse-Five, even at the level of content, 
there are repeated gestures towards a literary heritage. This is most clearly 
manifest in the fact that there are, as Tony Tanner bluntly notes, `a lot of books in 
this novel': 
They range from low fiction (Valley of the Dolls), to 
criticism (Celine and His Vision), to documentary studies (The 
Bombing of Dresden, The Execution of Private Slovik, Extraordinary 
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds), to high-level realistic fiction 
(The Red Badge of Courage), to poetry (Blake is mentioned, Roethke 
is quoted). 13 
In addition to this cursory list, we may add that many of the novel's central 
characters, including Kilgore Trout, Howard Campbell, Bertram Copeland 
Rumfoord, and Vonnegut himself, are authors of different types of monograph. 14 
However, Literature also persists much less obviously in the very amodal from of 
the Vonnegutian idiom; that is, persists in the negative imprint of 
'2 Palm Sunday, p. 368. 13 Tony Tanner, `The Uncertain Messenger: A Reading of Slaughterhouse-Five', in Critical 
Essays on Kurt Vonnegut, pp. 125-130 (p. 127). 
14 I say `cursory' here, because, as Charles B. Harris advises, to this list could be added 'light 
opera (The Pirates of Penzance), movie scripts, prayers, hymns, professional journals, 
newspapers, the Bible, drama, classical odes, dirty limericks, past popular songs ("That Old Gang 
ofMine", "'Leven Cent cotton"), speeches, political propaganda (Campbell's monograph), 
pornographic magazines, forewords to books, six Kilgore Trout novels, and references to writers 
of various ages and genres (Blake, Goethe, Scheherazade, Darwin)'. Charles B. Harris, 'Time, 
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Slaughterhouse-Five's stylish stylelessness. It is, to use a term proposed by 
Roland Barthes, `writing at the degree zero'. 15 Caught between the subjunctive 
and imperative moods, writing at the degree zero ostensibly belongs to the 
domain of the indicative: 
The aim here is to go beyond Literature by entrusting one's 
fate to a sort of basic speech, equally far from living languages and 
from literary language proper. This transparent form of speech, 
initiated by Camus's Outsider, achieves a style of absence which is 
almost an ideal absence of style, writing is then reduced to a sort of 
negative mood in which the social or mythical characters of a 
language are abolished in favour of a neutral and inert state of form. 16 
In its and discipline and its apparent disdain for the traditional trappings and 
ornamentation of Literature - what we might call style itself - context is bleached 
from the text and history is thus seemingly discernible only by its absence. 
Indeed, we might say the latter returns precisely as the absence of that style. For 
what the blank features of Vonnegut's prose refuse to acknowledge is inscribed in 
that refusal as the style's agonistic pedigree. Only now, in other words, in this 
specific period of the history of Literature, could style itself be discarded and 
thus, in the act of discarding, bear witness to its specific history. 
We may perhaps go further than this, as does Barthes, and propose that 
such a style is a kind of return to origins. Barthes argues that `neutral writing in 
Uncertainty, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.: A Reading of Slaughterhouse-Five', The Centennial Review, 
20: 3, (1976), 228-243, (p. 237). 
15 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1968), p. 76. 
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fact rediscovers the primary condition of classical art: instrumentality'. 17 In 
stating this Barthes is aligning writing at the degree zero with the practice of 
rhetoric. Such a practice may be defined, according to Fredric Jameson, as `that 
ensemble of techniques through which a writer or orator may achieve 
expressiveness or high style, conceived of as a relatively fixed class standard, as 
an institution in which the most diverse temperaments are able to participate'. '8 
If rhetoric therefore pretends to a kind of universalism by furnishing the 
individual with a common language, then style, in contrast, `is the very element 
of individuality itself, that mode through which the individual consciousness 
seeks to distinguish itself, to affirm its incomparable originality'. 19 
This, of course, presents a fresh set of problems for the postmodern 
author. Faced with what Jameson describes as `the explosion of modern literature 
into a host of distinct private styles and mannerisms', the contemporary writer is 
forced into a minor confrontation with the paradox of the 'new'. 20 If fashioning 
another new style amounts to no more than a perpetuation of the old order, while 
retrieving an old style clearly marks a kind of regression, then Vonnegut's 
solution to this problematic in Slaughterhouse-Five constitutes a shrewd 
negotiation between the two. For what Vonnegut does is to seize the very form 
of style itself and deploy it as content. Style here may be defined in its historical 
16 Ibid, p. 77. 
'7 Ibid., pp. 77-78. 
18 Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical T/: eories of Literature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 334. 
19 Ibid., p. 334. 20 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 
191), p. 17. 
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mode, with Jameson, 'as language which deliberately calls attention to itself and 
"foregrounds" itself as a key element in the work'. 2' The nature of such 
foregrounding, however, is a kind of accidental ostentation., or, rather, it is 
crafted to appear accidental by evidently being contingent upon its subject. Thus 
we might say that whilst a particular style presents itself as the objective 
correlative of its `raw' material, it simultaneously seeks in its own right to appeal 
to what Barthes calls `a sixth, purely literary, sense, the private property of 
producers and consumers of Literature'. 22 The most notorious example of this 
schizophrenic style for Barthes is `[t]he writing of Realism', which `far from 
being neutral, [... ] is on the contrary loaded with the most spectacular signs of 
fabrication'. 23 In such a situation, the evaluation of Literature develops in 
accordance with the quantity of artistic sweat that a fiction bears, as Barthes 
contends: 
[T]he value of a text is assessed by the obvious signs of the 
labour it has cost. Now nothing is more spectacular than attempting 
to combine predicates, as a workman adjusts some delicate 
mechanism. What pedants admire in the writing of a Maupassant or a 
Daudet is a literary sign at last detached from its content, which posits 
Literature unambiguously as a category without any relation to other 
languages, and in so doing establishes an ideal intelligibility of 
things. 4 
If we think of style here as the signifier, and of content as the signified, then the 
value of the former rises directly in proportion to the ease with which the two can 
21 Marxism and Form, p. 335. 
22 Writing Degree Zero, p. 65. 
23 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
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be disengaged and the latter discarded. In Slaughterhouse-Five, however, 
signifier and signified, or style and content, are seemingly indivisible. This is 
because `the obvious signs of the labour it has cost' are explicit at the level of the 
signified, rather than implicit at the level of the signifier. In fact, the first chapter 
is dedicated to narrating the literal difficulties Vonnegut had in producing the 
novel; as he states, `I would hate to tell you what this lousy little book cost me in 
money and anxiety and time'. 25 He then goes onto detail how `[a]s a trafficker in 
climaxes and thrills and characterization and wonderful dialogue and suspense 
and confrontations' he outlined the best narrative structure for Slaughterhouse- 
Five `on the back of a roll of wallpaper'. 26 Such open declarations of the labour 
of writing are, of course, characteristic of a certain type of postmodernist fiction. 
In John Barth's `Lost in the Funhouse', for example, the narrator consistently 
foregrounds the techniques being used to shape the story and seduce the reader. 
As with Vonnegut, however, much of this metafictional commentary is concerned 
to elaborate quite how badly the tale is being told, such as when the narrator notes 
despairingly that `[t]o say that Ambrose's and Peter's mother was pretty is to 
accomplish nothing; the reader may acknowledge the proposition, but his 
imagination is not engaged'. 27 In such cases, then, the fetishizing work of 
Barthes' `pedant' is forestalled at source because, as Mark Currie points out, `the 
literary object itself performs a critical function'. Thus freed from the 28 
24 Ibid., p. 69. 
25 Slaughterhouse Five, p. 9. 
26 Ibid, p. 12. 
27 John Barth, `Lost in the Funhouse', in The Heath Introduction to Fiction, 5's edn., ed. by John J. 
Clayton (Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1996), pp. 618-635 (p. 620). 28 Mark Currie, `Introduction', in Metafiction, ed. by Mark Currie (London and New York: 
Longman, 1995), pp. 1-18 (p. 1). 
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obligation to appeal to the `literary sense', individual style becomes a historical 
category to be replaced by the styleless style of Vonnegut. As Moms Dickstein 
comments, `[w]hat died in the sixties was not the novel but the mystique of the 
novel'. 29 
For Barthes, writing at the degree zero bespeaks a new kind of 
universalism, one which, like a kind of mathematical purity, `reaches the state of 
a pure equation, which is no more tangible than an algebra when it confronts the 
innermost part of man'. 0 Superseding Jameson's `explosion of modem literature 
into a host of distinct private styles and mannerisms', such algebraic clarity 
thereby also transcends the relativism of individual styles. The effect of this is to 
describe an escape from what Barthes terms the `tragic predicament peculiar to 
Literature' in which the writer's `consciousness no longer accounts for the whole 
of his condition'. 31 With neutral writing, then, `Literature is vanquished, the 
problematics of mankind is uncovered and presented without elaboration, the 
writer becomes irretrievably honest'. 32 
While we must be careful to distinguish between the universality of a 
style and of an ideology, the former characteristic may in some measure account 
for Vonnegut's apparent universalism, his critically lauded ability to face, what 
Charles B. Harris calls, `the absurdity of the human condition without losing his 
29 Moms Dickstein, 'Black Humor and History: Fiction in the Sixties', Partisan Review, 43: 2, 
(1976), 185-211, (p. 186). 
30 Writing Degree Zero, p. 78. 31 Ibid., p. 60. 
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concern for humanity'. 33 However, if this rather benign scenario seems to 
suggest that neutral writing is both historically specific and, in some way, 
transcendent to that specificity, Barthes indicates that the latter is but a 
momentary flicker across the otherwise contingent: 
Unfortunately, nothing is more fickle than a colourless 
writing; mechanical habits are developed in the very place where 
freedom existed, a network of set forms hem in more and more the 
pristine freshness of discourse, a mode of writing appears afresh in 
lieu of an indefinite language. The writer, taking his place as a 
"classic", becomes the slavish imitator of his original creation, society 
demotes his writing to a mere manner, and returns him a prisoner to 
his own formal myths. 34 
At one level, this describes the historical situation of Vonnegut and 
Slaughterhouse-Five. As Robert Merrill comments in an overview of Vonnegut's 
work, `recent evidence suggests that people are neither talking about nor reading 
Kurt Vonnegut as much as they did in the year immediately following his first 
great popular and critical success with Slaughterhouse-Five'. 5 At another level, 
however, it also points to a further contradiction at work in Vonnegut's style. 
This contradiction is perhaps best encapsulated in Slaughterhouse-Five by 
the phrase `So it goes'. On the one hand this phrase connotes a kind of 
32 Ibid., p. 78. 
33 Charles B. Harris, `Illusion and Absurdity: The Novels of Kurt Vonnegut', in Critical Essays on 
Kurt Vonnegut, ed. by Robert Merrill, pp. 131-141 (p. 140). 34 Writing Degree Zero, p. 78. 
35 `Introduction', p. 1. Vonnegut is not averse to admitting this apathy either: `Christopher 
Lehmann-Haupt, a New York Times daily book reviewer, told me at a party maybe five years ago 
that he couldn't stand to read me anymore, so that makes two of us'. Fates Worse Man Death, 
p. 110. 
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carelessness or adolescent laissez-faire; on the other hand it functions very 
precisely in the novel as a signification of death. Occurring one hundred and 
three times, the phrase's very repetitiveness undermines its apparent insouciance. 
The aleatory and the instrumental thus contaminate each other to the point of 
undecidability, as David Punter argues: 
The uniqueness of Kurt Vonnegut's style has been 
summarised in many different ways. One of the principal distinctions 
seems to me to be the continuous holding together of different poles: 
high technology and human eccentricity, the manipulative and 
repetitive languages of commerce and the faltering expression of 
love, intense patterning and emphatic inconsequentiality. 36 
This cohabitation of the fleeting and the functional succeeds because of what 
Harris describes as '[t]he detached tone of Vonnegut's novels'. 37 For the latter's 
style seems to deliberately void itself of any sensory apprehension of the objects 
it touches, encasing them within an insensible epoche as if to render a prose that 
best approximates to a phenomenology-in-aspic. Everything in the novel, from 
the vibrating bed to the firebombing of Dresden, is adumbrated in the same flat, 
bloodless register, perhaps indicating that this is the only way to register anything 
at all. Indeed, this would seem to be very much the point. The ubiquity of `So it 
goes' indexes the persistence of death in Slaughterhouse-Five, which, quite apart 
from the references to the bombing of Dresden, is, as Robert Merrill and Peter A. 
36 David Punter, The Hidden Script: Writing and the Unconscious (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1985), p. 78. 
37 `Illusion and Absurdity: The Novels of Kurt Vonnegut', p. 139. This, according to Ilarris, `is 
the primary device by which he suggests the hopelessness of the human condition and the 
resignation he feels is necessary to that hopelessness'. Ibid., p. 139. 
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Scholl point out, `filled with allusions to such post-war disasters as Vietnam, the 
assassinations of Bobby Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., and the riots in 
American ghettos'. 38 Vonnegut's prose is, we might say, shell-shocked, stung by 
the intensity of accumulative experiences it can only register at arm's length. As 
the narrator comments, `[e]verything is supposed to be very quiet after a 
massacre, and it always is, except for the birds'. 39 Vonnegut's prose is 
comparable to that birdsong, for it is ultimately the very style of trauma itself - 
reluctant, repetitious and recursive. 
2: Makin a Trauma Out of a Stylus 
Many critics have quite properly identified trauma and/or the writing of 
trauma as the subject of Slaughterhouse-Five. Tony Tanner, for example, argues 
that `[i]t is a novel about a novelist who has been unable to erase the memory of 
his wartime experience and the Dresden fire-storm'. 40 Pressing this point even 
further, Hams proposes that Slaughterhouse-Five is concerned to elaborate the 
effects of trauma as such, rather than a specific trauma, for `the novel is less 
about Dresden than about the psychological impact of time, death, and 
uncertainty on its main character' 41 Dickstein, however, finds that such weighty 
concerns are too onerous for the fragile fictional structure within which they are 
38 Robert Merrill and Peter A. Scholl, `Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five: The Requirements of 
Chaos', in Critical Essays on Kurt Vonnegut, ed. by Robert Merrill, pp. 142-151 (p. 149). 
39 Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 21. 
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articulated. This is particularly so because Pilgrim's traumatic experience 
resonates so overtly with that of Vonnegut's, and thus `faced with the 
firebombing of Dresden, where he himself had been a helpless bystander, a 
stunned survivor, he lets the intensity of his feelings overshadow the fable that 
tries to express them'. 2 The failure of the novel is, for Dickstein, coded 
testimony to the strength of the trauma it delineates. However, it is Vonnegut 
himself who perhaps comes closest to the contention argued here, when he notes 
of Slaughterhouse-Five that `[t]his thin book is about what it's like to write a 
book about a thing like [the destruction of Dresden]'. 3 Perhaps even more 
pertinently, he goes on to say that `[t]he book is a process of this sort of living 
with Dresden and the aftermath' 44 The inference we may draw from these 
statements is that Slaughterhouse-Five is not so much about both trauma and the 
writing of it; rather it is about the fact that trauma and the writing of trauma are 
the same process. 
In order to pursue this line of thought we must turn to the most persuasive 
theorization of trauma, that to be found in psychoanalytical discourse. Trauma is, 
of course, a term that finds its incipience in the disciplines of surgery and 
medicine, and in adopting it, as J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis propose, 
`psychoanalysis carries the three ideas implicit in it over on to the psychical level: 
40 Tony Tanner, City of Words: American Fiction 1950-1970 (London and New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), p. 194. 
41 `Time, Uncertainty, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. ', p. 228. 
42 `Black Humor and History: Fiction in the Sixties', p. 190. 
43 Joe David Bellamy and John Casey, 'Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. ', in Conversations with Kurt V'onnegul, 
ed. by William Rodney Allen (Jackson and London: University Press of Mississippi, 1988), 
pp. 156-167 (p. 163). 
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the idea of a violent shock, the idea of a wound and the idea of consequences 
affecting the whole organization' 45 One of the most compelling delineations of 
its psychical manifestations, and one that borrows heavily from the model of its 
organic matrix, is to be found in Sigmund Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
This text, for Peter Brooks, `constitutes Freud's own masterplot, the essay where 
he lays out most fully a total scheme of how life proceeds from beginning to 
end'. 46 A central characteristic of this `total scheme' is trauma, particularly that 
suffered by combat victims of shell-shock. Indeed, their experiences disclose the 
central problematic upon which Beyond the Pleasure Principe is predicated. Of 
particular concern here is the exhibition by the shell-shocked of a compulsion to 
repeat the initial moment of shock in dreams, or, rather nightmares. Such a 
compulsion contradicts the accepted function of dreams as wish-fulfilling 
scenarios. Therefore, as Freud argues, `[a]nyone who accepts it as something 
self-evident that their dreams should put them back at night into the situation that 
47 caused them to fall ill has misunderstood the nature of dreams'. As is well 
known, Freud's solution to this apparent paradox is to relativize the hitherto 
existing monopoly of the pleasure principle by postulating the existence of a 
death drive 48 The compulsion to repeat produced by trauma can thus be seen as a 
small act in the larger drama of the instincts which cling conservatively to what 
44 Ibid., p. 163. 
45 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. by Donald Nicholson- 
Smith (London: Karnac Books, 1988,1973), p. 466. 
46 Peter Brooks, `Freud's Masterplot', in Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reader, ed. by Sue Vice 
jCambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 30-37 (p. 30). 
7 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, (1920), in The Penguin Freud Library 
(hereafter P. F. L. ), Volume 11, ed. by Angela Richards and Albert Dickson, trans. by James 
Strachey (London: Penguin, 1973-1991), pp. 269-338 (pp. 282-283). 
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they have already known, determined to return to that `initial state from which the 
living entity has at one time or other departed and to which it is striving to return 
by the circuitous paths along which its development leads' 49 
The pertinence of this theory to a reading of Slaughterhouse-Five is 
immediately apparent, and it depends upon our understanding the novel as being 
`somewhat in the telegraphic schizophrenic manner of tales of the planet 
Tralfamadore'. 5° What is meant by this statement becomes clear when the 
Tralfamadorians explain to Billy that in their literature `[t]here is no beginning, 
no middle, no end, no suspense, no moral, no cause, no effects"'. S1 There is, in 
other words, no time at all; there is only inertness: 
"All time is all time. It does not change. It does not lend 
itself to warnings or explanations. It simply is. Take it moment by 
moment, and you will find that we are all, as I've said before, bugs in 
amber. "52 
As a `bug in amber', Billy constantly re-lives every moment in his life, `[h]e has 
seen his birth and death many times, he says, and pays random visits to all the 
events in between'. 53 He is, we might say, in a state of repetition, accustomizing 
himself to everything that happens in his life by experiencing it over and over 
again. Specifically, he is able to domesticate the terror and shock of death, as he 
48 '[Me shall be compelled to say, ' comments Freud, with a suitably melodramatic flourish, 'that 
"the aim of all life is death"'. Ibid., p. 311. 
49 Ibid., p. 310. 
50 Slaughterhouse-Five., p. 3 (title page). 
51 Ibid., p. 71. 
52 Ibid., p. 68. 
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notes when describing the origin of the refrain that accompanies death in the 
novel: 
"When a Tralfamadorian sees a corpse, all he thinks is that 
the dead person is in a bad condition in that particular moment, but 
that the same person is just fine in plenty of other moments. Now 
when I myself hear that somebody is dead, I simply shrug and say 
what the Tralfamadorians say about dead people, which is so it 
goes'. "54 
In the atemporal circuit of Tralfamadore, life and death become meaninglessly 
interchangeable terms, shorn of their differential relation. 55 All traumas are 
equally converted to the store of existing conditions, becoming part of the rhythm 
of existence rather than devastating ruptures inflicted upon it. Tamed and tied up 
by repetition, shock is redeployed as one more edifying instance of the 
homogeneity it now appears that it only meekly tried to splinter. 
Such conservatism is also seemingly at work in the structure of 
Slaughterhouse-Five. As we have already noted, this is not the first novel in 
which Vonnegut essays a description of the firebombing of Dresden and thus it is, 
for his more avid readers, a repeat experience, particularly as he deploys very 
similar descriptions in both instances. 56 Equally, Slaughterhouse-Five is not the 
33 Ibid., p. 25. 
54 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 55 This is not to deny, of course, that for Billy `life' carries with it connotations of shock which 
cause him to avow a more explicit death wish, such as, for example, when it is noted that `Billy 
really didn't like life at all', or when he is described as being 'bleakly ready for death'. Ibid., p. 81 
and p. 31 respectively. 
56 Compare, for example, `[w]e heard the bombs walking around up there', with '[t]here were 
sounds like giant footsteps above Those were sticks of high explosive bombs. The giants walked 
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first time we encounter many of the characters in the novel. The 
Tralfamadorians, for example, first appear in The Sirens of Titan, Howard W. 
Campbell, Jr. finds his inaugural appearance in Mother Night, and Kilgore Trout 
returns from God Bless You, Mr Rosewater. Even Billy's fictional home town of 
Ilium is a reprise of its initial deployment in Player Piano. There are, then, few 
surprises in Slaughterhouse-Five, either in teens of character, style and, 
ultimately, plot. 57 In regard to the latter, Tanner points out that, in God Bless 
You, Mr Rosewater, 
Eliot Rosewater's last breakdown is triggered off by his 
conviction that he can see Indianapolis in the grip of a fire-storm. 
This illusion is partly a recapitulation of his own war experiences, and 
partly a projection of a description of the fire-storm in Dresden which 
he has re-read repeatedly. This is the vision of sudden and 
unbelievable annihilation which has been somewhere behind all 
Vonnegut's work, and which (is] finally brought in to the centre of a 
novel in Slaughterhouse-Five. 8 
Slaughterhouse-Five, we might say, is every novel Vonnegut had written up until 
that point; when we read it we are simultaneously reading all his other novels too, 
and walked. ' Mother Night, p. x and Slaughterhouse Five, p. 133 respectively. Equally, there is 
very little difference between `[n]ow and then there would be a gentle shower of calcimine', and 
`[a]ll that happened down there was an occasional shower of calcimine'. Mother Night, p. x and 
Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 133 respectively. 37 In this respect, the recursive song that Vonnegut quotes near the beginning of the novel, and one 
which for him is associated with writing about Dresden, comes to seem emblematic of his project 
as a whole: 
`My name is Yon Yonson, 
I work in Wisconsin, 
I work in a lumbermill there, 
The people I meet when I walk down the street, 
They say, "What's your name? " 
And I say, 
"My name is Yon Yonson, 
I work in Wisconsin.... "' Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 10. 
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in much the same way that the images in a Tralfamadorian novel are "`seen all at 
once"'. 59 Within the ambit of such repetition, we are, as it were, inured to the 
trauma of Slaughterhouse-Five because we have experienced all its component 
parts so many times before. 
Within the novel itself, a similar reading experience is produced by the 
random time-shifts of the narrative. As we track the adventures of Billy through 
time, we are deprived of the traditional narrative qualities of cause and effect. All 
we encounter are continual surprises, a kind of rhythm of shock in which we are 
unable to maintain any stable sense of plot, jumping with Billy from episode to 
episode, from paragraph to paragraph, already partially habituated to the 
unexpected by Vonnegut's deadpan prose style. It is a paradox summed up by 
the spectacularly useless gesture of disclosing the secret of the novel's start and 
finish before it has even begun: 
I've finished my war book now. [... ] It begins like this: 
Listen: 
Billy Pilgrim has come unstuck in time. 
It ends like this: 
Poo-tee-weet? 60 
At one level, this information tells us nothing, for it fails to divulge the process 
through which the beginning becomes the end; at another level, nevertheless, it 
does gesture towards a poetics of the death drive, because we will still be 
58 `The Uncertain Messenger', p. 125. 59 Slaughterhouse Five, p. 71. 
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repeating the beginning and the end when we read them and will therefore be 
accustomed to their surprise. 61 At yet another level, however, this forewarning is 
completely misplaced because it comes at the end of Chapter One: the novel 
itself, in other words, is already in medias res and there is, therefore, a significant 
portion of the narrative that remains unaccounted for by reading it solely in terms 
of the death-drive. In order to understand the import of this we must turn to 
another theory of trauma from the one we have so far been discussing. 
This other theory of trauma is the one associated with Freud's concept of 
Nachträglichkeit or `deferred action'. The most famous articulation of this 
retroactive causality can be found in the case history of the so-called `Wolf Man'. 
Here, Freud describes what he terms `another instance of deferred action': 
At the age of one and a half the child receives an impression 
to which he is unable to react adequately; he is only able to 
understand it and to be moved by it when the impression is revived in 
him at the age of four; and only twenty years later, during the 
analysis, is he able to grasp with his conscious mental processes what 
was then going on in him. 2 
The inability of the `Wolf Man' to `react adequately' indexes the excessive 
character of that `original' impression, or `primal scene'. All the Russian's later 
symptom-formations, detailed by Freud, attest to the intemperance of this scene 
601bid., p. 24. 
61 Peter Brooks has given one of the fullest elaborations of a poetics of the death-drive, 
particularly in regard to the fact that '[n]arrative always makes the implicit claim to be in a state 
of repetition, as a going over again of a ground already covered'. 'Freud's Masterplot', p. 30. 
62 Sigmund Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, (1918), in P. F. L., Volume 9, 
pp. 227-366 (p. 278). 
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and of his inability to reintegrate it fully within the symbolic order. The primacy 
of the primal scene, however, is undercut not only by the fact that Freud remains 
unconvinced it ever took place but also, and more importantly, by the fact that it 
is the Wolf Man's successive attempts to reintegrate the scene in the symbolic 
which accords it that primacy in the first place. The primal scene, in other words, 
is elaborated retrospectively; it acquires its significance only as the consequence 
of its inscription within the field f another event, as Slavoj Zizek argues: 
In the case of the Wolf Man... the Cause of course, was the 
traumatic scene of the parental coitus a tergo - this scene was the 
non-symbolizable kernel around which all later successive 
symbolization whirled. This Cause, however, not only exerted its 
efficiency after a certain time lag; it literally became trauma - that is, 
Cause - through delay: when the Wolf Man, at age two, witnessed the 
coitus a tergo, nothing traumatic marked this scene; the scene 
acquired traumatic features only in retrospect, with the later 
development of the child's infantile sexual theories when it became 
impossible to integrate the scene within the newly emerged horizon of 
narrativization-historicization-symbolization. 63 
There is a sense here, then, in which two disparate temporal events are yoked 
together, not in order that their differences may be resolved in synthesis, for, as 
Jean Laplanche reminds us,, `Freud insists upon the tension between the old 
scene and the recent scenario', but, rather, in order to reinvigorate their field of 
meaning. TM The latter event thus comes to be restructured as the effect that 
precedes its cause, whilst the first event will have been the cause of an effect only 
63 Slavoj Zizek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London: 
Verso, 1994), p. 31. 
64 Jean Laplanche, New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, trans. by David Macey (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989,1987), p. 118. 
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as a repetition which takes place for the first time. We may say, therefore, that 
what Nachtraglichkeit designates is the privileging of synchrony over diachrony, 
for, as Jacques Lacan contends, 
[Freud] asserts that he holds it legitimate in the analysis of 
processes to elide the time intervals in which the event remains latent 
in the subject. That is to say, he annuls the times for understanding in 
favour of the moments of concluding which precipitate the meditation 
of the subject towards deciding the meaning to attach to the original 
6s event. 
This elision of the `time intervals' is perhaps best represented by those 
topological models, such as the Möbius strip and the Klein bottle with which 
Lacan became fascinated towards the end of his career. If, for example, we trace 
a finger around the band of a Möbius strip we arrive back where we started but on 
the other side of that band. Time curves back on itself, as it were, and by 
synchronically effacing the conditions of both genesis and nemesis, fosters the 
production of new meaning. 
To sum up, then, we may say that the trauma of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is a positivized economic experience in which the moment off shock 
can be identified in itself at the level of affect. The trauma adumbrated in Freud's 
analysis of the Wolf Man, however, is only identifiable as the product of a 
differential relation between two events in the field of meaning. The second kind 
of trauma is, therefore, we may venture, more in keeping with the Freudian 
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project as a whole because it attests to the materiality of the signifier, as 
Laplanche and Pontalis point out: 
Although Freud calls the first scene traumatic, it is plain that, 
from the strict economic point of view, this quality is only ascribed to 
it after the fact; or to put it another way: it is only as a memory that 
the first scene becomes pathogenic by deferred action, in so far as it 
sparks off an influx of internal excitation. 66 
It is, as it were, the rewriting of the first scene by the second scene which not only 
establishes the primacy of the first scene, but its traumatic character too. 
Paradoxically, the form of Beyond the Pleasure Principle appears to vouchsafe 
the validity of retroactive trauma over and above the decisive trauma that is its 
content. This is because Freud's text is predicated upon an attempt to integrate 
the problematic of the compulsion to repeat within the existing economic model 
of psychoanalysis. Indeed, we might say that the compulsion to repeat functions 
as the trauma of Freudian psychoanalysis here. It is unsymbolized as until Freud 
re-contextualizes it within the ambit of the death-drive; a re-writing that is 
prompted, after the fact, by the non-tautological character of the compulsion to 
repeat. Thus, for example, when Freud states before introducing the death-drive 
that `[w]hat follows is speculation... an attempt to follow out an idea 
consistently, out of curiosity to see where it will lead', he is openly gesturing 
toward the process of rewriting by and through which a trauma is registered. 67 In 
65 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1997,1977), 
p. 48. 
The Language of Psychoanalysis, p. 467. 67 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 467. 
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so doing he is admitting of a kind of metafictional strategy that articulates the 
boundaries of a narrative, the borderline between what is written and what is left 
unwritten, and how that boundary is contingent upon its historical moment. 
If we turn back now to Slaughterhouse-Five we may see how this 
Nachträglichkeit informs both the content and the form of the novel. What is of 
particular interest here is Vonnegut's delineation of the moment of trauma, or, 
rather, his difficulty in writing it. For what the first chapter rehearses are the 
many problems Vonnegut had in narrating the firebombing of Dresden at all: 
I thought it would be easy for me to write about the 
destruction of Dresden since all I would have to do would be to report 
what I had seen. And I thought, too, that it would be a masterpiece 
or at least make me a lot of money, since the subject was so big. 
But not many words about Dresden came from my mind 
then.... And not many words come now either. 68 
There are two important points of note here. The first is that the destruction of 
Dresden was and remains for Vonnegut an essentially unsymbolizable 
experience; he is literally unable to write his Dresden and, in fact, comments 
`how useless the Dresden part of my memory has been'. 69 Described in this way, 
Vonnegut's memory of Dresden comes to seem like a withered limb disrupting 
the organic harmony of his imaginary self. It is, as it were, a pathological excess, 
ineffably trumping the solace of the stories which would otherwise tame it. In 
fact, secondly, there is a very real sense in which Vonnegut is unable to `report 
68 Slaughterhouse Five, p. 10. 
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what [he] had seen' because all he saw were the effects of the firebombing. For 
Vonnegut, the firebombing itself is a calculated inference that can only be made 
because he was locked up in Slaughterhouse-Five, the unsymbolizable pat of the 
destruction of Dresden, we might say, the part of the historical memory of that 
city which was unassimilable to its re-writing as `the moon. 70 
The resistance of the Dresden massacre to narrativization was not merely 
Vonnegut's personal problem, for, as he points out, it was a public trauma too and 
`information [about it] was top secret'. 7' Finding that little had been written 
about the bombing, he even decided that `this really was the most minor sort of 
detail in World War II9.72 As he claims, he `had no idea of the scale of the thing': 
he had no conception, in other words, that it was a trauma. 73 It was only with the 
publication of David Irving's The Destruction of Dresden in 1963 that Vonnegut 
realized, `By God, I saw something after all! '74 What Vonnegut saw was the 
same thing, but how he saw it, and thus what its effects were, differed radically 
over the course of time. 
If this is Vonnegut's own experience of the retroactivity of trauma, it also 
bears a certain similarity with experience of Billy. For Billy finds that his present 
69 Ibid., p. 10. 70 Ibid., p. 133. When Vonnegut comments that `[e]verybody is supposed to be dead, to never say 
anything or want anything ever again' after a massacre, he is speaking from the point of view of 
the massacre's trauma. Ibid., p. 21. 
71 Ibid., p. 16. 
'Z Palm Sunday, p. 404. 73 Ibid., p. 404. 74 Ibid., p. 404. 
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is also arrested by the past, that he too `had a great big secret somewhere 
inside'75, one that is disclosed by the presence of a barbershop quartet: 
Billy thought hard about the effect the quartet had had on 
him, and then found an association with an experience he had had 
long ago. He did not travel in time to the experience. He 
remembered it shimmeringly. 76 
The `association' that Billy is forced to deal with is, of course, the firebombing of 
Dresden. What is important to note here is that this memory is the product of a 
synchronization between two chronologically disparate events: it is `his memory 
of the future', a return to the trauma of Dresden for the first time. 77 It is what 
traumatizes the event and causes him to feel `as though he really were stretched 
on the torture engine called the rack'. 78 Furthermore, this is the first and only 
time in the novel that Billy does not time-travel to an event but, rather, 
remembers it. If, as we have seen, time-travel figures in the novel as a fantasy in 
the imaginary service of the death-drive, then memory is thus explicitly 
counterposed as an instantiation of the temporality of Nachiräglichkeit. Memory 
here is self-divisive, sundering the egoistic comforts of repetition by confronting 
the subject with a trauma that is fully as much of the present as it is of the past. 
The connection between the two is forged at the level of the novel's form 
by a series of arrested motifs. These connect both Billy's present and past and 
75 Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 130. 76Ibid., p. 132. 
nlbid., p. 82. 
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Vonnegut's own past and present as it is realized in the writing of the novel, that 
is, in writing Billy's present and past. We find, for example, that Vonnegut 
admits to having `a ceremonial Luftwaffe saber', just as Billy `had a saber too'. 79 
The `Three Musketeers Candy Bar' that Nancy eats in Vonnegut's newspaper 
office is the same one that Billy's fiancee devours, and it is also the name that 
Weary fantasizes his fellow fugitives are called. 80 Vonnegut agrees to call his 
novel "`The Children's Crusade"', which is exactly what the English colonel 
terms Billy and his fellow American prisoners of war. 81 Equally, Vonnegut 
drives his `wife away with a breath like mustard gas and roses', whilst Billy, 
when answering the telephone to a drunk, `could almost smell his breath - 
mustard gas and roses'. 82 This last example perhaps comes closest to disclosing 
the function of these motifs - which otherwise seem to be repeated at random, 
neither aiding the development of character nor theme - for the smell, it 
transpires, finds its incipience in the corpse mines of Dresden: 
There were hundreds of corpse mines operating by and by. 
They didn't smell bad at first, were wax museums. But the bodies 
rotted and liquefied, and the stink was like roses and mustard gas. 83 
In the light of this revelation at the end of the novel, the smell of mustard gas and 
roses take son the status of a traumatic echo, a mnemic trace which disturbs the 
present and takes it back into the past. These motifs therefore enact a kind of 
781bid., p. 129. 79 Ibid., p. 12 and p. 146 respectively. 80 Ibid., p. 15, p. 86 and p. 38 respectively. 81 Ibid., p. 19 and p. 83 respectively. 
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temporal short-circuit through which the first scene is established as traumatic by 
virtue of its relation with the second scene. If the first scene here is quite clearly 
Dresden, then the second scene is that of 1960s America, the present off the 
writing of the novel and the resent of Billy Pilgrim. Thus, for example, we find 
that the narrative describes the locomotives carrying prisoners of war as being 
`marked with a striped banner of orange and black', which finds a resonance in 
the fact that the `gaily striped tent in Billy's backyard [was] orange and black', 
which in turn surfaces as an echo in the `vertical band of orange cross-hatching' 
that Vonnegut uses to represent the destruction of Dresden in one of his outlines 
for Slaughterhouse-Five. 84 It is, as it were, the trauma of postmodern America, 
particularly for Vonnegut qua narrator of the writing present, that precipitates the 
trauma of the destruction of Dresden and vice versa, each inhabiting and 
overdetermining the other in a manner that agitates any purely linear conception 
of the historical past. 85 
With the structure of Slaughterhouse-Five, Vonnegut elaborates this 
process quite literally, for the novel narrates the story of Billy Pilgrim's 
experiences in the war in a linear form, beginning with his training and ending 
82 Ibid., p. 11 and p. 60 respectively. 
83 Ibid., p. 160. 
84 Ibid., p. 57, p. 59 and p. 12 respectively. 
83 There are, in fact, a series of chronological discrepancies in Slaughterhouse-Five which serve to 
bolster this interpretation. For Harris, who provides by far the most exhaustive list of these 
seemingly deliberate errors, this means that Vonnegut 'does not merely deny the relevance of 
chronological order..., he denies its very existence. `Time, Uncertainty, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. ', 
pp. 239-241. Bo Pettersson, however, argues that the novel's chronological inconsistencies `do 
not alter the linear order of the scenes' and, as if by way of a rebuttal to I lams, provides the 
most fantastic tabulation of these scenes in an act worthy of gracing Vonnegut's notorious 
wallpaper itself. Bo Pettersson, The World According to Kurt bonngut: Moral Paradox and 
Narrative Form (Abo: Akademi University Press, 194), pp. 255-256. 
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with his release. This linear story, however, is consistently punctuated by 
seemingly random incidents which make up the story of the rest of Billy's life to 
the point where it is no longer clear which has priority over which, both 
occupying the history of the other. 86 It is, moreover, Chapter One which provides 
the framework for this problematization of linearity. As Harris rightly points out, 
`Chapter One is entitled "Chapter One", after all, not "Foreword" or 
"Introduction"', and is therefore an integral part of the novel. 87 Its integrity stems 
from the manner in which it foregrounds the act of narration itself. 
I had outlined the Dresden story many times. The best 
outline I ever made, or anyway the prettiest one, was on the back of a 
roll of wallpaper. 
I used my daughter's crayons, a different color for each main 
character. One end of the wallpaper was the beginning of the story, 
and the other end was the end, and then there was all that middle part, 
which was the middle. 88 
Character ad plot here are straight lines that proceed from arch to telos 
untroubled by `all that middle part' which, as its offhand description suggests, is 
merely the formal device linking the two. Vonnegut, however, is troubled and 
the whole of Chapter One admits of the slow process by which he came to write 
the bombing of Dresden, not as a straight line., but as something `jumbled and 
jangled', as if, we might say, he had rolled up the wallpaper chart and written it 
86 Vonnegut's own comments on this are interesting: `I guarantee you that no modem story 
scheme, even plotlessness, will give a reader genuine satisfaction unless one of those old 
fashioned plots is smuggled in there somewhere. I don't praise plots as accurate representations 
of life, but as ways to keep readers reading. ' Palm Sunday, p. 422. 87 'Time, Uncertainty, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. ', p. 228. 88 Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 12. 
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like that. 89 There is an analogy here with the way in which, as Jameson points 
out, `in the moment of the emergence of capitalism the present could be 
intensified, and prepared for individual perception, by the construction of a 
historical past from which as a process it could be felt to issue slowly forth, like 
the growth of an organism'. 90 The shock of capitalism is absorbed in the 
mediation of a narrative which retrospectively mobilizes the trope of organicism. 
Similarly, we might say that the writing of shock is itself `organicized' in the first 
chapter by Vonnegut's articulation of a meta-narrational history which collapses 
the synchronic back onto the diachronic, arcing the body of the narrative, as it 
were, in order to minimize the impact of the approaching trauma. Such 
organicism, however, is, as we noted, offset by both the temporal punctuations of 
the novel and by the authorial prolepses which forestall any sense of 
development 91 Indeed, the narrator provides an appropriate metaphor for this 
narrative of trauma when noting, during the description of the destruction of 
Dresden, that `[t]he one flame ate everything organic'. 92 
Finally, it is perhaps the destruction of organicism which forms the 
subject matter of not only Slaughterhouse-Five, but Vonnegut's entire oeuvre, 
and for which the destruction of Dresden stands as its most striking figure, while 
89 id, p. 21. 
90 Fredric Jameson, 'Progress Versus Utopia; or, Can We Imagine the Future? ', in Science Fiction 
Studies, 9: 2, (1982), 147-158 (p. 152). 
91 We are informed, for example, of Billy's entire life-story on the opening two pages of Chapter 
Two, just as we are appraised by Vonnegut that "'the climax of the book will be the execution of 
poor old Edgar Derby"'. Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 11. In fact, this climax is related so many tines 
in the novel that when we actually reach it, the incident no longer functions as ad no: iement at 
all. 
92 Ibid., p. 133. 
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the destruction of the extended family provides its most ubiquitous instance. 93 In 
this respect, therefore, it is unsurprising that the second scene which precipitates 
Billy's traumatic memory of Dresden is one centred around the barbershop 
quartet singing `That Old Gang of Mine'. For although `[h]e had never had an 
old gang, old sweethearts and pals... he missed one anyway'. 94 It is a lament 
described on almost every page of Slaughterhouse-Five, from Weary's invocation 
of The Three Musketeers to the fact that Billy and his German guard, Werner 
Gluck, were `distant cousins, something they never found out', and from the 
`urban renewal' after the race riots which `looked like Dresden after it was fire 
bombed - like the surface of the moon' to Billy's daughter, who is given pills `so 
she could function, even though her father was broken and her mother dead'. 95 
The constant redeployment of characters from Vonnegut's other novels also 
speaks of this lament for a lost family, as if, as he has the President of the United 
States do in Slapstick, or, Lonesome No More, Vonnegut is furnishing his readers 
with an artificial family. The use of a repertory of characters by an author is 
not, of course, limited to Vonnegut. On a smaller scale, Thomas Pynchon, for 
example, reincarnates Much Mass in Vineland, significantly 'after a divorce 
remarkable even in that innocent time for its geniality'. 97 The seven 
93 Vonnegut's comments on his family are instructive here: 'What is my favorite among all the 
works of art my children have so far produced? It is perhaps a letter written by my youngest 
daughter Nanette. It is so organic! ' Palm Sunday, p. 565. 
94Slaughterhouse-Five, p. 129. 
's Ibid., pp. 119-120, p. 50 and p. 141 respectively. % Asked why the Chinese have withdrawn from the United States, Eliza comments, `"What 
civilized country could be interested in a hell-hole like America where everybody takes such 
lousy care of their own relatives? "' Kurt Vonnegut, Slapstick, or, Lonesome No More (London: 
Vintage, 1991,1976), p. 82. 
97 Thomas Pynchon, Vineland (London: Minerva, 1991,1990), p. 309. Maintaining the 
connections, the Crying of Lot 49 also marks the return of the Vivaldi Kazoo Concerto and the 
Yoyodyne plant from V. 
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corespondents in John Barth's LETTERS, meanwhile are all reprisals of 
characters from his earlier work, whilst Patrick Bateman not only returns from 
Bret Easton Ellis's The Rules of Attraction to star in American Psycho, he also 
works at `Pierce and Pierce', the investment company of Sherman McCoy in Tom 
Wolfe's The Bonfire of the Vanities. Surpassing all these examples, however, 
Christine Brook-rose's Textermination describes a conference of all the most 
famous literary characters who have ever been written or read, including both 
Billy Pilgrim and Oedipa Maas. 98 In a further step, we ma perhaps take these 
examples as figures for the larger problematic of co-ordination in the totality of 
postmodernity. The lament here is not so much for the totality as such, but for 
knowledge of the individual's organic relation to it which does not entirely 
collapse into a kind of monadic relativism. There obtains as Jameson proposes, 
an incommensurability between the existential experience of the individual and 
the structural co-ordinates within which that exoperience is played out: 
[T]he phenomenological experience of the individual subject 
becomes limited to a tiny corner of the social world, a fixed-camera 
view of a certain section of London or the countryside or whatever. 
But the truth of that experience no longer coincides with the place in 
which it takes place. The truth of that limited daily experience of 
London lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong Kong; it is bound up 
with the whole colonial system of the British Empire that determines 
the very quality of the individual's subjective life. Yet those structural 
98 Brook-Rose also provides an important corrective to the androcentrism prevailing in the work 
of many of the older postmodern authors, specifically here Pynchon and Vonnegut. Oedipa in 
particular, gives voice to a feminism utterly lacking in the Crying of Lot 49, noting, for example, 
that `male authors are so macho, and even more the socalled Postmodems who think they're so 
avantgarde'. Christine Brook-Rose, Textermination (Manchester: Carcanet, 1997,1991), p. 142. 
When asked to talk about the female characters in his novels, Vonnegut's response is self- 
explanatory: `There aren't any. No real women, no love. ' Palm Suieday, p. 417. 
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co-ordinates are no longer accessible to immediate lived experience 
and are often not even conceptualizable for most people. 99 
The indicative mode of Vonnegut's writing degree zero here offers itself up as a 
compromise formation, neither quite resigned to the solipsism of the imaginary, 
nor quite clearly committed to a conceptualization of the totality, it effaces both 
for the common ground of the `facts'. Divorced from both the existential and the 
conceptual, these `facts', like Vonnegut's style itself, come to seem strangely 
unsettling, for they are both disembowelled and shorn of ideation, registering 
only as faint impressions of either, like uncanny symptoms of a problematic they 
can articulate indirectly but never overcome. 
There is, then, clearly a sense in which the content of Slaughterhouse-Five 
achieves it s expression in the form of the novel, or, more particularly, in its style. 
For I both there is inscribed a kind of nostalgia for the organic whole, a regret at 
the passing of, and an attempt to restore a common language and a common 
bond. Even to describe Vonnegut's novels as fragmented in form is secretly to 
disclose a hidden integrity, a unity of which the fragment is but a syntactical unit. 
The narrative collops of Slaughterhouse-Five thus bespeak a completeness, an 
imaginary unity to which Vonnegut's corpus morcele is a necessary counterpart. 
This is the conservative instinct of the text, its yearning for repletion which, like 
Freud's fabled organism, progresses towards a sufficiency unto itself and, 
ultimately, unto death. It is offset, however, by its inflection within the 
99 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Laie Capitalism (London: Verso, 
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temporality of Nachträglichkeit where integrity becomes merely what will have 
been. Unity in this temporal mode can only be achieved at the cost of a 
contingency to which it too must succumb: the perfect future of the future perfect. 
3: Coda 
As was suggested earlier, we may consider Slaughterhouse-Five as 
exemplary of a certain type of postmodern novel which centres upon 
narrativization qua trauma. Perhaps the most pertinent example of such a novel 
is Martin Amis' Time's Arrow, which, as Amis Acknowledges, owes a structural 
debt to `a certain paragraph -a famous one by Kurt Vonnegut'. 
10° This 
paragraph is the one in which Billy sees 'the late movie backwards'. 101 It is a 
film about an American bombing raid over a German city in the Second World 
War, and, seen backwards, `[t]he bombers opened their bomb bay doors, exerted 
a miraculous magnetism which shrunk the fires, gathered them into cylindrical 
steel containers and lifted the containers into the bellies of planes'. 
' 02 This 
reversal of empirical cause and effect is employed by Amis throughout Time's 
Arrow as the novel's narrative principal. The effect of this is to render a 
proximate realization of the temporality of Nachträglichkeit in which the past 
comes from the future. For the action of the novel begins with Tod's death and 
1991), p. 411. ioo Martin Amis, Time's Arrow, or, The Nature of the Offence (London: Penguin, 1992,1991), 
75. i01 
Slaughterhouse Five, p. 60. 
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ends with his birth, proceeding like a movie in which, as the narrator, Tod's 
`voice of conscience', points out, `the film is running backwards'. 103 Like Billy 
Pilgrim, Tod has a secret towards and around which the narrative inexorably 
moves: 
He is travelling towards his secret. [... ] It will be bad, and 
not intelligible. [... ]I will know the nature of the offence. Already I 
know this. I know that it is to do with trash and shit, and that it is 
wrong in time. 104 
The `nature of the offence' concerns Tod's role as a camp doctor in Auschwitz, 
and it is `wrong in time' because `[t]he world, after all here in Auschwitz has a 
new habit. It makes sense. 105 Which is to say that Auschwitz is the only thing 
that makes sense going backward with the narrative (for it produces endless new 
life), whereas, conversely, it is the one thing that does not make sense going 
forward. Such a temporal disjunction indexes the unsymbolizable, or 
`unintelligible' 
, nature of not only 
Auschwitz, but trauma generally. For, as 
1°2 Ibid., p. 60. 103 Time's Arrow, p. 56 and p. 16 respectively. Although it is unacknowledged by Amis, the 
negative narration he employs is also something of a return to the technique utilized by C. I1. 
Sisson in his excellent novel Christopher Homm. While this narrative form is not as foregrounded 
as it is in Time's Arrow, there are still some moments of pithy self-reflexivity, such as when the 
narrator notes of Mr Wilson, one of Homm's rhetorical victims, that `[h]e was apt to be entranced 
by anyone who talked to him in terms of foregone conclusions'. C, H. Sisson, Christopher Homm 
(Manchester: Carcanet, 1997,1965), p. 104. In this respect, it is also worth pointing out that 
Time's Arrow constitutes a return to tone of Amis's earlier novels - London Fields - both in terms 
of the theme of retroactivity and the title itself: `A word about the title Several alternatives 
suggested themselves. For a while I toyed with Time's Arrow. ' Martin Amis, London Fields 
(London: Penguin, 1990,1989), p. vi. 104 Time's Arrow, pp. 72-73. 105 Ibid., p. 138. 
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Lacan asserts, `there is cause only in something that doesn't work. 106 What he 
means by this is he designation of a certain relationship between the orders of the 
real and the symbolic in which, as with trauma, the latter circles around and is 
rendered inconsistent by the former. It is when the holes and inconsistencies in 
the symbolic network become apparent that we are made aware of the real qua 
cause. The real is therefore only indirectly discernible as an excess as `something 
that doesn't work' in the symbolic order. Hence we may, with Ziiek, understand 
that `the real is the absent cause of the symbolic' and that, moreover, `[t]he 
Freudian and Lacanian name for this cause is, of course, trauma'. 107 
The traumatized subject is thus always self-divided, split between the 
symbolic and real times of an event. In Time's Arrow, like American Psycho, this 
is represented by the delineation of Tod continuously from both the first and third 
person perspectives, with the narrator in the former role occupying the position of 
the latter but never being quite coeval with it. In Toni Morrison's Beloved, 
however, the ego-shattering effects of a traumatic history are given more material 
form in the shape of the eponymous revenant. Indeed, the forceful dislocations of 
trauma are given full play in the character of Beloved, for she is both a ghost and 
a person, as well as both Sethe's daughter and an anonymous African slave 
condemned to the Middle Passage, and also both an adult and a baby pregnant 
inside Sethe. The return to and of the real traumas of slavery are thus represented 
106 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by Jacques-Alain 
Miller, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1994,1977), p. 22. 
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as perpetuating material effects in the symbolic. In other words, it is only with 
the breakdown of the symbolic - here in the impossible co-existence of so many 
Beloveds - that the efficacy of a trauma is realized. As Sethe acknowledges, `she 
knew that the words she did not understand hadn't any more power than she had 
to explain', for if they had then her memories would not be traumatic at all. 108 In 
Janice Galloway's The Trick Is to Keep Breathing the disjunctive effects of 
trauma in the symbolic are given typographical form by phrases that literally spill 
over, and break onto, the edges of the page: 
He had ink on his finger, just above his wedding ring. 
Sometime 
Presentim 
Tell us to 
It's too lat 
asked. 109 
1 said, It's nice of you to ask me. I appreciate being 
Joy, the novel's protagonist, cannot and is not allowed to forget the death of her 
lover, for these fragments of memory continuously impinge themselves upon her, 
connecting moments in the past with the present. It is unsurprising therefore, that 
The Trick is to Keep Breathing and Beloved utilize circles as common motifs, for 
both novels are concerned to articulate a temporality that turns back on itself to 
account for a hole in the symbolic, an absence outside of the narrative which 
effects ruptures within it. 
107 Slavoj Lizek, `Hegel with Lacan, or the Subject and its Cause', in /reading Seminars I and II: 
Lacan's Return to Freud, ed. by Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink and Maire Jaanus (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), pp. 397-413 (p. 398). 
ios Toni Morrison, Beloved (London: Picador, 1988,1987), p. 161. 
109 Janice Galloway, The Trick is to Keep Breathing (London: Minerva, 1991,1989), p. 73. 
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Circles, of course, are also figures of repetition -a repetition that we have 
identified in association with the trauma of the death-drive - and as such, they are 
exemplary symbols of the conflict that all these novels stage between the 
synchrony produced by the habituation of the death-drive and the synchrony 
produced by the shock conjunction of two events inflected within the rubric of the 
future perfect. That the latter is finally privileged over the former here points to a 
mutation in the received definition of narrative, and one that finds its conditions 
of possibility in those of the postmodern itself. Indeed, our very understanding of 
the postmodern as a periodizing concept is predicated upon a temporal nexus of 
different events within the one `moment'. As Jameson contends, `[t]his moment 
is itself less a mater of chronology than it is of a well-nigh Freudian 
Nachträglichkeit, or retroactivity: people become aware of the dynamics of some 
new system, in which they are themselves seized, only later on'. ' 10 This is what, 
following Alvin Toffler, we may term `future shock' -a kind of traumatic 
cultural memory. For `[f]uture shock is a time phenomenon' and `[i]t arises from 
the superimposition of a new culture on an old one'. "' As postmodems we are 
all, as it were, subject to the temporality of trauma, all, like the narrator of Time's 
Arrow, `at the wrong time - either too soon, or... too late'. 
1 12 
11° Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, p. xix. 111 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (London and Sydney: Pan, 1971,1970), p. 20. 112 Time's Arrow, p. 173. 
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Chapter Four - The Eccentric Canon: 
Of a Vanishing Mediator and the 
Metaphorics of the Pleonasm in 
John Banville's Doctor Copernicus 
1: The Dawning of a New Error 
As with the novels of Kurt Vonnegut, what strikes the reader first about 
John Banville's work is always his style. Most of the reviews of his novels 
mention, if they do not actually concentrate upon, the character of his prose. This 
prose, in sharp contrast to the Vonnegutian idiolect, 'aspire[s], ' as Rüdiger Imhof 
proposes, `to the condition of poetry. " Indeed, as one Observer critic notes, 
`Barwille must be fed up being told how beautifully he writes'. 2 It is certainly a 
poetic prose and one that probably finds its apotheosis in the fictions of F. Scott 
Fitzgerald. In Banville, however, it lacks an economy of suggestion, a sometimes 
embarrassing surety of nerve, as if in the flush of stylistic failure there is an 
attempt to compensate through a superabundance of techniques and adjectives. 3 
The following passage from Doctor Copernicus is a typical example: 
1 Rüdiger Imhof John Banville: A Critical Introduction (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1997,1989), 
19. 
2 Cited on the sleeve jacket of John Banville, The Book of Evidence (London: Minerva, 1990, 
1989). 
3 Francis C. Molloy, for example, notes of Banville's style in Nightspawn that `[i]t is difficult not 
to conclude that the linguistic richness, the elaborate parody and the inventiveness of the book are 
somehow pointless and that the result does not justify the literary effort. ' Francis C. Molloy, `The 
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Andreas was handsomely made, very tall and slender, dark, 
fastidious, cold. Running or walking he moved with a languorous 
negligent grace, but it was in repose that he appeared most lovely, 
standing by a window lost in a blue dream, with his pale thin face 
lifted up to the light like a perfect vase, or a shell out of the sea, some 
exquisite fragile thing. 4 
Here Banville's attempt to pin down the irreducible quality of Andreas results in 
a procession of adjectives, each one a qualification of its predecessor, but at the 
same time an admission of a general failure to render the object in question. A 
similar pattern of insufficiency can be found at work in the similes employed here 
to describe Andreas' face, which is first like one thing, then another and then 
something else - this last being a broader conceptualization of the first two and 
therefore even further removed from the specificity of his face. In such a 
situation, the hackneyed expression `lost in a blue dream' takes on an emblematic 
status, for its stale phrasing announces the last recourse of a prose style unable to 
make the object accessible on its own terms. It is, as it were, a writing glutted on 
itself, feasting on a banquet of signifiers while the signified quietly starves. 
As an Irish writer it is tempting to attribute this feature of Banville's prose 
to what the character Hugh, from Brian Friel's Translations, describes as the 
manner in which "`certain cultures expend on their vocabularies and syntax 
Search for Truth: The Fiction of John Banville', Irish University Review, 11: 1, (1981), 29-51, 
ýp. 37). 
John Banville, Doctor Copernicus (London: Minerva, 1990,1976), p. 9. 
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acquisitive energies and ostentations entirely lacking in their material lives"'. s 
Banville, however, belongs to that tradition of Irish writers (whose most notable 
exponents are James Joyce and Samuel Beckett) which is defined, paradoxically, 
by its very rootlessness. In fact, as Banville himself claims, `if I were to look 
about for a stream to be part of I would certainly look to America or Europe'. 
Such a `stream' inevitably recalls Roland Barthes' historicization of the category 
of style discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, Banville's style might 
remind us of Barthes' comments on the French socialist realist Garaudy: 
We see that nothing here is given without metaphor, for it 
must be laboriously borne home to the reader that "it is well written". 
These metaphors, which seize the very slightest verb, in no way 
indicate the intention of an individual Humour trying to convey the 
singularity of a sensation, but only a literary stamp which "places" a 
language, just as a label tells us the price of an article. 7 
The excessive poeticization of Banville's style, however, is written in the wake 
not only of such a style itself, but also of its attendant criticisms. It is, to return to 
the passage already cited, a seemingly deliberate intemperance; one which, whilst 
not quite gratuitous, does actively flaunt the failures of its diction. This, we may 
venture, represents the elevation of the rhetorical figure of the pleonasm to the 
defining characteristic of a whole style. For the pleonasm designates a surfeit of 
s Brian Friel, Selected Plays (London: Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 418. 
6 John Barwille: A Critical Introduction, p. 10. It is Imhof who provides the most extensive 
analysis of Banville's relationship to contemporary Irish literature and he also finds little 
connection between the two, noting that 'as a conscientious artist in the second half of the 
twentieth century he must not write in the moribund modes of narrative discourse in which the 
greater part of what is being written in Ireland, but likewise in England, today presents itself. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
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language, a prodigality of signification unaccounted for by the means, as it were, 
of the referent. It denotes, in other words (and as it etymology in pleonasmos 
suggests), an excess. It is this excessive character of Banville's style which 
promotes within the reader a sense of its failure; a failure, that is, to remain within 
the proprieties of established poetic fiction (such as we find in the work of F. 
Scott Fitzgerald). For, ultimately, what the pleonasm connotes is redundancy; it 
is, quite literally, a waste of words. 
In this sense, as we shall see, the style of Doctor Copernicus offers itself 
as a paradigm and instance of the actual concerns of the novel - science and 
historiography - and can therefore be seen as one of the ways in which the logic 
of the content generates its own form. What these three themes have in common 
in Doctor Copernicus is their presentation as processes of emplotment. 
Emplotment here has a wider meaning than merely a specific concatenation of 
events, as I intend to mean by it also both the narrativization of events - that is 
their articulation and selection for insertion into narrative - and the type of 
narrative into which these events are inserted - which might broadly be conceived 
of as the discursive formation within which these will mean. Clearly these three 
functions impinge upon each other to greater or lesser degrees and thus, although 
it is necessary to distinguish between them, using the term `emplotment' in this 
collective sense avoids advertizing an autonomy of function which is misleading. 
7 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1968), p. 71. 
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The scientific tetralogy of which Doctor Copernicus is the first part (the 
others being Kepler, The Newton Letter and Mefrsto) are all concerned with the 
operations of emplotment. In The Newton Letter, for example, the 
misemplotment of events leads the protagonist to admit at its end that he 
`dreamed up a horrid drama, and failed to see the commonplace tragedy that was 
playing itself out in real life'. 8 Similarly, in Mefisto the reader is refused the 
sanction of the text for the necessary emplotment of events and thus the processes 
of a normally unconscious transaction are laid bare, caught mid-dialogue, as it 
were, between the reader and the read. Characteristically, then, Doctor 
Copernicus begins with the most fundamental moment of emplotment, which is 
the entry of the subject into language itself and the symbolic order proper: 
At first it had no name. It was the thing itself, the vivid 
thing.... 
Tree. That was its name. And also: the linden.... They did 
not mean themselves, they were nothing in themselves, they meant 
the dancing singing thing outside. 9 
Language, of course, proves to be something of a self-undoing device, a vacuity 
that can only seek plenitude outside of itself or in some provisional fuddle 
between the sign and the signifying system. Here such a fuddle consists of the 
infantile appropriation of nouns as proper names, with the child Copernicus 
attempting to dissect the flux of the real by using the resources of the symbolic as 
his instruments of precision. This precision, however, is achievable neither in the 
8 John Banville, The Newton Letter (London: Minerva, 1992,1982), p. 79. 
9 Doctor Copernicus, p. 3. 
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real nor the symbolic, as the latter mode fosters an infinity - the `And also... ' - 
which always undermines any attempt to rescue `the vivid thing' from the former. 
The shaky compromise effected by the young Copernicus here thus prefigures the 
equally shaky quest for absolutism throughout the rest of the novel, as the 
nascent discipline of science wrestles with the dialectics of concept and object. 
Banville explicitly emplots Copernicus' biography within the terms of this 
agonistic relationship, as if to indicate that the Book of the Revolutions of the 
Heavenly Spheres is a working out at the level of theory of a subjectivity stricken 
by the refusal of identity. Thus, from the very beginning we find that the 
formation of Copernicus' subjectivity is founded upon a process of evacuation, an 
emptying out of the particular self by the generality of concept: 
The voice addressing him was a hollow booming noise 
directed less at him than at an idea in Uncle Lucas's mind called 
vaguely Child, or Nephew, or Responsibility, and Nicolas could 
distinguish only the meaning of the words and not the sense of what 
was being said. [... ] He gazed intently upward through the window, 
and a part of him detached itself and floated free, out into the blue and 
golden air. Wloc lawek. It was the sound of some living thing being 
torn asunder... '0 
Here, Bishop Lucas (who quite literally assumes the mantle of the Name of the 
Father) fashions a symbolic mandate for Copernicus, crafting a place for him in 
the network of signifying relations. He does so by enacting a kind of conceptual 
violence upon Copernicus, slicing off those idiosyncrasies of the child that do not 
10 Ibid., p. 14. 
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correspond to his own ideation. As such, this scene is paradigmatic of all 
emplotment, for it describes a process of legitimation by exclusion, and one 
whose result, as the last sentence suggests, is not merely discursive, in a reductive 
sense of the word, but fully impinges upon the material conditions of its subject. 
If, in this instance, the surplus of the object refused accommodation in the 
concept is seen to wither ethereally away in the moment of neglect, Banville is 
keen to show elsewhere that such surplus is apt to re-emerge bristling with the 
violence of its own repression: 
It was the Vistula, the same that washed in vain the 
ineradicable mire of Torun - that is, the name was the same, but the 
name meant nothing. Here the river was young, as it were, a bright 
swift stream, while there it was old and weary. Yet it was at once here 
and there, young and old at once, and its youth and age were 
separated not by years but leagues. He murmured aloud the river's 
name and heard in that word suddenly the concepts of space and time 
fractured. " 
Here the process of homogenization effected by the conceptual machinery of the 
name is foregrounded as a form of violence. The equivalencing power of 
`Vistula' (that is, its very function as a name) is shown to be predicated upon an 
obdurate indifference, against which the specifics of time and space crash and 
break like minor tectonic plates subject to the exigencies of a global design. This 
play of lack and surplus, the torsion and give between language and its referents, 
is precisely the organizing principle of the dynamic that sustains the narrative of 
" Ibid., p. 20. 
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Doctor Copernicus. Which is to say that throughout the novel there persists an 
irresolvable tension between concept and object in which the lack of the object, 
its incommensurability to the concept, is matched in another moment by the lack 
in the concept, the Procrustean culpabilities of which miss the singularity of the 
object. Both sides of this equation are thus haunted by a surplus for which they 
are unable to account, a surplus that, we might say, returns as a symptom in the 
pleonastic character of Banville's style. For in the rush not to miss anything out, 
everything is included and nothing, finally, is said. 12 
This seeking after repletion, however, propels the narrative forward, both 
at the level of form and, as we shall see, at the level of content. Indeed, the extent 
to which Doctor Copernicus inherently ministers to this diachronic compulsion is 
given emblematic form by the initials `D. C. ' which end the text of the novel. 13 
These, of course, are the initials of Doctor Copernicus, but equally they signal an 
initialization - da capo - which returns us to the beginning of the text. 
14 In so 
doing, these initials designate the unresolved condition of the narrative, both its 
lack of an ending and a surplus which cannot be accounted for. By directing us, 
as readers, to describe a recursive trajectory in which we come at the same 
narrative again, Banville is gently coercing us into mimicking the paradigmatic 
action of his own prose style which likewise tropes the `same' object again and 
12 This finds an echo in Rheticus' comment that '[a]ll that mattered to [Copernicus] was the 
saying, not what was said; words were the empty rituals with which he held the world at bay'. 
Ibid., p. 176. 
13 Ibid., p. 242. 
14 Linda Hutcheon has also commented on this feature of the text, noting that 'Banville's Doctor 
Copernicus ends with "DC" - both the protagonist's initials and the (initiating/reiterating) da 
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again. `Sameness' here is, however, a species of difference, because the object in 
question (be it Andreas' face or Doctor Copernicus itself) is never more than the 
expression of a relationship between the parts of its description, what we might 
term a constellationary yield. Each new adjective added to qualify the previous 
ones, each re-reading of the narrative thus begets a difference in that 
constellation, a re-concatenation of its parts which effectively re-emplots the 
object and thereby changes it. By foregrounding this problematic at the level of 
form, Banville is directing our attention to the very conditions of language which 
so trouble the protagonists of almost all his novels15, for, as Fredric Jameson 
points out, `language can never really express any thing: only relationships or 
sheer absence'. 16 It is, he proposes, `itself a substitute, it must replace that empty 
center of content with something else, and it does so either by saying what the 
content is like (metaphor), or describing its context and the contours of its 
absence, listing the things that border around it (metonymy)'. 17 
Copernicus, of course, provides a striking example of the substitutive 
process of language, because his name, in its adjectival form, refers to an epoch 
as much as it designates a man. Indeed, history has continued the process of 
conceptualizing the signifier by disembowelling the original referent, the 
capo which refuses closure'. Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, 
Fiction (New York and London: Routledge, 1988), p-59- 15 Joseph McMinn, for example, notes that '[a]il of Banville's main characters, like their author, 
are writers looking to impose some convincing pattern on their experience of the world'. Joseph 
McMinn, 'An Exalted Naming: The Poetical Fictions of John Banville', Canadian Journal of 
Irish Studies, 14: 1, (1988), 17-27, (p. 17). 
16 Fredric Jameson, The Prison House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and 
Russian Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974,1972), p. 122. 
17 Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
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incipience of which Banville delineates in the novel. This process finds its most 
succinct expression in the successive stages of the narrative of Doctor 
Copernicus. In the first part, `Orbital Lumenque', the narrator always refers to 
Copernicus as `Nicolas'; in the second part, `Magister Ludi', he is referred to as 
`Canon Koppernigk'; while in the third part, `Cantus Mundi', now at one remove 
from the novel's narrator, he is mostly named merely as `the Canon'. By the 
fourth and final part of the novel, `Magnum Miraculum', Copernicus is refused 
any title at all by the narrator and merely assumes the personal pronoun `he', 
leaving history to appropriate the signifier of his name for other signifieds. It is 
little wonder, then, that throughout the novel Copernicus is frequently beset by 
anxieties concerning the misadventures of his title to the point where he is no 
longer `prepared to lend his name to the causing of such a disturbance'. 18 This is 
because, as he realizes, it no longer is his name, that he is no longer merely 
himself, `the vivid thing', but that he, or rather, his name, refers to a concept for 
which the quiddity of the man Copernicus is a redundant accessory. Ironically, 
there is something of this in the Gothan word (coined from Copernicus' name) 
`koeppernekesch', which Arthur Koestler describes as meaning `a far-fetched, 
cockeyed proposition', or, in other words, a concept that is incommensurable 
with its object. 19 
One of the most pertinent manifestations of this incommensurability can 
be found in the other popular spin on Copernicus' name which is its signification 
18 Doctor Copernicus, p. 185. 
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of revolution. There is a certain appositeness to this connotation, because the 
dialectic of concept and object that underwrites the narrative of Doctor 
Copernicus finds an analogy in the dialectic informing the definition of a Marxist 
revolution: 
At a certain stage of development, the material productive 
forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of 
production or - ... - with the property relations within the 
framework 
of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of 
the productive forces these relations turns into their fetters. Then 
begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic 
foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole 
immense superstructure. 20 
Form is not the passive receptacle of matter here but is the generation of a content 
restlessly seeking to realize itself in identity or Mass. It is precisely this 
restlessness that begets revolution. As Terry Eagleton notes, it is a question `of 
grasping form no longer as the symbolic mould into which... substance is poured, 
but as the "form of the content", as the structure of a ceaseless self-production'. 21 
In the light of this, an interregnum may be defined as a period in which content 
has outgrown its old form and has yet to find a new one: it is, we may say, an 
historical pleonasm. Copernicus' The Book of the Revolutions of the Heavenly 
19 Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers: A History ofMan's Changing Universe (London: 
Hutchinson & Co., 1968,1959), p. 187. 20 Karl Marx, `Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', in Early Writings, 
trans. by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1992, 
1859), pp. 424-428 (pp. 425-426). 
21 Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991,1990), p. 215. 
See also Marx's almost literary analysis of the revolutions of 1848 where he notes that `[t]he 
revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury the dead in order to realise its own 
content. There phrase transcended content, here content transcends phrase. ' Karl Marx, The 
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Spheres is one of the cultural touchstones of the interregnal period between the 
medieval and modem epochs, and throughout Doctor Copernicus there is a 
marked attention to the pleonastic character of its matrix: 
The physical world was expanding. In their quest for a sea 
route to the Indies the Portuguese had revealed the frightening 
immensity of Africa. Rumours from Spain spoke of a vast new world 
beyond the ocean to the west. Men were voyaging out to all points of 
the compass, thrusting back the frontiers everywhere. All Europe was 
in the grip of an inspired sickness whose symptoms were avarice and 
monumental curiosity, and something more, less easily defined, a 
kind of irresistible gaiety. Nicolas too was marked by the rosy 
tumours of that plague. 22 
The objective excess of Renaissance Europe, the way it spilled over its borders 
into the rest of the world, gorging on the productive surpluses of these mental and 
physical pursuits, is here given a subjective correlative in that `something more' 
which is an exuberance of spirit. Both these, in turn, find an adequate 
representational form in the pleonastic character of Banville's style which, we 
might say in this respect, corresponds to an interregnal writing - that is, a style 
with an eye to the future, pre-figuring a time when plenitude will be restored to 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. by Terrell 
Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1886,1852), pp. 31-127 (p. 34). 22 Doctor Copernicus, p. 27. It is worthwhile noting that this passage goes on to mention that '[i]n 
the writings of antiquity he glimpsed the blue and gold of Greece... and was allowed briefly to believe that there had been times when the world had known an almost divine unity of spirit and 
matter, of purpose and consequence'. This, of course, is the 'blue and gold' to which the surplus 
of the infant Copernicus flew when subject to the conceptual machinery of Uncle Lucas (see note 1). However, as Marx points out, the Mass or identity of Ancient Greece arises from an 
unrecapturable immaturity and therefore '[t]he charm of their art for us is not in contradiction to 
the undeveloped stage of society on which it grew'. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. by Martin 
Nicolaus (London: Penguin/New Left Review, 1973,1953), p. 111. 
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its signifying system and its impoverished surplus will come to have meaning. 
Banville's style, in other words, awaits emplotment. 
Indeed, we may say that the function of Copernicus qua the subject matter 
of Banville's novel is to dramatize the disciplines of the emplotment process. 
Specifically, by situating Copernicus at the arche of the Enlightenment narrative 
we risk erasing the surplus of that narrative and thus its very conditions of 
possibility. 23 In this respect, the contradictory character and history of 
Copernicus' work makes it an emblematic instance of the impoverishment 
effected by the strictures of emplotment. 24 It is in order to describe the contours 
of the absence produced by the narrativization of Copernicus and his work that 
Banville gives full play to these contradictions (of which Copernicus himself 
could be said to be the most striking exemplum): 
He said: 
"The Ptolemaic astronomy is nothing, so far as existence is 
concerned, but it is convenient for computing the inexistent. " 
But having said it, he recollected himself, and pretended, by 
assuming an expression meant to indicate bland innocence but which 
merely made him look a halfwit, that he was unaware of having put 
forward a notion which, if he believed it to be true, made nonsense of 
his life's work (for, remember, whatever they say about it now, his 
theory was based entirely upon the Ptolemaic astronomy - was 
indeed, as he pointed out himself, no more than a revision of Ptolemy, 
at least in its beginnings). 25 
23 Bertrand Russell's comment is typical when he states that '[t]our great men - Copernicus, 
Kepler, Galileo, and Newton - are pre-eminent in the creation of science'. Bertrand Russell, ff, story of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1995,1946), p. 512. 
Cocerned with tracing the historical fidelity of Banville's account of Copernicus, Wini Warren 
opines that he subsequently found it difficult `to tell what is accurate in any historical account, 
fictional or otherwise'. Wini Warren, `The Search for Copernicus in History and Fiction', 
Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 76: 2-3, (1993), 383-406, (p. 384). 
25 Doctor Copernicus, p. 186. 
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As Rheticus (himself an emarginated figure) informs the reader here, the 
Copernican theory of the universe is essentially a reading of Ptolemy, rather than 
a radical departure from it, despite the fact that the former is heliocentric and the 
latter geocentric in conception. This is because Copernicus was firmly located in 
the residual Middle Ages' tradition of Aristotelianism and hence of Ptolemaic 
wheel-geometry which, during his life-time, was under interrogation by the 
emergent strain of Pythagorean Platonism. The dominance of either culture was 
to some extent geographical (with Italy favouring the latter and Northern Europe 
the former), as well as institutionally based (with Catholicism at first fostering the 
new Platonism and then, in response to the Reformation, slowly refusing it, just 
as the Protestant countries, freed up by weaker national churches, had no option 
but to let it flower). One of the results of this cultural ecumenicalism was that 
parts of the ancient tradition hitherto refused emplotment in the narrative of that 
tradition, such as Aristarchus (who was probably the first to propose the 
`Copernican' system), were henceforth accommodated in an open dialogue with 
the more established ancients. Thus, in Copernicus' time heliocentric theories 
had established themselves as something of an undertow below the Ptolemaic 
current, as Koestler notes: 
It is highly unlikely, though, that Copernicus should have 
stumbled on his ideas simply by browsing through the ancient 
philosophers. Talk of a moving earth, of the earth as a planet or a 
star, was becoming increasingly frequent in the days of his youth. 26 
26 Sleepwalkers, p. 205. 
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Of course, the curious publication by hearsay of the Book of the Revolutions of 
the Heavenly Spheres described in Doctor Copernicus contributed to this 
heliocentric structure of feeling However, the impulse behind this epoch-making 
book was essentially conservative, as the character of Doctor Copernicus reveals: 
Thus, when I put it to him that he had a duty to publish, if 
only to demonstrate the errors in Ptolemy, he shook a trembling 
finger at me and cried: 
"We must follow the methods of the ancients! Anyone who 
thinks they are not to be trusted will squat forever in the wilderness 
outside the locked gates of our science, dreaming the dreams of the 
deranged about the motions of the spheres - and he will get what he 
deserves for thinking he can support his own ravings by slandering 
the ancients! "27 
Clearly, then, Copernicus wished to save the Ptolemaic tradition, in much the 
same way that he wished to `save the phenomena', to the point where, as Koestler 
memorably proposes, `[i]f Aristotle had stated that God created only birds, Canon 
Koppemigk would have described homo sapiens as a bird without feathers and 
wings who hatches his eggs before laying them'. 28 Far from facilitating its 
delivery, therefore, one of the `fathers' of modern science did all he could to abort 
it. 
27 Doctor Copernicus, p. 184. This is an approximation of a letter written by Copernicus and 
quoted in Sleepwalkers, p. 200. Z Sleepwalkers, p. 212. 
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In order to understand this apparent paradox, we might profitably take a 
detour through Jameson's analysis of Max Weber's critique of historical 
materialism. Briefly, this critique consists in the claim that Protestantism was the 
condition of possibility for the emergence of capitalism. Such a claim, of course, 
inverts the traditional Marxist hierarchy in which the base gives rise to the 
superstructure. Thus, rather than submitting to the vulgar Marxist thesis that `life 
is made less religious by a new theological doctrine (Protestantism) that 
systematically dismantles the traditional medieval religious structures and allows 
wholly secular ones to take their place', Weber contends that Protestantism was 
the universalization of a hitherto localized religious way of life. 
29 Subjecting 
Weber's argument to a narratological exposition, Jameson proposes that we 
distinguish between `two distinct moments of Protestantism, the theology of 
Luther and that of Calvin'. 0 If Calvin brought new content to theology, Luther's 
contribution to the universalization of this theology was no less decisive when, by 
shutting down the monasteries, he liberated the monks' fledgling instrumentality 
and allowed it to spread throughout all areas of a hitherto secular life. 
Protestantism, conceived in this way, effectively rationalized the Lebenswelt and 
prepared it for the advent of wholescale capitalism. In so doing, of course, it 
expedited its own obsolescence. The pertinence of this theory to Doctor 
Copernicus proceeds not from its content-level diagnosis (although it has no 
small bearing on this) but, rather, the manner in which it articulates Protestantism 
29 Fredric Jameson, `The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as Storyteller', in The Ideologies of 
Theory -1971-1986: Volume 2- Syntax of History, Fredric Jameson (London: Routledge, 1988), 
pp. 3-34 (p. 23). 
Ibid., p. 23. 
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at the level of form as a `vanishing mediator'. In other words, Jameson 
understands Weber to have emplotted Protestantism as the vehicle of 
transformation within the narrative which charts the trajectory from the medieval 
to the modem: 
It is thus in the strictest sense of the word a catalytic agent 
that permits an exchange between two otherwise mutually exclusive 
terms; and we may say that... the whole institution of religion itself 
(in other words, what is here designated as "Protestantism") serves in 
its turn as a kind of overall bracket or framework within which 
change takes place and which can be dismantled and removed when 
its usefulness is over. 31 
On a lesser scale, but in the same mould, Copernicus too is something of a 
vanishing mediator. Harried all over Europe, he is a scandalous excess to both 
the old and new orders in Banville's novel, for he commits the error of taking 
Ptolemy seriously. Indeed, rather than heeding Professor Brudzewski's advice to 
`save the phenomena', he attempts to save astronomy itself. 32 To this end, his 
perpetuation of the Ptolemaic system to its absolute limits, like Calvin's 
religionalization of everyday life, ironically, of course, paved the way for its 
obsoleteness. 
What is crucial to recognize here is that a vanishing mediator is produced 
by the asymmetry of content and form. As with Marx's analysis of revolution, 
form lags behind content here, in the sense that content changes within the 
31 Ibid., p. 25. 32 Doctor Copernicus, p. 29. 
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parameters of an existing form, until the logic of that content works its way out to 
the latter and throws off its husk, revealing a new form in its stead. Commenting 
on Jameson's essay, Slavoj Zilek proposes a similar distinction: 
[T]he passage from feudalism to Protestantism is not of the 
same nature as the passage from Protestantism to bourgeois everyday 
life with its privatized religion. The first passage concerns "content" 
(under the guise of preserving the religious form or even its 
strengthening, the crucial shift - the assertion of the ascetic- 
acquisitive stance in economic activity as the domain of the 
manifestation of Grace - takes place), whereas the second passage is 
a purely formal act, a change of form (as soon as Protestantism is 
realized as the ascetic-acquisitive stance, it can fall off as form). 33 
The contradictory character and history of the Copernican theory, then, stems 
from a similar lack of correspondence between content and form. It is, in the first 
moment, the working out of a new content (heliocentrism) within an old form 
(geocentrism); in the second moment, however, the old form outlives its utility 
and falls away. Copernicus' theory is thus neither the telos of medieval science, 
nor the arche of modern science, but the vanishing mediator between the two. 
Banville's fictional biography of Copernicus can therefore be understood as a 
testament to this status because it is the person of Copernicus himself who most 
clearly embodies this contradiction. He is, as it were, the old form within which 
the new content takes shape. In other words, he is the surplus of the narrative of 
modern science, the excess which fails to find emplotment within that story but 
yet which is necessary to its telling. The pleonastic form of Doctor Copernicus is 
 Slavoj Lilek, For They Know Not What They Do: Fi joyment As A Political Factor (London: 
Verso, 1991), p. 185. 
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thus, paradoxically, the form most suited to narrating the biography of its 
redundant subject. 
2: Just A Phrase We're Going Through 
If Copernicus' aim in writing The Book of the Revolutions of the Heavenly 
Spheres was essentially to apply a corrective measure to the work of Ptolemy, his 
rubric for this task was an aesthetic one. In the opening pages of the 
Commentariolus he outlines the absolute standards against which any 
astronomical system may be adjudged: 
Our ancestors assumed a large number of celestial spheres 
for a special reason: to explain the apparent motion of the planets by 
the principle of regularity. For they thought it altogether absurd that a 
heavenly body should not always move with uniform velocity in a 
perfect circle. 4 
For Copernicus, the problem with Ptolemy's system was that although the circles 
were perfect their velocity was, in fact, irregular and could only be made to seem 
otherwise by utilizing punctum equans - an astronomical sleight-of-hand that 
required the observer to assume a point in space in relation to the motion of a 
particular planet. As Copernicus laments, `a system of this sort seemed neither 
sufficiently absolute nor sufficiently pleasing to the mind'. 35 Indeed, it was 
sa Sleepwalkers, p. 202. 
35 Ibid., p. 202. 
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precisely this insufficiency, the lack of correspondence obtaining between 
concept and object, that set Copernicus on his epoch-making venture: 
Having become aware of these defects, I often considered 
whether there could not perhaps be found a more reasonable 
arrangement of circles... in which everything would move uniformly 
about its proper centre, as the rule of absolute motion requires. 36 
What strikes the reader about this statement is not so much the inaccuracies upon 
which it is based (that the planets move on epicycles of epicycles rather than 
Ptolemy's beloved circles), but that the criterion for Copernicus's judgement is 
aesthetic as opposed to scientific. He is not concerned, as we might expect, to 
elaborate evidential procedures but, instead to formulate a theory whose rubric is 
the uniformity of the circle. 
Indeed, to be specific, we might observe that the concept of the beautiful, 
rather than sublimity, constitutes the organizing principle of Copernicus' science; 
for in his obsession with uniformity, perfection and the absolute, he is registering 
a desire for order and finality, unity and harmony which are the central 
characteristic of the beautiful. This desire finds its most intimate expression in 
Doctor Copernicus through the feelings of embarrassment that crowd in on 
Copernicus during the novel, as the revenant of his brother reminds him: 
361bfd., p. 203. 
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It was always your stormiest emotion, that fastidious, that 
panic-stricken embarrassment in the face of the disorder and vulgarity 
of the commonplace, which you despised. 37 
As is implied here, embarrassment is the coming to consciousness of disorder; it 
is a laying bare of the compulsion to order or emplot the chaos and flux of the 
apparent world within the imaginary confines of a narrative. In other words, 
embarrassment constitutes a moment of fracture of the beautiful, a dehiscence, 
manifest in the moment, of the sublimity chafing at the edges and boundaries of 
that narrative. In this sense, the beautiful could be said to be emplotted within the 
sublime and therefore be contained by it, as is expressed by the etymology of 
`embarrassment', a word that finds its matrix in the Italian verb `imbarrare', 
meaning `to confine within bars'. This succinctly expresses the insularity of 
Copernicus's Ptolemaic vision (a feature represented in the novel by his own 
personal hermetic existence), yet at the same time reveals how its very definition 
depended upon what it decried and, ultimately, could not ignore. 
We may develop this analysis further by noting that embarrassment is also 
a disclosure of an ex-centric determination, for in the anxiety of the embarrassed 
subject there is an implicit recognition of his/her constitution as a subject by the 
gaze of the Other. Which is to say that, in this instance, Copernicus is caught 
('confined within bars') by the gaze of Andreas, the placeholder of the symbolic, 
and thus subjected he is forced to acknowledge his lack of autonomy in the form 
of embarrassment. Copernicus' quest for a non-alienated identity runs throughout 
37 Doctor Copernicus, p. 238. 
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the novel, but the processes of introjection (ensuing from the polyvalent gaze that 
always indexes the proximity of the Other) are shown to out-run it at every turn: 
However much he tried not to be, Nicolas was glad of his 
brother's going; now perhaps at last, relieved of the burden of 
Andreas's intolerable presence, he would be permitted to become the 
real self he had all his life wished to be. 
But what was that mysterious self that had eluded him 
always? He could not say. 38 
Copernicus `cannot say' here because subjectivity is not a self-grounding cogito 
but, rather, an ex-centric determination which is always Other (or other) to itself. 
Such Otherness is given material form in the death-bed scene at the end of the 
novel when Andreas re-appears to Copernicus as an hallucination and remarks of 
`the thing itself' hat, `You glimpsed it briefly in our father, in sister Barbara, in 
Fracastaro, in Anna Schillings, in all the others, and even, yes, in me'. 39 The ex- 
centric truth of Copernicus, in other words, is disclosed ex-centrically: as Andreas 
points out, `It is not I who have said all these things today, but you'. 4° 
This paradigm of ex-centricity, upon which we might say the whole of 
Banville's novel turns, finds a cosmological manifestation in Copernicus' 
discovery of elliptical orbits. However, this discovery itself takes on an elliptical 
form in The Book of the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres: 
38lbid., pp. 65-66. 
39 Ibid., p. 241. 
40 Ibid., p. 241. 
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It should be noticed, by the way, that if the two circles have 
different diameters, other conditions remaining unchanged, then the 
resulting movement will not be a straight line but... an ellipse. 4' 
Elliptical circles are, of course, the actual forms of all planetary orbits but, as 
Koestler notes, this passage was crossed out on the original manuscript and was 
never published. It thus became an ellipsis (from which `ellipse' is a back 
formation), an omission from the text that is indexed by the very ellipsis ('... an 
ellipse') that precedes its presentation. An ellipse is that most unnatural of forms 
for Copernicus, a non-concentric orbit; which is to say that it is ex-centric, it is an 
orbit around nothing, for there is no stabilizing centre. This is precisely the 
condition of the Book of the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres which omits the 
moment of absolution, or correspondence that Copernicus sought between 
concept and object for one of inadequation that leaves a lack at the very heart, or 
centre, of his work. The irony of this may be said to lie in the fact that the 
conscious disavowal of the elliptical form of the orbit is a ventriloquizing of his 
refusal of the elliptical, or ex-centric, constitution of his subjectivity. Thus, his 
life-work is disabled by its enabling conditions (in other words, his subjectivity) 
just at the point when a correspondence between the two would have yielded a 
realization of the truth of those conditions. 
This interesting possibility is re-articulated in a different form by Banville 
when he makes Rheticus the agency of ellipsis: 
41 Sleepwalkers, p. 21. 
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[T]here was little more for me in this scribbling than aching 
knuckles, and the occasional, malicious pleasure of correcting his 
slips (I crossed out that nonsensical line in which he speculated on the 
possibility of elliptical orbits - elliptical orbits, for God's sake! 
42 
Here the amanuensis ('the slave at hand') displaces his master, Copernicus, 
literally making him ex-centric to his own work and thus the absent cause of it. 
The elliptical presence of Copernicus within his elliptical text is fully ironized by 
Banville, ex-centrically as it were, in the novel Kepler where Copernicus' theory 
on elliptical orbits reappears in disembodied form ('[W]as it a premonition 
glimpsed in some forgotten dream? ' wonders Kepler) as the value 0.00429 43 
This is the ratio of the radius of an ellipse to the circle that contains it at the 
thickest point of the overlap, which, for our purposes, expresses the absence at the 
heart of the circles that obsessed Copernicus and represented the truth of the 
planetary orbit he attempted, but failed, to disclose. 44 
Clearly, then, there is a level in Doctor Copernicus at which the economy 
of surplus and lack informs both the subject and the theory of Copernicus. 
Indeed, Banville is keen to demonstrate that this rubric of ex-centricity finds its 
deftest expression in the most celebrated aspect of Copernicus' work which is the 
over-arching architecture of his cosmos: 
42 Doctor Copernicus, p. 202. 
a' John Banville, Kepler (London: Minerva, 1990,1981), p. 151. 
44 For a more detailed account of the mathematical relationship obtaining between elliptical and 
circular orbits see Sleepwalkers, pp. 331-332. 
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You imagine that Koppernigk set the sun at the centre of the 
universe, don't you? He did not. The centre of the universe 
according to his theory is not the sun, but the centre of Earth's orbit, 
which as the great, the mighty, the all-explaining Book of Revolutions 
admits, is situated at a point in space some three times the Sun's 
diameter distant from the Sun! All the hypotheses, all the 
calculations, the star tables and diagrams, the entire ragbag of lies and 
half truths and self-deceptions which is De revolutionbus orbium 
mundi... was assembled simply in order to prove that at the centre of 
all there is nothing, that the world turns upon chaos. 45 
If doxa maintains that the Copernican system is heliocentric, then Banville is 
keen to foreground the fact here that it is rather more vacuo-centric. 46 By 
contrasting the received conviction about Copernicus' theory ('You imagine... 
don't you? ') with its actuality, Banville succeeds in adding yet another layer of 
ex-centricity to those we have already seen at work in the text. The fact that the 
concept of the theory is not equivalent to the theory itself, exemplifies the manner 
in which an astigmatic content finds its own form. 
As doxa also maintains, the most important result of Copernicus' 
theorization (in relation to its ex-centric organization) is that implicit in this 
vacuo-centric topology is the re-settling of humanity on the margins of the 
universe. Indeed, not only is humanity unable to assume any anthropocentric 
status in relation to its known environment, but also, in charting the course of the 
world upon chaos, Copernicus effectively obviated any stable notion of hierarchy 
45 Doctor Copernicus, pp. 217-218. 
46 As an example of such doxa we may take the following which defines the Copernican system as 
the theory `which stated that the earth and the planets rotated around the sun and which opposed 
the Ptolemaic system'. Patrick Hanks, ed. The Collins English Dictionary (London and Glasgow: 
Collins, 1986,1979). This is, of course, inaccurate on both counts. 
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at all. As Koestler argues, [t]he Copernican universe... has no natural centre of 
orientation to which everything else can be referred'. 7 The subjective effects of 
such a polycentric universe manifest themselves, for Rheticus, in a form of 
collective anxiety analogous to the embarrassment felt by Copernicus: 
What was it he said to me? -first they will laugh, and then 
weep, seeing their Earth diminished, spinning upon the void... He 
knew, he knew. They are weeping now, bowed down under the 
burden of despair with which he loaded them. I am weeping. I 
believe in nothing. The mirror is shattered. The chaos48 
It is difficult not to detect in the penultimate image of the shattered mirror here 
the fracturing of an imaginary universe, as the ego is expelled from its seat at the 
centre of the cosmos. 49 No longer able to view the universe in terms of itself, the 
Copernican subject is threatened by an infinity which is by definition always 
beyond it. Re-articulating this within the rubric employed earlier, we may note 
that where once the cosmos was beautiful, after Copernicus it became sublime. 50 
Thus, despite Copernicus' attempt to subsume the cosmos within a narrative of 
47 Sleepwalkers, p. 217. 
48 Doctor Copernicus, p. 218. It is perhaps worthwhile noting that in my edition and in every other 
edition I have consulted, the last full-stop is missing from this passage. If it is not a printing error 
tor, indeed, even if it is) this absence finds a thematic resonance in the void under discussion. 
9 This imaginary motif is given full play throughout the novel, such as when Copernicus laments 
that "`you make a mirror, thinking that in it shall be reflected the reality of the world; but then you 
understand that the mirror reflects only appearances, and that reality is somewhere else, off behind 
the mirror; and then you remember that behind the mirror there is only the chaos'. Ibid., p. 209. 
In the light of this it is perhaps instructive to invoke Jameson's description of Lacan's work as a 
`Copernican attempt to assign to the subject an ec-centric position with respect to language as a 
whole'. Fredric Jameson, `Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan', in The Ideologies oj7heory - 
1971-1986: Volume 1-Situations of Theory, Fredric Jameson (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 75- 
115 (p. 95). 
50 This is a point echoed by Koestler when he notes that `once the apparent daily round of the 
firmament was explained by the earth's rotation, the stars could recede to any distance.... The 
sky no longer had a limit, infinity opened its gaping jaws, and Pascal's "libertin" seized by cosmic 
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the beautiful, it was actually the sublimity that was liminal to that emplotment 
which came to define his enterprise. 
What is clear, then, is that it is not so much Copernicus' success but his 
failure which has the fullest implications for the history that follows. What is 
meant by this may be understood, as we noted earlier, in terms of the position 
assigned to Copernicus by that history as the arche of modem science. Banville's 
Copernicus, however, is less sure, not only of his own position but of the 
narrative as a whole when he declares: `My book is not science - it is a dream. I 
am not even sure if science is possible. '51 This is because the possibility of 
science for Copernicus is always mitigated by the fact of mediation, whereas for 
him it should be a project predicated upon the adequation of concept to object. 
Indeed, throughout the novel the narrator makes constant recourse to the fact that 
`[h]e was after the thing itself now, the unadorned, the stony thing'. 52 However, 
as the adjective `stony' implicitly acknowledges, Copernicus's endeavour in 
trying to arrest the slippage of surplus and lack is always-already forestalled at 
the level of mediation. We may observe this problematic im-mediation more 
clearly when it is articulated as a simile, such as in the phrase `the true thing, a 
cold brilliant object like a diamond'. 53 As we can see here, there is, of course, no 
way of accessing the `true' thing other than ex-centrically, for how can it be the 
`true' thing if it is also like a diamond at the same time that it is not a diamond. 
agoraphobia, was to cry out a century later: "Le silence etemel de ces espaces ii f n1is m'etfraie! " 
Sleepwalkers, pp. 216-217. 51 Doctor Copernicus, p. 207. 
52 Ibid., p. 110. 
281 
Copernicus' despair towards the end of the novel can thus be accounted for 
precisely in terms of his failure to excavate the thing-in-itself, that is, the 
noumenal cosmos. 
When Copernicus cries out from his death-bed delirium, then, for the 
`Word! 0 word! Thou word that I lack! ', he is appealing for the transcendental 
signifier which would cut through the mediation that bridles the possibility of his 
conception of science. It is only recently that scientific discourse has relented in 
accommodating this fact by way of acknowledging that it is precisely that -a 
discourse. Notable variants upon this theme include GSdel's theorem, which may 
be summarized as the `il nya pas hors de texte' of mathematics, and 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which avers that mediation is inherent to 
observation. Of more particular concern here is the significant stream of work 
produced over the last couple of decades which has sought to delineate the 
necessitous practice of emplotting scientific fact within a narrative form which 
thus contaminates it with the very modes of aesthetic representation its cognitive 
procedures are meant to disable. Indeed, much of this work (such as that 
proposed by Evelyn Fox Keller and Roald Hoffman) has tended to register this 
latter point as the scotoma of a discursive regime keen to privilege its practices 
above others and that it is therefor a constitutive blindness. 54 For example, as B. 
Latour and S. Woolgar note, the objectivity of scientific research is fostered by a 
s' Ibid., p. 169. sa As Jon Turney notes, `[s]ome scientists seem to regard cultural analysis as criticism only in the 
pejorative sense. Tell them that they use metaphors to ground their theorising, for example, and 
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process of what they term `deindexicalisation' in which repeated utilizations of a 
piece of research will bleach away all deictic markers, such as authors, dates, 
places and even pronouns, until it is rendered utterly decontextualized as a free- 
55 standing fact 
Clearly, then, while the terms `beauty' and `sublimity' have so far been 
utilized as analogues of scientific reasoning there is also a sense in which this 
betokens the imbrication of reason and aesthetics within science in a far more 
literal manner. Thus, if at one level Copernicus' work is a negotiation with what 
is sublime to its own conceptualization (in other words, what is symptomatic in 
Ptolemy's Almagest) it serves as an instance of the kind of narrative refinement 
that is exigent upon the modem natural sciences of which he is apparently a 
founder. For what Banville adumbrates in Doctor Copernicus are precisely the 
aesthetic foundations of science that have been expunged from its official 
discourse. In a more literal sense, these foundations are (as Copernicus is) the 
vanishing mediators of science. In recent years this idea has been given 
expression by Thomas Kuhn's influential analysis, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. Kuhn argues that paradigm shifts have only occurred at certain 
receptive historical moments, not just when the `facts' have been known, and 
that, furthermore, a condition of such receptivity is largely aesthetic: 
they take it as a slight rather than as an observation about how theorising is possible. ' hie Times 
Higher Education Supplement, 9 February 1996, p. 16. 
55 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Los Angeles: Sage, 1979), passim. 
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There must also be a basis, though it need be neither rational 
nor ultimately correct, for faith in the particular candidate chosen. 
Something must make at least a few scientists feel that the new 
proposal is on the right track, and sometimes it is only personal and 
inarticulate aesthetic considerations that can do that. Men have been 
converted by them at times when most of the articulable technical 
arguments pointed the other way. When first introduced, neither 
Copernicus' astronomical theory nor De BroFlie's theory of matter 
had many other significant grounds of appeal. 5 
What seems to be at stake in Kuhn's description here is the privileging of taste 
and trust over tests and truth. 57 Of course, any fiduciary bond struck upon the 
anvil of personal worth is as equally warped by the aesthetics of representation as 
it is by the ex-centricity of the subject. The value of Kuhn's work proceeds from 
its laying bare the device, as it were; its highlighting of the fact that the 
subsequent operations of deindexicalization stand in stark contrast to the initial 
processes of validation that scientific research is subject to. 58 Doctor Copernicus, 
as a fictional biography, would thus seem to offer itself as the pre-eminent 
medium for reindexicalizing the vanishing mediators of science, both because it 
56 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, god edn. (London and Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974,1962), p. 158. 
s' On the matter of taste in the sciences, Eric Hobsbawm notes that `in the conceptual debris on 
which the twentieth century sciences were built one basic and essentially aesthetic assumption 
was not challenged. Indeed, as uncertainty clouded all the others, it became increasingly central 
to scientists. Like the poet Keats, they believed that "Beauty is truth, truth beauty", although their 
criterion was not his. A beautiful theory, which was in itself a presumption of truth, must be 
elegant, economical and general. It must unify and simplify, as the great triumphs of scientific 
theory had hitherto done. ' Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century - 
1914-1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), p. 540. 
s$ Rom Harre has characterized these initial processes as test of personal worth, where character 
assumes the status of an epistemological proof: `When philosophers carry on their discussions of 
science in terms of the official or strict system they are not describing either the cognitive or the 
material practices of the scientific community, even in ideal form. They are describing a rhetoric 
and an associated set of narrative conventions for presenting a story in which rival teams of 
scientists appear as heroes and villains. ' Rom Hari-6, 'Some Narrative Conventions of Scientific 
Discourse', in Narrative in Culture: The Uses of Storytelling in the Sciences, Philosophy, and 
Literature, Christopher Nash (London: Routledge, 1994,1990), pp. 81-101(p. 95). 
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foregrounds its status as narrative, and because it reinvigorates the subjective 
matrix of scientific truth. 
Doctor Copernicus, we might say then, enacts a return to the conditions of 
possibility of science, both in the sense that it elaborates the hidden assumptions 
upon which it is based and in the sense that it articulates the contradictions of the 
hidden founder of its discourse. At a diegetic level the figure for this return in the 
novel is the circle, a motif which Rheticus ultimately ascribes to Copernicus: 
If he believed that Man could redeem himself, he saw in - 
how shall I say - in immobility the only possible means toward that 
end. His world moved in circles, endlessly, and each circuit was a 
repetition exactly of all the others, past and future, to the extremities 
of time: which is no movement at all. 59 
This, clearly enough, represents the imaginary time of self-replication. However, 
Copernicus (whom we have already noted as an `old form') is contrasted with 
Rheticus here for whom the past always comes form the future. As he boasts of 
his symbolic temporality, `when I speak of the present, I am as it were looking 
backward, into what is, for me, already the past'. 60 The significance of this lies in 
the fact that Rheticus is also a narrator in the novel, and indeed, the temporal 
framework he outlines is particular to all narrators of the past tense. In this 
respect we may say that the novel sets up a distinction between the temporality of 
Copernicus and that of the narrator. Specifically, it may be proposed that this 
59 Doctor Copernicus, p. 204. 
60 Ibid., p. 204. 
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distinction finds expression in the contrasting figures of return maintained at the 
diegetic and exegetic levels of the text. If the figure for the former level is that of 
the circle, then the figure for the latter level is that of the anachronism 61 
On one plane, this figure finds expression in the anachronistic facts of the 
portrayal of Copernicus in Banville's novel. Copernicus' Aristotelianism 
belonged to a residual medievalism, while his heliocentrism formed part of the 
emergent culture of the Renaissance and has since been recuperated as the arche 
of Enlightenment science. If the theory of heliocentricity enacted a kind of 
topographical violence upon the Earth (that is, relocated it out of place), then this 
anachorism is matched on the temporal plane by a similar dislocation which finds 
Copernicus out of time. Torn asunder from their matrix and re-emplotted in the 
narrative of modernity, Copernicus and his theory are made to mean, ex- 
centrically as it were, in another time. The anachronism, in other words, is 
central to the themes and concerns of Doctor Copernicus. Its formal pertinence 
proceeds from the manner in which it facilitates the disengagement of the subject 
from an imaginary circle of history and, instead, fosters a sense of historicity. As 
Theodor Adorno comments, `[b]ecause no other truth can be expressed than that 
which is able to fill the subject, anachronism becomes the refuge of modernity '. 62 
The anachronism, we might say, jolts the subject out of its self and into the Other. 
61 It is worthwhile pointing out that for Imhof the function of the 'circular patterns in the novel' is 
to `effect a reiterative narrative progression that imitates the orbital motions of the planets'. John 
Banville: A Critical Introduction, p. 104. 
62 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. by E. F. N. Jephcott 
(London: Verso, 1874,1951), p. 221. Indeed, in the light of this it may be ventured that Doctor 
Copernicus does not so much rehearse the antagonisms between medieval and modern ways of 
thinking, as those between the modern and the postmodern. 
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It is a mode of historical testimony not of the subject's time, but of the 
temporality of the symbolic. 
Indeed, in Doctor Copernicus the anachronism comes to figure as 
precisely that point of excess which expedites a wholesale revaluation of the rest 
of the narrative. A simple example of this is the description of Albrecht: 
Grand Master Albrecht was a small quick reptile-like man 
with a thin dark face and pointed ears lying flat against his skull. His 
heavy quilted doublet and tight breeches gave him the look of a well- 
fed lizard. A gold medallion bearing the insignia of the Order hung 
by a heavy chain on his breast. (It was said that he was impotent. )63 
The juxtaposition of the `gold medallion' with the rumour of impotency is a 
reference to the contemporary myth of the "medallion man"- a middle aged man 
who advertizes a sexual potency he is unable to deliver. This excess of 
signification is replicated at the level of form here, for the emplotment of the 
anachronism within a historical narrative is equally surplus to its identity. The 
parentheses employed by Banville are also symptomatic; they designate an 
intervention in a narrative which breaches and thereby qualifies the identity thus 
far established by that narrative. In deliberately foregrounding the lack of 
identity, Banville's utilization of the anachronism thus works to augment the 
operations of the dialectic between surplus and lack noted earlier in the analysis 
of the novel's form. In particular here, the anachronism gives rise to an avowedly 
historical self-consciousness, for quite clearly the conflation of references several 
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hundred years apart institutes a problematization of the historical coherence of the 
narrative. Which is to say that as the `medallion' reference is obviously 
heterogeneous to its given field (a contemporary reader could date it precisely 
from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s), we are pressed into a cognizance, not only 
of our inhabitance of the present and its discontinuity from the past (and hence 
our distance from that past), but also of an alterity inhabiting the text manifest as 
a sense of history. 64 In this sense, the anachronism is the paradigmatic mode of 
historicization, as its recognition is predicated upon an acknowledgement of 
temporal differentiation. 
A more subtle variety of anachronism can be found in the use Banville 
makes of quotations. In particular here we might note the dialogue between 
Copernicus and Rheticus in which they both literally ventriloquize the words of 
other historical figures: 
The Canon was standing at my shoulder. [... ] When he 
spoke, the words seemed to come, slowly, from a long way off. He 
said: 
"If at the foundation of all there lay only a wildly seething 
power which, writhing with obscure passions, produced everything 
that is great and everything that is insignificant, if a bottomless void 
63 Doctor Copernicus, p. 134. 
64 Paradoxically, then, an anachronistic text yields a more compelling historicity than a contrasting 
one with an historical narrative whose attempt to be utterly 'faithful' to the past yields an 
imaginary history. This is a point picked up on by Steven Connor when, in analysing A. S. Byatt's 
Possession: A Romance, he argues that `the willingness to be possessed by the past is inseparable 
from the more acquisitive desire to be possessed of it. The elaborately constructed simulations of 
nineteenth-century prose [in Byatt's novel] are a testimony to a characteristically twentieth- 
century form of egocentricity, which confirms itself not by exclusion but by assimilation of what 
is other to it. The virtues and attentive humility before the thisness of the past is... never 
absolutely to be distinguished from the virtuoso appropriation of it. ' Steven Connor, The English 
Novel in History; 10950-1995 (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 148. 
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never satiated lay hidden beneath all, what then would life be but 
despair? " 
I said: 
"I hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the 
ancients dreamed. s65 
The quotations here from Kierkgaard and Einstein respectively are also abetted 
by ones from Sir Arthur Eddington, Max Planck and Wallace Stevens. What is 
striking about these quotations is precisely their status as anachronisms. Whilst at 
one level Banville tries to alert the reader with the written nod and a wink of `the 
words seemed to come, slowly, from a long way off' nd the stilted, italicized 
conduct of the conversation, at another level the reader - this reader - is quite 
ignorant of the source of the quotations. Indeed, it is only the rather misleadingly 
helpful `Notes' at the end of the novel which delineates their actual matrix. The 
significance of this is that there is nothing inherent in the quotations which 
distinguishes them as anachronistic in relation to the rest of narrative. If on the 
one hand this promotes an awareness of historical context, then, on the other 
hand, it also invokes a cognizance of the temporality which underwrites the 
anachronism. For, in order to establish these anachronisms as such, we must 
return from `outwith' the novel (that is, from the `Notes') back into the text and 
reappraise them anew. By so doing we are mimicking the process of the 
anachronism which also returns out of context to reinvigorate its field of 
meaning. In this sense Doctor Copernicus is not so much an historical, as an 
historicizing fiction, for it not only elaborates a historical subject but also the very 
structures of historicity which expedite that project in the first place. 
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Finally, we may perhaps aver that the anachronism indexes the persistence 
of the subject in Doctor Copernicus. Heterogeneous to its field, the anachronism 
represents a point preceding symbolization, that is, a point before integration 
within the symbolic network. As such, its situation is analogous to Jean-Francois 
Lyotard's `event' or, more pertinently, to the status of the vanishing mediator 
before it has vanished. It thus discloses a moment of `openness' in history, a time 
before which the narrative of that history has retroactively emplotted it within a 
linear story. This `openness' is what constitutes the subject, for it is what 
maintains an alterity to the `objectivity' of the symbolic network (at least anterior 
to its incorporation by that network). The subject, in other words, is what is ex- 
centric to the symbolic; it is, as Zizek proposes, `a name for that unfathomable X 
called upon, suddenly made accountable, thrown into a position of responsibility, 
into the urgency of decision in such a moment of undecidability'. 
66 Doctor 
Copernicus is a narrativization of this `moment of undecidability'; it tells the 
story of an `openness' before which Copernicus came to be designated the arche 
of modem science. 7 The anachronisms of his character and theory can thus be 
seen as what Michel De Certeau designates as `lapses in the syntax constructed 
by the law of a place', lapses which `symbolize a return of the repressed, that is, a 
return of what at a given moment, has become unthinkable in order for a new 
65 Doctor Copernicus, p. 208. 
66 For They Know Not What They Do, p. 189. 
67 Much of that story is concerned to elaborate the lengthy period of time during which 
Copernicus refused to publish his theory and thereby refused his subsequent symbolization. It is 
little wonder, then, that Copernicus disappears as a name from the novel towards its end, nor that 
he spends most of Part Four on his death-bed, because, as publication approached, so did 
symbolization and hence his disappearance as a subject in the sense outlined here. 
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identity to become thinkable' 68 The novel returns to Copernicus his status as an 
historical pleonasm, the unthinkable excess of science and, in doing so, it returns 
him his subjectivity. Indeed, we might say that the genre of historical biography 
finds its most apposite expression in Doctor Copernicus because, ultimately, the 
subject of the novel is the subject itself. 
68 Michel De Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. by Tom Conley (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988,1975), p. 4. 
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Conclusion: 
The Tense of an Ending 
Wishing to exercise the power of amnesty vested in her, a prison governor 
gathers together three prisoners in a room and makes them sit down in a triangle. 
She places on the head of each a randomly chosen hat from a total selection of 
five hats, three of which are white and two of which are black. The colour of 
each hat is invisible to the person who wears it. She then informs the prisoners 
that she will release the first prisoner who can identify the colour of his own hat, 
a fact which he must signify by getting up and leaving the room. In the tension of 
the room, three possibilities emerge. 
The first possibility is that one prisoner is wearing a white hat and the 
other two black hats. The white-hatted prisoner can, in this instance, immediately 
see that both black hats are being worn and thus quickly exit the room. The 
second possibility is that there are two white-hatted prisoners and only one with a 
black hat. One of the prisoners wearing a white hat must reason that his is either 
black or white as he can see both a black and a white hat. Nevertheless, if he is 
wearing a black hat then the other prisoner wearing a white hat would conclude 
that his is white and get up to leave. As he does not, then the first prisoner can 
conclude that his hat is also white. In the third permutation, all three prisoners 
are wearing white hats. Seeing two white hats, one of the prisoners will initially 
discern that his hat is either black or white. If it is black then one of the other two 
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prisoners would assume that if his hat is black that the white-hatted prisoner 
would get up and leave. As he does not he must presume he is wearing a white 
hat. The first prisoner can also therefore conclude he is wearing white. Indeed, 
all three prisoners will simultaneously move toward the door having come to the 
same conclusion. On seeing that they are all trying to effect an exit at the same 
time, however, they will all pause wondering if each rose for the same reason, or 
if it was because one of them was wearing a black hat. This joint hesitation will 
confirm that they are all in the same predicament, that they are all in fact wearing 
white hats and they will all then hasten towards the door, intent on being first to 
reach the governor. 
It is, of course, a familiar sophism, which, in one of its variations, takes 
John Banville's Copernicus merely seconds to solve. ' For Jacques Lacan this 
sophism also provides an allegory of the temporal modes of subjectivity. In the 
first possibility Lacan discerns an exclusionary objectivity, `the subjectivization, 
however impersonal, which takes form here in the "one knows that... "'. 2 In other 
words, the prisoner is instantly able to objectify the fact that `[b]eing opposite two 
blacks, one knows one is white'. 3 The second possibility is inscribed within an 
intersubjective dialectic which involves occupying another's position: `Were Ia 
black, the two whites would waste no time realising they are white'. 4 There is 
already a time lag here (what Lacan calls `the time for comprehending') with 
1 John Banville, Doctor Copernicus (London: Minerva, 1990,1976), pp. 19-20. 
2 Jacques Lacan, `Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism', 
trans. by Bruce Fink and Marc Silver, Newsletter of the Freudian Field, 2: 2, (1988), 4-22, (p. 11). 
3 Ibid., p. 11. 
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'each of the whites finding the key to his own problem in the inertia of his 
semblable'. 5 However, in the third possibility, the purely reciprocal character of 
the second possibility is surmounted by the `assertion about onese f: `I hasten to 
declare myself white, so that these whites, whom I consider in this way, do not 
precede me in recognizing themselves for what they are'. This `moment of 
concluding' is the "`I's" logical genesis', an assertion of the subject's symbolic 
mandate which anticipates an identification in order to avoid the radical doubt of 
Che vuoi? 7 It entails a shift, as Slavoj Zizek points out, from the `void of the 
subject epitomized by the radical uncertainty as to what I am, i. e., by the utter 
undecidability of my status, to the conclusion that I am white, to the assumption 
of my symbolic identity - "That's me! "'8 
Literature is also determined by an analogous anticipatory gesture. We 
may locate this particularly in what Steven Connor terms the `addressivity' of 
narrative. In using this term Connor means to evoke 
Not just the tendency of narratives to surmise or otherwise 
orientate themselves towards certain receivers or addressees but also 
the associated effects of recoil and redoubling, whereby the narrative 
may be seen to acknowledge, or even react against the knowledge of 
that address. 9 
41bid., p. 11. 
s Ibid., p. 11. 
6 Ibid., p. 12. 
7 Ibid., p. 12 and p. 14 respectively. 
8 Slavoj Zilek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 75-76. 
9 Steven Connor, The English Novel in History: 1950-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 10. 
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In other words, inscribed within the text is an anticipation of its symbolic 
mandate, a hastening towards a specific reader and a specific reading. The 
delicate ironies of a Jane Austen novel, for example, presuppose a reader who 
will share a certain set of assumptions against which the rather less refined 
actions of her characters may be tacitly adjudged (and the assumptions safely 
confirmed). The narrative, as it were, finds comfort in the fact that it will be what 
it already is. Such comforts, it may be suggested, are just what the postmodern 
novel refuses: it resists the assertion of self. 
Predicated upon the future perfect, the postmodern novel always eludes 
the grip of a reciprocal addressivity by situating its readers beyond the imaginary 
reading that they have yet to reach. It is as if the material conditions of Che vuoi? 
within which narratives are written and launched (what Connor identifies as `the 
multiplication of competing forms of attention and address after the Second 
World War') thus find expression in the very forms of these novels themselves. 10 
For they constitute a canon of texts whose binding characteristic is the refusal of 
canonization. Rather than hastening to the door, then, the postmodern novel 
expedites a havering between the time for comprehending and the moment of 
concluding, producing in that tension the multiple senses of what will have been. 
10 Ibid., p. 12. 
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